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In Memory of Edward Said

Preface
This book proposes that we consider the relationship of our many dif-
ferent activities as scholar-teachers in terms of our work for greater so-
cial justice and equality. Although this goal is not limited to scholars in 
the humanities and social sciences, it is more obviously related to our 
work than to other disciplines. Our scholarship is tested primarily by 
our students and occasionally by legislators and others framing public 
policies. We both study and practice “cultural politics”, especially as I 
define this phrase in this book. My claim contradicts those who argue 
that knowledge must be “free” of politics. Knowledge is never free of po-
litical values, and it is wisest for us to encourage our students to debate 
the political connotations of whatever field they study. When such po-
litical implications are ignored or denied, they continue to operate but 
in secret, more dangerous ways. Of course, we must “teach the conflicts”, 
not just advocate for our own political positions, however persuasive we 
may find them.
I also believe that in many academic disciplines there is a necessary 
continuity between academic and public debates, as well as between 
scholarly and social activism. In this book, I offer examples of how I have 
engaged these debates and pursued activist goals since 1991. I am not an 
important or influential political activist, and it is one of my central argu-
ments that ordinary scholars do make a difference in the public sphere 
and can be even more influential once they recognize their abilities to do 
so. The monumental changes in world history are built upon very small 
acts, whose coordination may be both the result of profound organiza-
tion and historical fortune. It is easy to be discouraged today by the mar-
ginal positions so many academics appear to occupy amid the broader 
social, political, and economic forces of globalization. It is more difficult, 
but far more hopeful and productive, for us to find the points of inter-
section where our work complements labor by others in the interests of 
achieving greater equality for all.
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All of the chapters in this book are based on essays published in jour-
nals, scholarly books, and newspapers in the U.S., Germany, Egypt, and 
the United Kingdom. Each chapter differs greatly from its first publica-
tion, in most cases because the history separating its original publication 
and its appearance in this book is addressed. I have made specific efforts 
in several chapters (chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, and 9) to retain the historical 
contexts prompting their original publication and to comment on the in-
tervening history. Sometimes these changes are specifically indicated, as 
in chapters 2, 3, and 8; in other cases, these changes are integrated into a 
unified argument, as in chapters 1, 5, and 9. I am trying to represent the 
historical dimension of scholarship when it enters explicitly the political 
and public spheres. In one sense, scholarship must be timely; in another 
sense, scholarship must mark and record the passage of historical time.
I am grateful to many friends who have inspired me with their own ac-
tivism as scholar-teachers. This book is dedicated to Edward Said, who 
continues to teach me. When I first came up with the idea for publishing 
this book in digital format, my good friend, Mark Poster, introduced me 
to Gary Hall, whose work has also had a profound influence on me. Ran-
dy Bass at Georgetown University, Reinhard Isensee at the Humboldt 
University (Berlin), and Matthias Oppermann at Bielefeld University 
have led the way in digital scholarship and encouraged me to complete 
this book. Other friends have set a very high standard for me to follow 
with regard to activism: Colin Dayan and Hortense Spillers at Vander-
bilt University, Ruth Wilson Gilmore at the City University of New York, 
Henry Giroux at McMaster University, Abdul JanMohamed at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, Curtis Marez and Shelley Streeby at the 
University of California, San Diego, Donald Pease at Dartmouth College, 
Wilfried Raussert at Bielefeld University, Marita Sturken and Dana Polan 
at New York University and Winfried Fluck at the Free University (Ber-
lin). My colleagues in American Studies and Ethnicity at the University 
of Southern California are well-known for their abilities to connect schol-
arship, teaching, and activism. Sarah Banet-Weiser, Richard Berg, Philip 
Ethington, Macarena Gomez-Barris, Sarah Gualtieri, Jack Halberstam, 
David Lloyd, Tania Modleski, Tara McPherson, Maria Elena Martinez, 
Manuel Pastor, Laura Pulido, Leland Saito, George Sánchez, and Janelle 
Wong have taught me more about “cultural politics” than I can ever repay.
Preface 11
My thanks to the editors and publishers for permission to reprint sig-
nificantly revised versions of the essays first published by them: Chap-
ter 1, “Edward Said and American Studies”, first published by American 
Quarterly 56:1 (March 2004), 33–47; Chapter 2, first published as “The 
‘Vietnam-Effect’ in the Persian Gulf War,” Cultural Critique, special is-
sue, “The Economies of War,” 19 (Fall 1991), 121–39; Chapter 3, first 
published as “Images from Fallujah Will Stir Debate, But... Won’t Alter 
Policy”, Op-Ed, Newsday (April 2, 2004), A49; Chapter 4, “Areas of Con-
cern: Area Studies and the New American Studies”, first published in Alif: 
Journal of Comparative Poetics (Egypt) 31 (2010), special issue on “The 
Other Americas”; Chapter 5, “Culture, U.S. Imperialism, and Globaliza-
tion”, first published in American Literary History 16:4 (Winter 2004), 
575–595; Chapter 6, “Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran in Idaho”, first 
published in American Quarterly 59:2 ( June 2007), 253–275; Chapter 7, 
“The Death of Francis Scott Key and Other Elegies: Music and the New 
American Studies”, Cornbread and Cuchifritos, eds. Wilfried Raussert and 
Michelle Habell-Pallán (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2011), 
27–40; Chapter 8, “Visualizing Barack Obama”, first published in Journal 
of Visual Culture 8:2 (August 2009), 207–210; Chapter 9, first published 
as “The Dramatization of Mao II and the War on Terrorism”, South Atlan-
tic Quarterly 103:1 (Fall 2003), pp. 21–43 and “Global Horizons in Don 
DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007)”, Don DeLillo: Mao II, Underworld and Fall-
ing Man, ed. Stacey Olster (London: Continuum, 2011), 121–134.

Introduction
The Cultural Politics of the New American Studies
Now what? Barack Obama’s election was a great success. A person of 
great integrity and political skills replaced George W. Bush. In his mem-
oir, Decision Points (2010), George W. Bush defends water-boarding and 
other forms of torture for “saving lives”, as well as his decision to invade 
Iraq on the erroneous evidence of Iraqi “weapons of mass destruction” 
for “making the world a safer place without Saddam Hussein”.1 The 2010 
mid-term elections have given Republicans a majority in the House of 
Representatives, promising a politically divided Congress for the remain-
ing two years of President Obama’s first term. President Obama’s popular-
ity has dropped to 47%, well below the enormous popularity he enjoyed 
in his first 100 days in office. Republicans, especially advocates of the Tea 
Party or Tea Party Express, appear to be resurgent, successfully defending 
their foreign policy mistakes under George W. Bush and redirecting their 
responsibility for the current economic recession to President Obama 
and the Democrats. In the Republicans’ political statements, government 
bailouts of Wall Street and the costs of  “Obamacare” have caused our 
economic and social problems, not two costly and unnecessary foreign 
wars or unregulated capitalism. We are at a critical point in U.S. politics, 
when scholarly knowledge is needed more than ever to clarify history 
and enable citizens to make intelligent decisions.
Most of the people reading this book contributed to Barack Obama’s 
victory, as well as criticized the policies of the George W. Bush admin-
istration. Indeed, one of the few positive lessons from the past decade is 
that a relatively free intellectual class is one of our best protections against 
fascism or other dictatorial usurpations. During the Second Gulf War, 
our invasion and occupation of Iraq, and our ongoing war in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, academics were among the most consistently critical of our 
policies and the best informed regarding the long history of U.S. imperi-
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alism as background to our foreign policies, which were justified by the 
Bush Administration as “exceptions” to an otherwise “anti-imperialist”, 
democratic U.S. For a variety of reasons, intellectuals with academic ap-
pointments turned out to be even more courageous than the usually cele-
brated “public intellectuals”, many of whom defended U.S. policies in the 
post-9/11 era. Todd Gitlin’s nationalist sentiments, of course, preceded 
9/11 but Don DeLillo’s surprisingly sentimental defense of beleaguered 
New Yorkers and his general indictment of global terrorism in his Harp-
er’s essay “In the Ruins of the Future: Reflections on Terror and Loss in 
the Shadow of September” (December 2001), and his novel, Falling Man 
(2007) surprised many fans of his canny interpretation of the U.S. role in 
global disorder in Mao II (1991). In the past decade we also witnessed 
the proliferation of neo-conservative public intellectuals, many support-
ed by private think-tanks as they rotated out of government positions in 
Republican administrations or relied on their own tenured positions in 
colleges and universities to defend Bush’s foreign policies, Wall Street’s 
unregulated, late modern capitalism, and to fuel populist anxieties about 
“illegal immigrants” as internal enemies.
The emergence of neo-conservative public intellectuals from the aca-
demic ranks dates back to the “culture wars” of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Richard Rorty, Samuel Huntington, and Stephen Ambrose were 
spinoffs of Allan Bloom, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Dinesh D’Souza, and Francis 
Fukuyama. As print and broadcast journalism tempered its criticism of 
our foreign policies under George W. Bush thanks in part to mergers and 
acquisitions in these media and the general “Murdoch Effect”, academic 
criticism joined with political organizations like Moveon.org to preserve 
some semblance of anti-war and anti-imperialist activism. As hundreds 
of thousands of Iraqi civilians were murdered in sectarian violence and 
millions of Iraqis emigrated to Jordan, Syria, and other countries, chang-
ing dramatically the geopolitical shape of postwar Iraq while U.S. occu-
pying forces allowed such violence to continue unabated, a few brave aca-
demics tried to challenge the public’s mood of war’s “inevitable violence” 
by risking their own lives to visit and report on the shattered lives and 
neighborhoods of Iraq.
Mark Levine’s book, Why They Don’t Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis 
of Evil (2005), grew out of just this sort of eyewitness travel outside the 
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U.S. State Department and military channels to war-torn Iraq.2 Levine’s 
work is complemented by the consistent criticism of U.S. imperialism and 
neo-imperialism by a wide range of American Studies scholars, including 
Donald Pease and Amy Kaplan, who criticize how the Bush Administra-
tion built what might be termed “State Exceptionalism” to justify both 
our invasion of Iraq and the subsequent human rights’ abuses from Abu 
Ghraib to Guantanamo integral to this foreign policy.3 Much of this new 
work on U.S. imperialism draws upon the anti-imperialist scholarship 
of Richard Drinnon, Richard Slotkin, Ronald Takaki, Annette Kolodny, 
and other American Studies’ scholars of the 1960s and 1970s, who un-
derstood how colonial expansion and accompanying racial subalternity 
are central to U.S. nationalism, no matter who occupies the Executive 
branch of the government. Much of President Obama’s global popular-
ity depends on his appeal to a new American Exceptionalism and on the 
presumption that nationalism transcends ethnic and racial identities. The 
repeated refrain of his campaign that only in America could Barack Hus-
sein Obama be elected President impresses me as a gentler version of the 
older and more dangerous exceptionalisms American Studies has criti-
cized so effectively.
We still have important obligations as scholarly activists to continue 
our criticism of U.S. imperialism in the ongoing occupation of Iraq, the 
expansion of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, meliorist policies in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the U.S. “empire of military bases” 
that continues to grow.4 U.S. neo-imperialism also includes policies of 
strategic neglect, including the ongoing crises in Haiti, Darfur and So-
malia, Zimbabwe, and other African political and human rights’ crises 
barely visible in the U.S. media and State Department policies.5 Although 
U.S. policies appear to be thawing toward Cuba, we continue to wait for 
regime changes, as we did in Vietnam so long ago, expecting that Fidel 
Castro’s diminished powers or death, like Ho Chi Minh’s death in Viet-
nam and Saddam Hussein’s execution in Iraq, will result in sudden politi-
cal transformations. A new policy toward Cuba is urgently needed, as is 
more public debate about our role in the Caribbean and broader Latin 
America. Given the importance of the history of Cuba-U.S. relations in 
the hemispheric scope of the new American Studies, we must push as 
scholars and activists for more than merely symbolic acts by the U.S. state 
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toward Cuba, Haiti, and other hemispheric sites of traditional conflict 
with the U.S.
President Obama also needs to address the current political crisis in 
Iran, defending the rights of the Iranian opposition while avoiding the 
usual platitudes about how Iran should “follow” the model of U.S. de-
mocracy and its civil religion. Despite our constitutional separation of 
church and state, our political history has been profoundly shaped by 
religious interests, perhaps no more powerfully than in the past few de-
cades. Our complaints about “theocratic” Iran should be tempered by our 
own reverence for the “Puritan Origins” of U.S. democracy and the per-
sistence of these religious values in the Protestant work-ethic and various 
forms of capitalist rationalization of economic inequities. We should also 
be aware of the long history of religious persecution in the U.S., whose 
original colonists so famously immigrated to the Western Hemisphere in 
quest of religious freedom and tolerance. Yet colonial and national U.S. 
history is full of the religious persecution of peoples practicing indig-
enous religions, Catholicism, Caribbean Voodoo and North American 
Hoodoo, Mormonism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Sufism, Jainism, Islam, 
and many other religions.
To be sure, the Obama administration in two years has changed sig-
nificantly our global reputation. President Obama’s speech in Cairo, “A 
New Beginning”, on June 4, 2009 is a powerful indication of these new, 
good intentions.6 But none of this should dissuade us from the neces-
sary criticism of Obama’s practical policies. U.S. troops remain in Iraq, 
despite the much-publicized withdrawal of U.S. combat forces in Sep-
tember 2010. The Obama administration has widened the unwinnable 
war in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the Taliban while maintaining 
support for the corrupt administration of President Karzai, thus ignoring 
the lessons of history for the region and of the more general “Vietnam-
Effect”. The recent assassination of Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy Seals 
operating covertly in Abbottabad, Pakistan affirms our commitment to 
violent, military solutions and our disregard for the sovereignty of our 
client-state, Pakistan. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is at one of its most 
volatile stalemates of the past fifty years. Although scheduled for closure, 
Guantanamo remains open, its prisoners now destined to be sent to for-
eign countries like Palau and Bermuda, in yet another instance of U.S. 
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“outsourcing”, while those prisoners released have often rejoined al-Qa-
eda or other terrorist organizations after their long incarcerations by the 
U.S. Further information about how our government tortured prisoners 
of war has been suppressed on grounds as specious as those employed by 
the Bush Administration.
Such macropolitical issues cannot be separated from the economic 
crisis the U.S. and many first-world nations are still struggling to over-
come. The front cover of Newsweek for June 13, 2009 advertised Fareed 
Zakaria’s “The Capitalist Manifesto”, replete with a faux red leather bind-
ing and Soviet star. Tediously repeating slogans about “Capitalism with 
a Conscience”, Zakaria dismisses strong evidence that Karl Marx’s pre-
diction is coming true, advocating instead economic “self-regulation” by 
Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue.7 Predicated on a relentless will to 
grow without regard for the consequences, capitalism is collapsing from 
its own internal contradictions. What we are witnessing in the “global 
credit crisis”, “subprime mortgage meltdown”, or “financial regulatory 
failure” is in fact the consequence of economic surpluses used to produce 
further surpluses, rather than being reinvested in the human, social, and 
global system or prompting redistribution of wealth through improved 
wages, benefits, and working conditions for the proletariat. The modern-
ization of China has resulted in its transformation into a modified capi-
talist economy that has produced extraordinary surpluses, often cited 
as one part of the global economic solution, but also strong evidence of 
what is wrong. Propping up bureaucratic Chinese Communism is a capi-
talist economy that has rapidly produced incredible class distinctions in 
China and now commands immense surplus wealth that will reconfigure 
economies around the globe under the guise of saving these economies 
from their own internal problems.
Ruth Wilson Gilmore has argued in Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, 
Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (2007) that the prison-
industrial complex in California is just one example of how “criminality” 
has been redefined under the pressures from economic surpluses look-
ing for new investment opportunities.8 Motivating legislators looking for 
economic opportunities for their districts, these surpluses have contrib-
uted to a prison-industrial-legislative complex far more difficult to deci-
pher than the relatively simple accounting tricks of hedge fund managers 
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and other manipulators of surplus capital. Like Angela Davis and other 
activists committed to prison reform, Gilmore interprets the “carceral ge-
ographies” written on the bodies of inmates in the vast U.S. prison system 
to constitute neo-slavery, whose abolition faces economic entanglements 
between criminalization and capitalism as profound as those confront-
ing nineteenth-century abolitionists. At what point does the globalizing 
of California intersect the Chinese factories, where exploited labor pro-
duces so many of the inexpensive imports to the U.S.?
William D. Cohan’s House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Ex-
cess on Wall Street (2009) clearly analyzes how the investment banking 
firm of Bear Stearns could go from one of the most powerful investment 
companies in the world to bankruptcy in a matter of weeks.9 The surplus-
es with which Bear Stearns “played the market” were never intended to 
help the poor, rebuild the infrastructure, or contribute to the U.S. “com-
mon wealth”. In their greatest crisis, the Bear Stearns Board members 
worried first about their enormous bonuses, topping 25–35 million dol-
lars annually, then as the investment firm buckled as its reputation failed, 
voiced concern for their “loyal employees”. Finally pleading for U.S. gov-
ernment bailouts, they vaguely invoked patriotic commitments to the 
U.S. economy. But Bear Stearns’ purpose in the everyday economy of 
Wall Street had nothing to do with jobs, wealth, or opportunities “trick-
ling down” to the American people, especially those suffering at the bot-
tom of a rapidly expanding class hierarchy; Bear Stearns worked only for 
its own sake, borrowing more and more money at an increasingly rapid 
rate for the sake of its balance sheet built on assets that, while substantial 
in their own right, increasingly appeared trivial when compared with the 
margin and other credit obligations of the firm. In the end, Bear Stearns 
was little more than its symbolic capital, which dwarfed its actual cash 
and material assets, and this symbolic capital could be sustained only by 
a reputation for ever-increasing growth that was unsustainable. Desper-
ately trying to save the firm’s reputation in the final weeks of its existence, 
Bear Stearns’ executives seemed blithely unaware of the fact that their 
collapse was inevitable, whether sooner or later, according to the theory 
of surplus value.
Yet if late-modern capitalism is indeed collapsing, traditional Marxism 
is unlikely to reappear as a viable alternative. However vigorously the Left 
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has challenged the bailouts and solutions to capitalism sponsored by Sec-
retary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and the Obama Administration 
as superficial efforts to address systemic problems, the Left still has not 
offered a socio-economic alternative to late-modern capitalism and its 
complement, the “war on terror”. We may be witnessing the revival of the 
Keynesian economic policies tested in the most sustained way by Frank-
lin Roosevelt, but Roosevelt’s “New Deal” was not socialism, much less 
communism. As intellectuals, we need to remind people of the long his-
tory of efforts at collectivization, including its failures, and of the inher-
ent relationship between collective labor and the basic social contract. At 
the same time, we need to revise dramatically the basic Marxian analysis 
of class divisions, class conflict, and industrial modernization.
Who today constitutes the “working class”? How is our labor alien-
ated from us, and what are the processes of reification and other forms 
of mystification? What role does culture play in these “productive” pro-
cesses of the late-modern or postmodern economy, and how have these 
economic practices reconfigured the global economy into a hierarchy of 
different national economies producing value in ways unimaginable to 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels? In many respects, our post-Marxian and 
neo-Marxian ideas remain too close to their modern sources.
How shall we do this work of criticizing the Obama Administration for 
continuing the imperial legacies of the U.S. state and propping up the rot-
ten capitalist economy? American Studies is traditionally an activist field. 
We work for social change and greater justice in classrooms, at confer-
ences, on the streets, on the web, and through the many political organi-
zations to which we contribute. These activities are for most of us not dis-
crete. We encourage our students to get involved in the causes they find 
compelling; we work more than most academics for “open classrooms” 
that include field work, community involvement, volunteer work, and in-
ternships as part of the course assignments. The meaning of cultural poli-
tics is not to be sought in a particular method but in the intersection of 
these activities in progressive politics committed to the demystification 
of such separate domains as politics, economics, education, and activism.
Traditional Marxism considered cultural practices to be epiphenom-
enal, part of the super-structural consequences of deeper economic pro-
cesses. But culture is where value is defined and revised or sustained, 
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especially in post-industrial societies in which cultural production is 
fundamental to their economies. Prevailing cultural values in U.S. culture 
make possible salaries for CEOs and celebrities in excess of 100 million 
dollars per year, as well as our tolerance of gun violence, pervasive pov-
erty, inadequate health care, high unemployment, racism, sexism, and a 
host of other social failures. In this regard, the Myth-and-Symbol schol-
ars were right to focus on cultural narratives that reified the most fantas-
tic social inequities, even if the national myths they studied often spoke 
more to U.S. ideals than realities.
Cultural politics also refer to the processes through which the prevail-
ing values of a society are internalized and lived by subjects who identify 
with the imagined community fashioned and reproduced by such narra-
tives. Whether we mean the processes of interpellation through which 
subjects are managed by ideological state apparatuses, as Louis Althusser 
argued, or Slavoj Žižek’s neo-Lacanian notions of internalization in post-
ideological contexts, culture designates the symbolic system through 
which we constitute ourselves as subjects.10 There is no “value” without 
culture; economic surplus, political power, personal identity, and social 
affiliation depend upon their deployment through the symbolic network 
we term “culture”. Political critique is thus impossible without interpreta-
tion of this cultural matrix; analysis remains mere commentary on politi-
cal particulars until it has taken into account how political practices rely 
on the rhetorical persuasion of culture.
Do such claims grant culture more importance than it deserves? Am I 
conflating culture with social, political, and economic forces that in fact 
operate according to their own rules and are merely represented in cul-
tural systems? Such questions will always be debated, but my contention 
in this book is that at least since the 1960s, political and economic lead-
ers have understood culture to be an essential field of power. Advertising 
in both political campaigns and the marketplace involves more than just 
winning votes and selling products, but providing the sort of legitimacy 
within an imagined community that grants the politician and corpora-
tion identity and authority. Of course without votes or sales, neither the 
politician nor the corporation would survive, but cultural circulation 
enables the sort of authority that promises re-election or the successful 
introduction of new products. Because subjects understand themselves 
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primarily through cultural networks, culture can no longer be under-
stood as merely a semiotic fantasy whose illusions can be dispelled but 
must be interpreted as fundamental to social, political, and personal rela-
tions. Cultural politics thus designates the interpretation of the cultural 
narratives that enable such fictions as the State, the market, the nation, 
and citizenship to be accepted as real. What matters in cultural politics is 
the articulation of a system of cultural representation that accomplishes a 
specific end or purpose, whose “value” may then be judged.
Such interpretations are not exclusively the work of scholars; represen-
tatives of the State, the market, the nation, and citizens offer frequent and 
competitive interpretations of this cultural narrative. We refer vaguely 
to “popular culture” and “mass media”, sometimes merely to distinguish 
their works and forms from “high culture” and its specialized media. 
But such distinctions no longer have much relevance, except as vestigial 
traces of earlier periods defined by other media, such as print and oral-
ity. Contemporary scholars interpret cultural narratives along with other 
interpreters, all of whom compete for audiences. Don DeLillo’s difficult 
novels differ from a performance by the Jonas Brothers; both their im-
plied and actual audiences reflect these differences. But both forms of 
cultural representation exist on the same plane of “cultural politics”: in-
terpretations that situate their audiences in relation to an imagined com-
munity, market, and identity. As a medium, the Internet enables a wide 
range of different discursive, visual and aural practices, including avant-
garde works targeting small audiences and others intended to reach the 
broadest possible market share.
The Cultural Politics of the New American Studies is thus an effort to 
comprehend these different interpretations in relation to the field of 
American Studies. In the exceptionalist understanding of “America” as 
a unique nation, this task would be difficult enough, but today we un-
derstand “American Studies” to encompass the different societies of the 
Western Hemisphere, their many different languages, the global intersec-
tions we identify loosely with the “Pacific Rim” and “Atlantic World”, and 
the history of Western imperialisms and neo-imperialisms that continue 
to shape global realities.11  The Cultural Politics of the New American Stud-
ies does not claim to deal with all of these issues and areas, because the 
discipline is no longer encyclopedic in its methods or scope. Instead, 
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these many fields are understood in terms of their relevant intersections 
and historically significant contacts.
The chapters in this book are examples of the interpretations I have de-
fined as “cultural politics”, and they do a variety of activist work I try to 
identify in each chapter. The book is divided into two parts. Part I: Cul-
tural Politics deals with issues and topics of immediate activist relevance. 
In this part, I ask how our work as scholars qualifies as “cultural politics”, 
competing with the other, everyday acts of interpretation that construct 
the narratives of state, market, nation and citizen. Edward Said’s dual role 
as a public intellectual and a distinguished scholar at a major university 
is used to introduce this part to encourage us to think anew about a dis-
tinction between these two social and political functions. Every scholar 
is a “public intellectual” in the digital era, but just what does this new 
role mean for those of us trained in the specific protocols of traditional 
scholarship?
In chapters two and three, I offer two personal examples of efforts to 
use scholarship to act in the public sphere in response to political crises: 
the First and Second Persian Gulf Wars, respectively. Although done in 
the spirit of Said’s activism, my own efforts require a reinterpretation of 
Said’s founding concept of “Orientalism” to understand better the trans-
formation of Western Orientalism into the foreign policies of the U.S. as 
it justified the Vietnam War and then the First and Second Gulf Wars in 
relation to this “Vietnam-Effect”. All three chapters suggest their mutual 
concern with the intellectual problem of interpreting U.S. nationalism in 
relation to Western imperialism and transnationalism. Chapter four turns 
from the activist questions of how we can best protest U.S. neo-imperi-
alism to the more specific academic politics of the “area-studies” model 
for studying Latin America, Asia, and other regions. Recalling how the 
academic practices of area studies were developed by scholars, private 
foundations, and the U.S. state during World War II, I argue that some of 
the same issues facing us today in our protests of U.S. participation in for-
eign wars also haunt our academic disciplines. Nation and region-specific 
forms of knowledge may contribute, however unwittingly, to our imperial 
imaginary. “Cultural politics” thus includes critical accounts of the public 
sphere and academic protocols. It is not simply a question of choosing 
whether to demonstrate in the streets against war or write about the as-
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sumptions behind nation-specific knowledge, but of doing both in con-
junction with each other.
Part II: Cultural Practices deals with more familiar cultural media: film 
and television (chapter 5), memoir and literary criticism (chapter 6), mu-
sic (chapter 7), visual culture (chapter 8) and the novel (chapter 9). All 
of these media are in themselves instances of “cultural politics”, so my in-
terpretations do not depart from the focus on this topic in Part I. In Part 
II, I am also concerned with the conflict between nation-specific knowl-
edge and global concerns, often arguing that the focus on the U.S. nation 
in a global era has had two troublesome consequences. In the aftermath 
of 9/11, U.S. nationalism has assumed a reactionary political quality that 
is curiously linked with an effort to internalize foreign problems. What I 
term in several chapters “hyper-nationalism” depends on the effort to im-
port imaginatively foreign conflicts and render them in more manageable 
domestic terms: terrorism, religious intolerance, racism, sexism and class 
conflict. Many U.S. cultural works attempt to comprehend and imagi-
natively solve international problems by restaging them in U.S. national 
contexts. Tacitly such hyper-nationalism reinforces U.S. cultural and po-
litical imperialism by arguing that such domestic negotiations are models 
for the eventual and ideal democratization of other nations.
Alternatively, the popularity of an émigré writer’s works in the U.S. is 
often motivated by our desire to recognize in such works a desire for U.S. 
citizenship and thus a validation of our social and political values. It is 
no coincidence that the émigré memoirs and novels of greatest interest 
to us come from the very regions where our national values are the most 
contested. The colonial subaltern who once reproduced the values of the 
imperial power in the colonized country has reappeared in U.S. neo-im-
perialism as a model citizen in the domestic U.S., testifying to the justice 
of contested foreign policies and rehabilitating old U.S. myths. Equally 
interesting is how older U.S. cultural narratives are interpreted by immi-
grant writers who have lived and worked both outside and inside the U.S. 
The vestigial colonialism in the European and U.S. literature Nafisi reads 
as a child in her upper-middle-class family in Tehran becomes a cultural 
source of freedom and rebellion in her adult opposition to the theocra-
cy of the Republic of Iran. The flea-markets of Oakland are greeted by 
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Khaled Hosseini’s Afghani characters in The Kite Runner as versions of 
the stands in the bazaars of Kabul before the rule of the Taliban.
Part II asks how we can criticize those cultural politics so deeply em-
bedded in inherited behaviors, whether those of the immigrant to the 
U.S. or the U.S. citizen, whose identifications with a cultural narrative 
are crucial for their physical and psychological survival. The usual schol-
arly answers are still important: offer historical contexts and knowledge 
about all the communities involved; call attention to national myths and 
how they work and clarify cultural, religious and political differences. Yet 
there are limits to rational explanations, especially when the cultural nar-
ratives are powerful and venerable. As I suggest in chapter 7, alternative 
means must also be considered, including emotional, affective appeals, 
such as popular music makes, in order to challenge the emotive bonds 
we establish with the nation, market and identity. The nineteenth-cen-
tury abolition of slavery would not have occurred without the power-
ful appeals that fugitive slave narratives, testimonies, and sentimental 
romances made to readers without direct experiences of slavery. By the 
same token, the mere appeal to feelings did not alone bring about the 
Emancipation Proclamation or the other legislation guaranteeing aboli-
tion. The coordination of different practices of cultural politics is thus a 
central subject of Part II.
Finally, the medium of this book is itself an important part of the cul-
tural politics of the new American Studies. We are familiar with the ways 
late-modern capitalism has invaded all aspects of education. From incen-
tive pay for and performance-related evaluations of teachers to charter 
schools and for-profit colleges and universities, education has become a 
business like any other in our own time. Extramurally funded research 
and criteria for promotion and tenure are closely tied to marketability, 
even in fields where the capitalist model makes little sense. Of course, 
education is not a business, even if the financial aspects of education are 
crucial for its success. Our products are not commodities, but human be-
ings, whatever our specializations. Our success is not measured in test-
scores, job security, or salaries, but in the quality of our students’ minds 
and psyches. However vainglorious it may be to claim that we are trying 
to educate “good citizens”, something of this ideal should guide our ef-
forts, especially for those of us whose teaching and research focuses on 
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the arts, humanities and social sciences. What better proof of our teach-
ing and research can there be than the student who uses that knowledge 
to shape his or her social, economic, political and cultural experiences?
We should talk back to this corporatizing of the late-modern research 
university, in part because we have a better understanding of and greater 
access to the structures of academic power than most corporate admin-
istrators. We need, of course, to take the “American University” as an ob-
ject of study in the new American Studies, and there are superb exam-
ples of such work already available from Bill Readings’ The University in 
Ruins (1997) to Christopher Newfield’s Ivy and University: Business and 
the Making of the American University, 1880–1980 (2003) and Unmaking 
the Public University: The Forty Year Assault on the Middle Class (Harvard 
UP, 2008), work Newfield has acted upon by serving on the University of 
California’s Budget and Planning Committee.12 Readings and Newfield 
emphasize how the real problem in the late-modern university is not ten-
ured radicals “politicizing” classrooms, but capitalism turning the univer-
sity into a factory to produce new products and workers.
Politicized knowledge is far less dangerous than capitalized knowledge. 
Political positions and ideas can be debated and rejected, which is what 
occurs in most educational contexts. Irrational biases on the part of stu-
dents and faculty can be evaluated negatively and when necessary pro-
tested as unjust, especially when our understanding of diverse political 
issues is crucial to historical, social, political and cultural education. Eco-
nomic interests in education, excluding the study of Economics as a disci-
pline, operate normally apart from pedagogy. Even the research that de-
pends crucially upon funding is often separated from specific economic 
interests, even when the research is serving such ends. It is the invisibility 
of economic influence on teaching and scholarship that makes its power 
so insidious. While insisting upon the importance of “free inquiry” in 
both the classroom and laboratory, no college or university administrator 
would deny the necessity of extramural funding from government and 
private sources to assure fiscal stability.
Everyone knows that these funding sources regulate formally the ways 
we can use the funds and the kinds of projects that are supported. As 
long as we are paid salaries and benefits, we will be part of the econom-
ics of the contemporary university, but we can in fact work to resist the 
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growing capitalization of knowledge and the economic valuation of such 
knowledge. One way to begin such work is to change the way we com-
municate our research to each other and the broader world. The time has 
come for us to abandon the vestigial elements of capitalism that govern 
the dissemination of our research and to make it accessible to everyone 
in the most affordable ways. The Cultural Politics of the New American 
Studies follows the model developed by Gary Hall in Digitize This Book! 
The Politics of New Media or Why We Need Open Access Now (2008), pub-
lished in Kate Hayles’ and Mark Poster’s “Electronic Mediations” series 
by the University of Minnesota Press.13
I will not repeat here Hall’s persuasive arguments, which are both the-
oretically sophisticated and practical responses to the crisis in scholarly 
publishing. My own volume is simply one contribution to Hall’s larger 
project of “open access”, but it is worth spelling out a few of the implica-
tions of this method of sharing knowledge in relation to the arguments of 
The Cultural Politics of the New American Studies. First, the publication of 
this book in digital format and its free availability to anyone who wishes 
to download it are acts of “cultural politics”. As a political act, digital pub-
lication of a scholarly book seems a mere token gesture, hardly compa-
rable to more serious activism. But the purpose of “open access” is not 
intended to compete with other acts of political activism, but merely to 
include the free dissemination of scholarly knowledge as one part of the 
work for greater social justice.
Will publishing the book on the Internet end global warfare, racism, or 
class inequities, or will it be accessible to the millions of people without 
any Internet access, computer hardware, or digital education? Of course 
not. But “open access” to scholarly knowledge has some immediate con-
sequences worth considering. By refusing a market-based model for the 
success of our work, scholars can emphasize its intellectual purposes and 
make it available to a much larger potential audience. Will this potential 
audience have an impact on the sort of scholarship we produce? One of 
my purposes in this book is to suggest a much closer relationship between 
“high”, “popular”, and “mass” cultural work. These distinctions have been 
maintained largely by scholars, who have often placed the greatest value 
on “high” cultural work. The availability of our work to audiences out-
side strictly academic circles might change this hierarchy or at the very 
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least prompt scholars to provide better justifications for their attention to 
high, popular, or mass cultural materials.
This book is also not a book. The chapters are revised essays, all of 
them published in journals, books and newspapers. In fact, this method 
of producing scholarly books in the humanities and social sciences is 
quite common. Few scholars have the luxury to write from start to fin-
ish a new book, despite the high value these fields place on the scholarly 
book. In most research universities and many liberal arts colleges, an As-
sistant Professor will not be promoted and tenured without a scholarly 
book, an Associate Professor not promoted without two or more schol-
arly books. Yet few scholars read new books from start to finish, unless we 
are reviewing the book in a journal. We surf other scholarly books, read 
chapters for class preparation or to write our own work, assemble parts 
of books with other essays for classroom readers, and in countless other 
ways “use” them.
Will you read this book from cover to cover, or will you download por-
tions, speed-read others, ignore still more? How you use this book is up 
to your particular interests. I offer a sustained argument, offer several 
examples and thus demonstrate my ability to represent the sort of intel-
lectual authority that justifies my work as a scholar-teacher. If we believe 
that our younger colleagues should still be asked to do such work of sus-
tained argument and demonstrate their ability to disseminate that work 
in the seven years usually allowed for a tenure and promotion decision, 
then we should provide them with the means of sharing this work that are 
not tied exclusively to market conditions. Should “supply-and-demand” 
economics determine the fate of a Medievalist who has spent a decade 
earning a Ph.D. and has new work to share with well-trained specialists in 
his/ her field? Such scholarly communication will expose us even more 
than we are today to the Campus Watches of the world, as well as to those 
readers who take perverse satisfaction in our specialized, indecipherable 
prose. But it will also mobilize our scholarship in ways that will make it 
more responsive to the crises that every day demand our analytical and 
interpretive talents.
For Open Humanities Press and its equivalents to succeed, we will 
have to change the local academic protocols regarding the value of schol-
arship. What indeed is the difference between a refereed electronic book 
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and a hardcopy or paperback book? Why must younger scholars compete 
in the marketplace of university or trade publishing to prove the value of 
their ideas? I want to suggest that we declare our scholarship free, distinct 
from corporate capitalism’s valuation of everything, including intellec-
tual property, and insist not just that you “steal this book!”—that worthy 
slogan of the 1960s—but that you use this book! Perhaps when prices for 
university press books drop from their now unaffordable heights to free 
downloads, we might read more of each others’ work.
We might also find that our work participates more quickly and broad-
ly in the new political and social movements facilitated by new technolo-
gies. Some will argue reasonably that we ought to remain apart from the 
political ferment of the present, offering the distance and perspective of 
careful deliberation, scholarly rigor, and documented evidence. But we 
have witnessed in the past how readily such scholarly distance has pro-
duced excess caution, in some cases ideological collaboration, that has 
contributed to the very terrors we had hoped knowledge would help us 
and our students overcome.
Cultural politics resulting in progressive social changes is the result of 
many different kinds of activities: traditional protest in the streets, social 
and political organization through the Internet, op-ed journalism, tradi-
tional scholarship in established journals and books, quickly deployed 
electronic scholarship in zines and new digital presses, popular music, 
film and television, visual and plastic arts and museum exhibitions. Rath-
er than venerating those rare public intellectuals, like Edward Said, who 
have spoken the truth to power, every scholar should aspire to be a public 
intellectual, connecting his or her scholarship to the domestic and for-
eign policies that shape our lives every day. At the same time, scholars 
must be vigilant regarding the cultural politics employed to discourage 
progressive change, especially when it only pretends to advocate social 
equality and justice. The sites of power are no longer obvious; scholars 
can help map them and enable us all to challenge their authority.
I
Cultural Politics

Chapter 1
Edward Said and American Studies
How did exile become converted from a challenge 
or a risk, or even from an active impingement on 
[Auerbach’s] selfhood, into a positive mission, whose 
success would be a cultural act of great importance?
– Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983)
I first met Edward Said in 1976, when he came to the University of Cali-
fornia, Irvine for what turned out to be one of many visits over the next 
twenty-five years. He was invited to Irvine primarily as a Critical Theorist, 
first by the School of Criticism and Theory, founded by Murray Krieger, 
and later by the Critical Theory Institute, a research group organized at 
Irvine in the early 1980s, for several occasional lectures, mini-seminars, 
and the1989 Wellek Library Lectures. Several of the faculty members in 
the Critical Theory Institute, such as Alexander Gelley, Gabriele Schwab, 
J. Hillis Miller, and Wolfgang Iser were also in Comparative Literature, 
so Said’s lectures and seminars usually drew a good proportion of Criti-
cal Theorists and Comparatists. Of course, Comparative Literature and 
Critical Theory were closely related at Irvine between 1975 and 2005, 
which may have been one of the many reasons we felt such close ties with 
Edward Said’s work.
When Said delivered his Wellek Library Lectures on May 9, 10, and 
11, 1989, he was Parr Professor of English and Comparative Literature at 
Columbia University, a fact lost on many people who viewed him primar-
ily as a Comparatist and Critical Theorist.14 Said’s 1964 doctoral disserta-
tion at Harvard was on “The Letters and Short Fiction of Joseph Conrad,” 
and his subsequent writings include numerous essays and book chapters 
on major figures in nineteenth and twentieth-century English literature.15 
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Shakespeare, Milton, Defoe, Swift, Samuel Johnson, Sterne, Fielding, 
Blake, Austen, Wordsworth, Keats, Coleridge, George Eliot, Dickens, 
Gissing, Arnold, Hopkins, Hardy, Wilde, Shaw, Yeats, Conrad, Ford Ma-
dox Ford, Kipling, Joyce, T. E. Lawrence, and Orwell appear frequently in 
his books and essays. Even this partial list indicates both Said’s thorough 
education in the elite literary culture of the modern Anglo-American 
university, often identified loosely with F. R. Leavis’s The Great Tradition 
(1948), and the social criticism of an aesthetic ideology he drew from 
Swift, Sterne, Dickens, Gissing, Wilde, Shaw, and Conrad.
Yet when considered in terms of his contributions to American Stud-
ies and American literary study, Edward Said does not appear to figure 
centrally in fields secondary to his formal education in English and his 
increasing focus on non-European cultures, especially those constituting 
the Arab world, from Orientalism (1978) to the end of his career. Said 
refers frequently to T. S. Eliot and Henry James, especially in the early 
work Beginnings: Intention and Method (1975), but he treats both authors 
in keeping with their post-World War II incorporation into the English 
tradition.16 Of the relatively few U.S. literary authors Said treats at any 
length, he quickly focuses on their scholarly reputations as representative 
Americans in order to link such exceptionalism with “the American quest 
for world sovereignty” (R, 364). His witty review of Ernest Hemingway’s 
posthumously published The Dangerous Summer (1985)—Hemingway’s 
return to the bullfighting culture he treated expertly in Death in the After-
noon (1932)—begins by invoking the platitude that “American writing” 
is distinguished by its “‘how-to-ism,’” only to conclude that “the great 
problem of American writing” is that “the shock of recognition derived 
from knowledge and converted into how-to-ism can only occur once 
[…]. The second time around, it is dragged into the market” and com-
mercialized.17 Said is referring explicitly to the inferiority of The Danger-
ous Summer to the earlier Death in the Afternoon, but he is also arguing 
that the distinctiveness of Hemingway’s identity is more an effect of the 
market than of his ineffable representation of American masculinity.
In his “Introduction” to the 1991 Vintage paperback of Moby-Dick, 
Said also focuses on American exceptionalism, agreeing with “Leon 
Howard, Newton Arvin, and Michael Paul Rogin” that “the irreducibly 
American quality of his life and work” (R, 358) distinguishes Melville’s 
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reputation and confirms the scholarly cliché that Moby-Dick is “the great-
est and most eccentric work of literary art produced in the United States” 
(R, 356). Having paid homage to the Americanists, Said stresses Moby-
Dick’s “Euripidean” plot and “connections to Homer, Dante, Bunyan, 
Cervantes, Goethe, Smollett,” proceeding to an extended comparison 
of Melville and Conrad (R, 356, 358–359). Putting Melville in the com-
parative contexts of Europe and America, Said can then problematize the 
exceptionalist model of American literature by claiming: “I suppose it is 
true to say that only an American could have written Moby-Dick, if we 
mean by that only an author as prodigiously endowed as Melville could 
also have been, as an American, so obsessed with the range of human 
possibility” (R, 358). Said’s rhetorical qualifications cause the reader to 
hesitate as well, so that the fiction of Melville’s “Americanness” is effec-
tively replaced by what Said concludes are the inherently transnational 
qualities of Moby-Dick: “The tremendous energies of this magnificent 
story of hunting the White Whale spill over national, aesthetic, and his-
torical boundaries with massive force” (R, 358).
Another good example of how Said deconstructs American excep-
tionalism is his interpretation of R. P. Blackmur. Said views Blackmur’s 
focus on “consciousness” in Henry James as symptomatic of Blackmur’s 
own struggle to legitimate his authority “as a teacher, critic, and cultural 
force at Princeton right after World War Two” (R, 261), especially in an 
anti-intellectual and anti-aesthetic society that “obligates the artist” to re-
alize imaginatively the whole cultural fabric “no longer carried by social 
institutions” (R, 260). Said also argues that the Jamesian sensibility or 
fine conscience that so appealed to Blackmur was part of that civilized 
heritage the American had to take up in the postwar period as part of a 
vaguely defined “American responsibility for the world after the disman-
tling of the old imperial structures” (R, 261). Said can thus identify “the 
imperialism latent in [Blackmur’s] sense of the American creation of a 
new consciousness” while brilliantly diagnosing Blackmur’s skepticism 
as a reaction to this new version of the white man’s (call it the Ameri-
can’s) burden: “All [Blackmur’s] portraits of intellectuals and artists in the 
world are either morose, severely judgmental, or downright pessimistic: 
his lifelong fascination with Henry Adams is the strongest case in point” 
(R, 261–262).18
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Taken by themselves, Said’s writings on American authors and critics 
do not constitute a major contribution to American Studies, but weav-
ing through even his earliest references to the U.S. is his central concern 
with the rise of the American Empire. Said’s definition and criticism of 
U.S. imperialism developed throughout his career, and there are notable 
omissions and oddities in the ways he interprets the rise of the U.S. global 
hegemony. Orientalism is the work most frequently cited as a model for 
new American Studies committed to the critical study of the U.S. as an 
imperial power, but Said’s classic work relatively backgrounds the com-
plex nineteenth-century history of U.S. political, economic, and cultural 
involvements in the South Pacific, Japan, China, Africa, and the Arab 
world. Said’s most sustained discussion of this history occurs in the fi-
nal chapter, “Orientalism Now”, where he emphasizes how “during the 
nineteenth century the United States was concerned with the Orient in 
ways that prepared for its later, overtly imperial concern” and proceeds 
to a brief discussion of “the founding of the American Oriental Society 
in 1842”.19 Said’s criticism of imperialism in Orientalism focuses on the 
great European imperial powers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries—England, France, Spain, and Portugal—to understand in part the 
historical legacies and foreign policies taken over by the United States in 
the twentieth century. Said often characterized Orientalism as part of his 
own anti-war response to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, including his en-
dorsement of Noam Chomsky’s critique of the “instrumental connection 
between the Vietnam War and the notion of objective scholarship as it 
was applied to cover state-sponsored military research” (O, 11).20 Never-
theless, the general argument of Orientalism stresses U.S. imperialism as 
a twentieth-century development, despite the substantial, even defining 
scholarship in American Studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s that 
studied the “internal colonialism” of slavery, Native American genocide, 
Manifest Destiny, and sustained conflicts with other colonial powers in 
North America such as Spain, France, Great Britain and Mexico.
Fifteen years after Orientalism, Said refers in Culture and Imperial-
ism (1993) to an “imperial motif ” that rivals “the European one” in 
nineteenth-century America and how such U.S. imperialism has been 
“memorably studied by Richard Slotkin, Patricia Limerick, and Michael 
Paul Rogin”.21 American Studies scholars could add many names to Said’s 
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1993 list, including Ronald Takaki, Richard Drinnon, Robert Berkhofer, 
Reginald Horsman, and Annette Kolodny, but it is fair to conclude that 
Culture and Imperialism takes more seriously than Orientalism the study 
of how U.S. racial, gender, ethnic, and regional categories legitimated tra-
ditional imperialism. It might also be the case that Said’s relative neglect 
in Orientalism of nineteenth-century U.S. imperialism, including the sub-
stantial scholarship done on the U.S. as an “internal colonizer”, may have 
provided motivation for new scholarship in American Studies that since 
1993 has focused increasingly on the relationship between internal and 
external modes of territorial expansion, economic exploitation, popula-
tion control and cultural legitimation. Amy Kaplan acknowledges just 
this sort of indirect influence in the opening chapter of The Anarchy of 
Empire in United States Culture (2002): “I am indebted to Edward Said’s 
Culture and Imperialism […] which powerfully shows how the treasures 
of high culture in Europe bear the traces of their foundation in a remote 
geography of imperial violence”.22
Culture and Imperialism certainly pays much greater attention to U.S. 
imperialism (and American Studies scholarship on this subject) than 
Orientalism, but Said’s identification of the U.S. with neo-imperialism in 
the aftermath of decolonization is consistent in both works. “Freedom 
from Domination in the Future” is the final chapter of Culture and Impe-
rialism, and it begins with “American Ascendancy: The Public Space at 
War”, which deals primarily with U.S. global hegemony as it took shape 
in the post-World War II period (CI, 283–303). To be sure, Said makes 
references to earlier instances of U.S. imperialism, including the territo-
rial expansion of Manifest Destiny and “offshore experiences […] from 
the North African coast to the Philippines, China, Hawaii, and […] the 
Caribbean and Central America” (289), as well as to “anti-imperialists 
like Mark Twain, William James, and Randolph Bourne” (287). But the 
explicitly utopian project of political reform Said proposes in his final 
chapter is set firmly in contrast to “the depressing truth” that cultural 
anti-imperialism “has not been effective” from the Spanish-American 
and Philippine-American Wars to Desert Storm, the military action that 
haunts the final pages of Culture and Imperialism with Said’s awareness 
that: “Such views as opposed the United States attack on Iraq did nothing 
at all to stop, postpone, or lessen its horrendous force” (287).
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Even Said’s brief “A Note on Modernism” in Culture and Imperialism 
follows his periodization of traditional imperialism with primarily the 
British and French (and to a lesser extent imperial powers of Spain and 
Portugal who are in “decline” in the nineteenth century) and neo-impe-
rialism with the U.S. (CI, 186–190). His version of cultural modernism 
does not go very far beyond the Anglo-Irish-Franco version he considers 
at greater length in Beginnings. Conrad, Forster, Joyce, Woolf, T. E. Law-
rence, Malraux, Proust, Picasso, T. S. Eliot, Pound, and Thomas Mann (a 
nod to German colonialism) are Said’s representatives of the cosmopoli-
tan modernism that ambivalently represented non-European cultures 
either in conjunction with or as contesting the European will to global 
power (188–189). In these contexts, T. S. Eliot and Pound figure for Said 
less as “American” writers than as major figures in such cosmopolitanism, 
an assumption reinforced by their own carefully cultivated expatriate 
identities as British and Italian, respectively.
Edward Said is often named as the “founder” of Postcolonial Studies, 
a claim that has troubled me even as I acknowledge Said’s great impor-
tance in advancing Postcolonial Studies as a diverse set of methodolo-
gies and overlapping, sometimes contentious, studies of different areas 
and groups, especially in the non-European and non-U.S. “peripheries” 
where the majority of the world’s population lives and in many cases 
barely survives. In recent years and certainly influenced in part by Said’s 
work, Postcolonial Studies has become a central methodology and topic 
of debate within the changing field of American Studies. Beginning with 
Lawrence Buell’s “Are We Post-American Studies?” (1996) and includ-
ing the essays in C. Richard King’s Postcolonial America (2000) and in my 
Post-Nationalist American Studies (2000), discussions of how American 
and Postcolonial Studies can be related have been among the most lively 
and contentious in the academy.23 In The New American Studies (2002), I 
offer my own analyses and solutions to these problems, because I believe 
that the future of both fields are crucially related and that mistaken ef-
forts to struggle with each other for institutional power and space may 
have unexpectedly negative consequences for both fields.24
Said’s ambivalent relationship to the history of Postcolonial Stud-
ies is instructive for those scholars interested in articulating a closer re-
lationship between American Studies and Postcolonial Studies. One of 
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the most important sources for Postcolonial Studies is the work done 
by South Asian scholars in groups like the Subaltern Studies Group of 
Historians, which has close affiliations with politically activist groups, in-
cluding Marxist and feminist organizations. Culture and Imperialism cites 
the work of some Postcolonial Studies scholars, but Said pays scant atten-
tion to feminism and repeats his traditional distrust of Marxist politics. 
Orientalism is predicated on the European “feminization” of the “Orient”, 
as well as the projection of European homophobia onto the “exotic East”, 
but throughout his career Said acknowledges feminism more gesturally 
than substantially, rarely mentions gay studies and queer theories, and 
registers frequently his commitments to Marxian theories but his distrust 
of Marxian practice. As early as 1982, Gayatri Spivak challenged Said to 
take more seriously both feminism and post- or neo-Marxian theories by 
contending that Said’s “calls for a criticism that would account for ‘quo-
tidian politics and the struggle for power’” must be supplemented by 
“feminist hermeneutics”, which already “articulate the relationship be-
tween phallocracy and capital, as well as that between phallocracy and 
the organized Left”.25 In The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983), Said 
could admire Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as “bril-
liant and […] compelling” while distancing himself from “Marxism” as 
just another label that inhibits the freedom of “critical consciousness”.26
My uneasiness with the identification of Said as the origin of Postco-
lonial Studies stems in part from Said’s own cultivation of his role as a 
Gramscian “organic intellectual”, whose critical function Said identified 
in the early 1980s as operating “in that potential space inside civil soci-
ety, acting on behalf of those alternative acts and alternative intentions 
whose advancement is a fundamental human and intellectual obligation” 
(WTC, 30). In my view, Said grafted Gramsci’s organic intellectual with 
the modernist “cosmopolitan” in an effort to salvage an independent, of-
ten elite, metropolitan “critical consciousness” that became increasingly 
untenable in the light of poststructuralist critiques of the subject, post-
colonial calls for collaborative multidisciplinary scholarship and political 
coalitions, and cultural studies’ criticisms of the aesthetic ideology and its 
cult of “genius”. In 1997, Said criticized Postcolonialism for “the realiza-
tion of militant nationalism and of nation-states in which dictators […] 
speak the language of self-determination and liberation”. Under these 
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circumstances, Said prefers the alternative “of the intellectual whose vo-
cation is to speak the truth to power, to reject the official discourse of 
orthodoxy and authority, and to exist through irony and skepticism, […] 
trying to articulate the silent testimony of lived suffering and stifled expe-
rience” (R, 526).
Said always stresses how his own transnational experiences help him 
shape an identity strategically “out of place”, to borrow from the title 
of his autobiography, and thus capable of a “worldly” perspective often 
unavailable to intellectuals rooted in specific national or other social lo-
cations. In the concluding paragraph of Out of Place, Said turns such an 
outlook into an ontological category: “I occasionally experience myself 
as a cluster of flowing currents. I prefer this to the idea of a solid self, the 
identity to which so many attach so much significance. These currents 
.[…] are ‘off ’ and may be out of place, but at least they are always in mo-
tion, in time, in place, in the form of all kinds of strange combinations 
[…]. A form of freedom, I’d like to think, even if I am far from being to-
tally convinced that it is”.27 Said often found such worldliness in the best 
literature, comparative scholarship, and in strong predecessors, notably 
Erich Auerbach, but in ways that sometimes threatened to gloss over the 
very different historical, cultural, and sociopolitical circumstances in-
volved (WTC, 5–9).28 Said never explicitly connected this cosmopolitan-
ism with Americanness or even with modernism, but it has very strong 
roots both in the myth of American selfhood criticized effectively by the 
American myth critics and in American expatriates’ careful cultivation of 
their “otherness” abroad.
Many of Said’s models for such cosmopolitanism were friends and col-
leagues at Columbia identified with the New York intellectuals.29 Said’s 
collection of essays, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays, is dedicated “To 
the memory of F. W. Dupee” and opens with a testament to their friend-
ship, especially Dupee’s “radical and open spirit” and his encouragement 
of Said’s “interest in the new styles of French theorizing, in experimental 
fiction and poetry” (R, xiii). Although he acknowledges his “great affec-
tion for Trilling as an older colleague and friend”, Said clearly includes 
Lionel Trilling with those New York intellectuals “among whose worst 
features were […] a tiresome narcissism and a fatal propensity to self-im-
portant, rightward-tending shifts”, as well as an “Anglophilia so endemic 
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to the New York intellectual style” (xiii).30 In contrast, Said represents 
Dupee as a left intellectual, committed to the “radical, anti-authoritarian 
politics of his early Trotskyist years”, even though Dupee’s scholarship 
and teaching in the years Said knew him certainly followed the high-cul-
tural model of many other New York intellectuals (xiii). As a scholar, Du-
pee is certainly best remembered for his 1951 contribution to the “Amer-
ican Men of Letters” series, Henry James: His Life and Writings, which 
played a major part in the post-World War II revival of Henry James as 
central in the American literary tradition.31 Nevertheless, it is “Fred Du-
pee who after 1967, when the great Arab debacle occurred, supported me 
in my lonely fight on behalf of the Palestinian cause”, and “Dupee and his 
wife Andy were the only friends from my academic New York life ever 
actually to pay me a visit in Beirut, at that time (fall 1972) the center of 
revolutionary politics in the Middle East” (xiii).
Said’s testament to his friendship with the Dupees is unquestionably 
personal and sincere, but it is also a means for Said to acknowledge his 
affiliation with the New York intellectuals while distancing himself from 
their Eurocentric cultural interests and conservative politics. The same 
conclusion might be drawn more broadly with respect to Said’s frequent 
praise for New York City as “today […] what Paris was a hundred years 
ago, the capital of our time”, due largely to “its eccentricity and the pecu-
liar mix of its attributes”, especially as it contributes to his own sense of 
being “out of place” (R, xi). Remarkably, Said’s admiration of Fred Dupee 
and his love of New York follow the logic of filiation and affiliation he 
analyzed so brilliantly in “Secular Criticism”: “If a filial relationship was 
held together by natural bonds and natural forms of authority—involving 
obedience, fear, love, respect, and instinctual conflict—the new affilia-
tive relationship changes these bonds into what seem to be transpersonal 
forms—such as guild consciousness, consensus, collegiality, professional 
respect, class, and the hegemony of the dominant culture” (WTC, 20).
I have focused thus far on how Edward Said ambivalently worked 
within the EuroAmerican worlds of culture, history, and higher educa-
tion he so effectively criticized in his major writings. Succeeding within 
those systems was, of course, crucial for his critical consciousness, and 
his role as a public intellectual cannot be understood without analyzing 
his affiliations with the EuroAmerican modernists, the New York intel-
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lectuals, myths of the “American Adam,” and the “traveling theory” that 
found such a welcome in the U.S. academy of the 1970s and 1980s. Much 
of Said’s “critical consciousness” was thus deeply “American”, just as he 
was himself not only a sometime scholar of American literature and cul-
ture but personally, existentially, and legally American. Indeed, his celeb-
rity was also curiously and sometimes troublingly American, insofar as 
the international community of scholars both loved and reviled him for 
his ability to operate successfully within the specialized discourses of the 
university and still respond in several different mass and popular media. 
Said exemplified the ways the Enlightenment’s cult of genius changed 
into one of celebrity in the postmodern era, and along the way how this 
transformation became closely identified with the American commer-
cialism Said satirizes so eloquently in his essay on Hemingway, “How 
Not to Get Gored” (R, 238).
Scholars admired or condemned Said precisely because he was ex-
pected to assume the responsibilities of communicating our knowledge 
to the general public and of translating intellectual debates into public, 
even foreign, policies. Edward Said did this work brilliantly, but he also 
became the academy’s sacrificial figure, far too charismatic in our imagi-
nations for us ever to match his accomplishments and far too dangerous 
in his political actions for us to emulate. W. J. T. Mitchell points out in 
“Remembering Edward Said” that “Edward’s public appearances were 
plagued by death threats that he dismissed (along with his cancer) as an 
annoying distraction, and (even worse) by questioners who wanted to 
lure him into anti-Semitic comments, or to characterize his criticisms of 
Israel as expressions of anti-Semitism”.32 Said was unquestionably coura-
geous in the ways he responded to public, often dangerous, criticism and 
in the positive ways he responded to his Leukemia, but we also fitted to 
him the mask of mythic heroism in part to avoid our own responsibili-
ties as intellectuals to carry our knowledge to a wider audience and to 
endure the eccentric responses such wisdom so often provokes. There 
are, of course, many other public intellectuals who have achieved their 
reputations in part as consequences of their distinguished scholarship, 
yet few achieved the sort of celebrity that in the case of Edward Said was 
a distinctively American version of sacrificial success.
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The dangers of this cult of academic celebrity are underscored by the 
continuing debates regarding academic freedom and legislative efforts to 
limit such freedom, often on the grounds that “politics” do not “belong” 
in the classroom. The recent legislation in Arizona directed at undocu-
mented workers included a bill banning Chicano/a Studies in the Tuc-
son public schools on the grounds of its “anti-Americanism”. In 2003–
2004, there was considerable debate in Congress over H.R. 3077, the 
resolution popularly known as Congress’s effort to “regulate postcolonial 
studies”.33 Passed by the House of Representatives on October 24, 2003, 
H. R. 3077 languished in a Senate subcommittee before quietly dying 
in 2004. The bill grew in part out of efforts by Martin Kramer’s Middle 
East Forum and Daniel Pipe’s Campus Watch to repress what these neo-
conservatives consider the politicizing of knowledge by area studies and 
Postcolonial Studies. The Congressional hearings were viewed by many 
intellectuals as a new stage in the federal government’s censorship under 
the guise of “national security”. Named several times as the “founder of 
Postcolonial Studies” in Stanley Kurtz’s report to the Subcommittee, Ed-
ward Said and Orientalism are central examples of what Kurtz terms the 
“anti-Americanism” now taught in U.S. universities. Kurtz, a “well known 
partisan from the Hoover Institute and National Review”, recommends 
U.S. government regulation of “the Title VI funds given over to universi-
ties of the study of the rest of the world” (Prashad). The ease with which 
Kurtz incorrectly identifies Said as the “founder” of Postcolonial Stud-
ies and suggests thereby a conspiracy controlled by a single intellectual is 
what troubles me. New government interference in intellectual life has al-
ready resulted from the Bush Administration’s appeals for “anti-terrorist” 
and new “Homeland Security”, with or without scapegoats like Edward 
Said, but the ability of uninformed neo-conservatives to mount success-
ful attacks of this sort hinge on their rhetoric of paranoia and conspiracy. 
How much better might it have been for Postcolonial and Area Studies 
had Kurtz been unable to single out the “perpetrators”, because so many 
scholars had shared openly these paradigms of knowledge? In short, 
what would have happened if we had all said: “Yes, we are all Postcolo-
nial scholars”?
Said’s fame is based less on his arguments in such major academic 
books as Beginnings, Orientalism, and Culture and Imperialism, few of 
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which have been read by Said’s most vituperative public critics, than on 
his advocacy of the politics of self-determination and cultural represen-
tation by the peoples of the Arab world. Within this world, there are of 
course Said’s own Egyptian, Palestinian, and Lebanese filiations; he has 
argued vigorously on behalf of the Palestinians’ rights to their own home-
land and accompanying economic, political, and cultural autonomy. In 
this respect, he has criticized consistently and coherently U.S. foreign 
policies that have unilaterally supported Israeli imperialism toward the 
Palestinian people, especially evident in the conduct of the Israeli gov-
ernment and its military in the current crisis. One of the consequences 
of the internationalizing of American Studies as a discipline is that we 
must take responsibility for the conduct of the U.S. outside its borders, 
and Said’s advocacy of Palestinian rights generally includes his criticism 
of U.S. governmental policies, media representations of Palestinians pri-
marily as “terrorists”, and Orientalist scholarship that have contributed to 
the current undeclared war between Israel and Palestine.34
Said’s extensive scholarship and journalism on the politics and cul-
tures of the Arab world reach back to the beginnings of his career with 
the publication in 1970 of “The Palestinian Experience” and “A Palestin-
ian Voice”.35 Assessing Said’s work in Middle Eastern Studies and political 
journalism over thirty-three years will take the research skills and back-
ground knowledge of scholars with qualifications in those fields, but even 
before such work is done American Studies scholars can learn much from 
Said’s comparative studies of the U.S., Arab, and Israeli political and cul-
tural contexts. In 1979, he wrote prophetically: “I do not recall a period 
in recent Arab history when there has been so widespread, so sustained, 
and so anguished an interest in the United States. Beneath all this interest 
there is of course the undisputed fact that America and American inter-
ests touch Arab lives with an intrusive immediacy”.36 A common criticism 
of the broadening of American Studies to include both the work of inter-
national scholars and considerations of the U.S. as a global power is that 
we cannot cover “everything” in our curricula and scholarly projects. Yet 
the assumption that the study of the U.S. in its connections with other 
nations, peoples and regions must somehow be done by each individual 
scholar or exclusively organized by American Studies programs and cur-
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ricula is refuted by the work of many scholars responding to Said’s provo-
cations for a new understanding of our relations with the Arab world.
In the post-nationalist era we have already entered, characterized as 
much by neo-nationalist struggles as it is by a dizzying array of transna-
tional dangers and hopes, the comparatism Edward Said exemplified in 
his public persona and his distinguished career should be the work of 
many different scholars, coming from many, increasingly overlapping dis-
ciplines such as American Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Comparative 
Religions, History, Comparative Literature, Philosophy, Political Science, 
Anthropology, and Foreign Language departments. Their work ought to 
be diverse and contentious, but the goal should be certain intellectual co-
alitions essential for a new liberal education global in scope. Another goal 
should be the development of public policies that might confirm or chal-
lenge the knowledge of government sponsored experts on all sides. In 
short, we might work toward these difficult but imaginable collaborative 
ends as a way of replacing the singular celebrity of Edward Said with the 
more collective and diverse voices of professional intellectuals willing to 
take greater responsibility for the world in which they live. If we continue 
to work in the directions already suggested by Said’s work and in the rich 
scholarship of Postcolonial Studies, Cultural Studies, and the new Ameri-
can Studies, we will remember Edward W. Said in the best way possible: 
as the teacher who encouraged us to go beyond his work.
In this spirit, I turn now to the development of an “American Orien-
talism” Said may have anticipated but did not live to witness in its cur-
rent state, particularly manifest in the troubling Islamophobia evident in 
certain areas of contemporary U.S. society. The recent debates about the 
construction of an Islamic Center two blocks from “ground zero” in Man-
hattan, recently entangled with plans by a small-town preacher in Central 
Florida to burn Korans on 9/11 in protest against Islamic terrorists, are 
troubling examples of how polarized the U.S. and the Islamic world have 
become. My purpose is to suggest that Edward Said’s contributions to 
American Studies are more than merely disciplinary and certainly more 
important than what he might have occasionally said about Henry James, 
Ernest Hemingway, and T. S. Eliot. Said’s legacy for the new American 
Studies and its cultural politics must be understood as his elaboration of 
key ideas for our understanding of the U.S. as a global power deeply in-
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volved in the politics of the Middle East. By the same token, Said should 
not be treated as an omniscient prophet; American Orientalism is not 
merely an extension and elaboration of the European version Said inter-
preted so well in Orientalism and other scholarly and journalistic works. 
When Said died on September 25, 2003, the Second Gulf War had been 
officially declared over and our military “mission accomplished” in Presi-
dent George W. Bush’s infamous speech on May 1, 2003, even though 
the U.S. military occupation of Iraq would last another seven years. Said 
certainly recognized Bush’s military bravura and our unjustified invasion 
in the search for elusive “weapons of mass destruction” as the causes of 
the civil war that would break out in Iraq and the breakdown of civil so-
ciety that would cause hundreds of thousands of Iraqis to die in sectarian 
violence and millions to flee the country. For Said, it was a familiar story 
in the history of Western imperialism in the region.
Said did predict how traditional U.S. imperialism would metamorpho-
se into neo-imperialism from the First Gulf War to the Bush Adminis-
tration’s postulation of a “Great Middle East”, balanced and secured by 
our disastrous invasion and occupation of Iraq in the Second Gulf War. 
This “new Orient” follows historically the paths of European colonialism 
in the Middle East, especially in the build-up and aftermath of colonial 
struggles in North Africa and the Middle East surrounding the construc-
tion of the Suez Canal, which opened in 1869, the balance-of-power 
European and Ottoman Empire politics negotiated in the region in the 
World War I era, and the first major foreign exploitation of Middle East-
ern oil resources in the 1920s. Gun-boat diplomacy, spheres of political 
influence, such as the British Mandate in Palestine, commercial oppor-
tunism of first world nations disguised by the rhetoric of modern “devel-
opment” and “free-trade” capitalism such as Standard Oil and British Pe-
troleum relied upon, have merely been extended by the U.S. over the past 
two decades in typically “Orientalist” ways.
Said also understood how this imperial legacy shaped the current stale-
mate between the state of Israel and Palestine, as well as such immedi-
ate neighbors as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria—a political stalemate 
virtually guaranteed by the territorial fractures that have made distinct 
national sovereignties in the region impossible to define, much less main-
tain. “Imperialism is finally about land,” Said writes in Culture and Impe-
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rialism, insisting upon an imperial bed-rock we are warned never to for-
get (CI, xii-xiii). A mere glance at a map of the distribution of Israeli and 
Arab communities in Israel and Palestine’s divided territories makes clear 
how impossible any simple division of the region into Israel and Palestine 
would be, reminding us perhaps why Palestinian politicians in 1948 re-
jected the apparently common-sense solution of “partitioning” two dis-
tinct nations. Whatever successful solution is achieved will involve new 
conceptions of “national borders”, changing notions of the self-contain-
ment and territorial autonomy of the nation-state.
But there are limits to the mere extension of the traditional imperialist 
model to the neo-imperialism of the contemporary U.S., which certainly 
dates from the Vietnam War (1965–1975). Said’s insistence upon the ir-
reducible “reality” of land as the object of imperialism’s desire may also 
mark the limitation of his thoroughly modern conception of Orientalism 
as a key strategy of Western imperialism. In exposing how Orientalism 
disguised the basic land-grabs of European imperialists, Said imagined a 
relatively straightforward demystification of the Western discursive prac-
tices—scholarship, literature, visual arts, news media, et al.—that other-
wise masked or disguised the real political situation in the Middle East. 
Feminized, marginalized, minoritized and above all linguistically and cul-
turally excluded from this Western discourse, Arabic culture needed pri-
marily to be reasserted in its venerable authority, both as it had informed 
and shaped the West and as it continued to represent itself in ways sim-
ply distorted and repressed in the willful misreadings of the West. Tak-
ing upon himself this task as cultural translator and demystifier, Said cast 
himself in the role of anti-imperalist critic of a West whose cultural proto-
cols he understood at the professional level of a trained European Com-
paratist and Continental theorist.
Today, “covering Islam” has assumed some different modes not com-
pletely anticipated by Said that transform our understanding of what 
must be termed a “neo-Orientalism” manipulated by the U.S. State that 
draws only in part from traditional Western Orientalism, itself primarily 
the work of European imperialism. I will consider a few of these new mo-
dalities under a single, roughly formulated heading: the internalization of 
the traditional “Orient” within the U.S. nation. I prefer this description to 
“Americanization”, itself an older form of cultural importation within the 
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history of U.S. imperialism, because I think this process has some new 
features that differ from “Americanization” in the simplest sense, nota-
bly a complex and contradictory use of the “nation” by hegemonic pow-
ers that are themselves self-consciously transnational and global. Said 
certainly understood nineteenth-century European Orientalism to be a 
projection of Europe’s own unconscious anxieties about the foreign, the 
feminine, the sexual, the racial and the irrational “other”. Said objected to 
deconstruction and post-structuralism in general, but he himself “decon-
structed” these “others” to expose the European psychosis, whose princi-
pal symptom must be its incurable, unsatisfiable imperialist desire.
But Said’s criticism of Orientalism reaches its limit when confronted 
by such cultural productions as John Walker Lindh, “the American Tali-
ban”, and Azar Nafisi, the American Iranian; the former a convicted and 
imprisoned “enemy combatant” (legally, not a “terrorist,” or else he would 
be in Guantanamo, probably untried, at this very moment), and the other 
a new “patriot” for both U.S. and Iran, perhaps even that inconceivable 
“transnational” entity, “American Iran”. I consider both Lindh and Nafisi 
in their own terms in chapters five and six, respectively, but I want to use 
them here to exemplify the neo-Orientalism Said did not quite compre-
hend. Lindh draws the “new Orient” into the otherwise disparate field 
of “domestic terrorism”, condensing David Koresh, Timothy McVeigh, 
Ruby Ridge (Idaho) secessionists with Middle Eastern, Islamic radical-
ism. Today, that relation has morphed to include Left politics’ anti-im-
perialist struggle in the anti-Vietnam War movement and thus tacitly the 
anti-war movements against the immoral wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Sarah Palin’s resurrection of Barack Obama’s association with William 
Ayres during the 2008 Presidential Campaign is symptomatic of how 
Obama’s “criticism” of America and the Second Gulf War condenses the 
Weather Underground Ayres co-founded in the 1960s and the anti-Viet-
nam War politics it served with a more general anti-American “hatred” 
that improbably links critical positions as different as critical American 
Studies as a discipline, anti-Gulf War protests, such as MoveOn.org has 
sponsored, and neo-Nazi and radical Libertarian groups committed to 
American isolationism and racial purity. It would do no good to protest 
that such radical movements in the U.S., only some of which have been 
labeled “domestic terrorism”, usually depend upon their profound patri-
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otism, insisting that whatever criticism they advocate is necessary for a 
functional democracy.
Lindh posed a far greater threat to U.S. state authority because he re-
fused that democratic and national universe of discourse. As a conse-
quence, he had to be ideologically neutralized by infantilizing him and 
offering him a “lenient” sentence that further testified to his “adolescent” 
rebellion against Yuppie parents, Bay Area permissiveness, and other 
“symptoms” of a post-Vietnam generation that could not adequately par-
ent because its members had themselves “never grown up”. The familiar 
neo-conservative explanation of anti-Vietnam War protest, such as Paul 
Berman has claimed in A Tale of Two Utopics (1996) and its sequel Pow-
er and the Idealists (2005), dismisses strong criticism of foreign policy, 
imperialism, and unjustified warfare as “childish”, out of touch with the 
“real world” and the presumed “Realpolitik” of U.S. military and eco-
nomic policies around the globe. To be sure, the conflation of the “Ori-
ent” (Yemen and Afghanistan in the case of Lindh) with “infantilism” 
recalls sophisticated Hegelian theories of historical “development” from 
the “infant” East through the adolescence of Egypt to Greco-Roman 
young adults and the full maturity of German idealist philosophers, like 
Hegel himself. Lindh’s domestication of Islamic radicalism turns on his 
adolescent rebellion against Western “modernity and development”, a re-
gressive gesture through which “he” displaces and incorporates Arabic, 
Afghani, Yemeni, and other “Oriental” social institutions and Islam, em-
bodying this “new Orient” in the uncanny figure of the bearded Bay Area 
youth in the U.S. courtroom, once again confusing anti-Vietnam War hip-
pies with radical Islam.
Another version of this misrecognition is the emigré Middle Eastern 
writer, Azar Nafisi, whose authority in Reading Lolita in Tehran (2003) 
is presumed to be that of a “native informant”, familiar with the political 
and social history of Iran in the aftermath of the Shah’s brutal rule. Nafisi 
is, of course, just one of numerous emigré writers who have capitalized 
on such eye-witness accounts, including the equally celebrated Khaled 
Hosseini, whose The Kite Runner (2003) is supposed to give us an insid-
er’s account of Afghanistan from the pre-Soviet era to the Taliban’s rule. 
Of course, eye-witnesses are always to be judged skeptically, especially 
when we are considering politically conflicted societies irreducible to a 
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single, representative perspective. Often enough the actual authority of 
the non-Western native is Western, threatening native credentials. Nafi-
si’s authority is actually that of the Ph.D. in English literature she earned 
from the University of Oklahoma, not her ability to do the sort of social 
ethnography of modern Iran we identify with the new cultural geogra-
phers and anthropologists.
Traditional imperialism produces subalterns by shaping them in the 
mould of the cultural and social values of the metropolitan center of Em-
pire. Nafisi and Hosseini carry this tradition further by adopting those 
values in active ways to construct a “representative” Iranian-American 
and Afghani-American, each of whom represents the utopian ideal of 
citizenship for Iran or Afghanistan after democratization. Of course, the 
political precondition for such democratization is military invasion and 
occupation, so that such utopian fantasies are always already predicated 
on U.S. imperial expansion. Nafisi and Hosseini represent traditional 
“assimilationist ideals”, but neither author ever “forgets” his or her na-
tive culture as assimilated minorities are expected to do. Instead, these 
new subalterns actively construct fantastic Iranian and Afghani “cultures” 
inside the U.S., both in their English-language books (and among their 
primarily Anglo-American audiences) and in their special valorization of 
Iranian or Afghani refugee communities in the U.S. as models for those 
who will eventually “return” to their homelands.
A third version of this internalization of the Orient is the adaptation of 
mythic national narratives and archetypes to new foreign ventures in the 
Middle East, such as the various interpretations of Jessica Lynch in the 
context of Puritan captivity narratives and the condensation of domes-
tic frontier conflicts with the Second Gulf War. To be sure, later develop-
ments, including Lynch’s own repudiation of events and the melodrama 
of her heroic rescue by the U.S. military, have done much to challenge 
this national mythopoeia, but the speed with which Jessica Lynch was 
in fact adapted and adopted to domestic concerns is symptomatic of my 
general conception of the “U.S. nationalization of international crises” 
as means of containing and controlling those crises. The U.S. fascination 
with the fate of Patrick Daniel “Pat” Tillman (1976–2004), killed in Af-
ghanistan by “friendly fire”, may suggest that ideological complications, 
even contradictions, contribute to the new mythopoeia.37 Both Jessica 
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Lynch and Pat Tillman remain figures of interest as long as they continue 
to represent the contradictions of the Second Gulf War and our ongoing 
war in Afghanistan, and they do so by bringing these wars “home” in all 
their unresolved political complications.
The broader cultural narrative is the Vietnam-Effect in both Gulf Wars 
and Afghanistan, whereby our ventures in one “Orient” (Southeast Asia) 
appears to condition our later policies in two other, very different “Ori-
ents” (Iraq and Afghanistan), confusing the three regions by mere nomi-
nal association. The “Vietnam-Effect” says it is all about us, not them, 
whether Iraqis, Afghanis, Vietnamese, Laotians, or Cambodians, so that 
we can readily transfer key terms, the operative metaphors of imperial 
poetics, from one domain to another without experiencing cognitive dis-
sonance: quagmire (Vietnam and First Gulf War), dominoes (Southeast 
Asia and Afghanistan/ Pakistan), yellow ribbons (POW/ MIA and the 
VVA and Gulf vets), PTSD, Agent Orange and Gulf War Syndrome. Of 
course, these social psychological practices of projection and substitu-
tion are crucial to nineteenth-century European Orientalism, which be-
gan with its own fantasies of the exotic “East” and substituted such fic-
tions for regions neither “eastern” nor “Oriental”.
The difference of the new Orientalism is the self-conscious importa-
tion of these fantasies. In the nineteenth-century imaginary, distance 
was a crucial factor, which preserved the exoticism of distant lands and 
peoples, especially important when people from those lands had immi-
grated to the metropolitan centers of the empire. But today U.S. neo-
imperialism depends upon rendering familiar the distant and exotic, es-
pecially their imaginary qualities, incorporating them into that powerful 
U.S. myth of assimilation. That old British fantasy of “the English world” 
in which everyone within the British Empire would speak English and 
behave according to the British standard of civil society has metamor-
phosed into the U.S. imaginary of an “end of history” when everyone will 
come to America to realize his or her destiny. And, of course, by implica-
tion “America” will be everywhere. In this dystopic view, we look inward 
to our domestic problems to work through foreign policy issues in antici-
pation of those “foreign” problems coming to us, as we know they will. It 
is this fantasy of “American universality”, too often the model for new cos-
mopolitanism, including Said’s own, that tells us U.S. neo-imperialism is 
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not so much about land, natural resources, even global economic or mili-
tary power, but primarily about a national identity we still cannot define.
The new Orientalisms are multiple, overlapping, and strategically con-
fusing, enabling their authors to substitute foreign policy discussions for 
any genuine historical discussion of the Vietnamese, Iraqi, Israeli, Pales-
tinian, Lebanese, Pakistani and Afghani peoples. The irony of these cul-
tural processes of internalization, domestication and displacement is that 
they take place through a U.S. national model that has never been more 
fragile and fictional, irrelevant as it is to the global State power wielded by 
the Reagan-Bush administrations through transnational coalitions with 
the royal Saudi family, U.S. allies in the Greater Middle East, oil inter-
ests in the Black Sea neighborhoods of Afghanistan, and global capital-
ism’s dependency on Chinese modernization and development. Barack 
Obama’s administration has attempted to create an image of more coop-
erative international relations and a less militant foreign policy, even as 
the U.S. continues to wage two wars in the name of U.S. “national secu-
rity”. The Obama administration’s new foreign policy and international 
image still depend upon a vigorous American exceptionalism. The U.S. 
is not just the “leader” of the “free world”, but the democratic exemplar 
of religious, racial and ethnic, gender and sexual, economic, and politi-
cal diversity and tolerance. The “Orient” is everywhere else, especially 
here at home.
Chapter 2
The “Vietnam Effect” in the Persian Gulf Wars
It’s déjà vu all over again.
– Yogi Berra on witnessing Mantle and 
Maris hit back-to-back home runs.
Prologue: 2010
In the previous chapter on “Edward Said and American Studies”, I argued 
that the new Orientalism characteristic of U.S. neo-imperialism draws 
upon a “Vietnam Effect”, in which foreign policy issues are incorporated 
into domestic U.S. issues in ways that distract us from the specific con-
cerns of foreign peoples and states affected by our policies. The Vietnam 
War and thus the “Vietnam Effect” were consequences of Cold-War ide-
ology. Although the Cold War focused attention on conflicts between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union, the battles for global superiority were fought 
on the peripheries of Europe and North America, especially in the “Ori-
ent” that in the nineteenth-century European imaginary stretched from 
the Middle to the Near and Far East. U.S. fears that the “dominoes” 
would “fall” to Soviet and Chinese control in Southeast Asia if we did not 
assume the colonial legacy of the French in “Indochina” were based on 
the post-World War II foreign policy view that Asia was a principal battle-
ground in the Cold War.
Christina Klein argues in Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow 
Imagination, 1945–1961 that U.S. foreign policies and popular culture 
worked together to produce an imaginary Orient, which was both a pro-
jection of U.S. desires and a domestication of global problems, especially 
in Asia. What began as a U.S. dream of a “global imaginary of integration” 
is ironically shattered by the ideological production of Cold War Orien-
talism, so that “the foreign policies and middlebrow culture of the 1940s 
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and 1950s culminated not only in the Vietnam War but also in John 
Woo”.38 We created the historical and transnational conditions that led 
not only to our disastrous foreign and military policies in Vietnam but 
also that produced a counter-narrative, exemplified for Klein in the career 
of John Woo, the Hong Kong film director who incorporates traditional 
Hollywood motifs in films like Hard Boiled (1992) and has influenced 
significantly U.S. films by such directors as Quentin Tarantino.39 How-
ever fantastic its origins, U.S. Orientalism produced real effects that every 
day become more difficult to distinguish from our own national identity. 
In long historical terms, we should understand such U.S. Orientalism as 
shaped by globalization and Cold-War balance-of-power politics, but one 
of the clearest examples of how it works ideologically is what is known in 
popular culture as “the Vietnam Effect”.
Popularized first in the late 1970s to refer to poor military and for-
eign policy decisions by the U.S. in the conduct of the War, the “Viet-
nam Effect”, sometimes alternatively termed the “Vietnam Syndrome”, 
referred to the defeatist mentality caused by our first loss in a major 
military conflict. Conservatives argued that Vietnam was a war we “won” 
on the “battlefield”, but “lost” in the mass media, domestic politics, and 
the Paris Peace Talks. The “liberal media” supported the strong anti-war 
movement, crises in the Executive branch—the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to run for re-election in 1968, 
Richard Nixon’s Watergate Scandal in 1971—and concessions to the 
North Vietnamese in the Paris Peace talks had reversed our military suc-
cesses. Other interpretations suggested that we were never close to “win-
ning” our extension of the French colonial war against the Vietnamese, 
failing to understand the determination of the North Vietnamese Army 
and the insurrection by the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. 
Even in strictly military terms, we had merely reacted to enemy actions, 
rarely taking initiative and never really “winning hearts and minds” of the 
Vietnamese civilians caught between warring adversaries. Traditional 
military tactics of territorial control failed and were replaced with equally 
unsuccessful “body counts” of enemy dead, which when broadcast on 
the evening news only fueled anti-war sentiments. From a conservative 
perspective, the “Vietnam Syndrome” was our defeatism in the aftermath 
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of losing the War; in the liberal view, the “Vietnam Effect” was a conse-
quence of our Cold War-era neo-imperialism.
What follows is a historically specific interpretation of the “Vietnam Ef-
fect” first delivered on February 12, 1991 as a speech at an anti-war dem-
onstration organized by the students and other activists at the University 
of California, Irvine. “Why the War in the Persian Gulf Is Another Viet-
nam” was given less than a month after the U.S. aerial bombardment of 
Iraqi military positions began the Persian Gulf War on January 16, 1991 
and eleven days before U.S. ground forces would begin their military ac-
tion in Kuwait on February 23, 1991. Much has changed in U.S. foreign 
policy and cultural attitudes, especially toward the Middle East and Ar-
abs and Islamic peoples globally since 1991, but the historical aspect of 
this essay remains important for two reasons. First, it was not intended 
initially as a scholarly essay, but as part of political activism. Delivered to 
a modest audience on a Saturday night in the Emerald Bay auditorium 
of the University of California, Irvine Student Center, the talk was one 
of several preceded by a recording of Gore Vidal criticizing President 
George H. W. Bush for his decision to invade Iraq. Second, while I con-
tinued to participate in local anti-war demonstrations, I also urged my 
colleagues on the national level to use our scholarly means to protest the 
Persian Gulf War. As a member of the Editorial Collective of Cultural Cri-
tique, I urged Editor Donna Przbylowicz and Associate Editor Abdul Jan-
Mohamed to put together an emergency special issue, which they assem-
bled on short notice as “The Economies of War” issue and published in 
the Fall of 1991.40 With a lead-off essay by Noam Chomsky and powerful 
critiques both of the Persian Gulf and Vietnam wars by other recognized 
scholars, this special issue declared its commitment to what I term in the 
title of this book, “the cultural politics of the new American Studies”.41
In what follows, I have made revisions only to clarify the historical con-
texts of President George H. W. Bush’s administration (1989–1993) and 
the First Persian Gulf War (August 1990–March 1991). Rather than draw 
certain obvious connections with subsequent events, especially our disas-
trous invasion of Iraq on the false evidence of Saddam Hussein’s “weap-
ons of mass destruction”, I have preferred to let this historical moment 
speak for itself. Neither the anti-war activism in which I participated nor 
the scholarship published in its cause, stopped the First Gulf War or pre-
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vented our leaders from “finishing the job” in the Second Gulf War, with 
the disastrous results for the Iraqi people and the “Greater Middle East” 
we have witnessed since 2003. But the intellectual and political activities 
in real historical time to which my marching, speech, and published essay 
contributed in small ways finally “add up”, if only because they offer the 
consistent rational critique of irrational policies, often bolstered by false 
patriotism, that is so necessary to a free society.
“The Vietnam Effect”: 1991
Reporting to the Congress our military success in the Persian Gulf, Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush declared on March 3, 1991: “Thank God, we’ve 
kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all.”42 Asked about the pos-
sibility of deploying U.S. troops to protect Kurdish refugees in northern 
Iraq, the President insisted in his April 14, 1991 press conference that we 
would not be drawn into another “quagmire” in Iraq. The words hardly 
needed to be uttered; from the beginning of our military involvement in 
the Persian Gulf, “Vietnam” has been a constant historical referent.43 The 
slogan, “We support our troops,” helped forge a patriotic consensus (85 
% according to most opinion polls taken in the first week of the ground 
war) unmatched in U.S. history. That slogan referred explicitly to the 
Vietnam War and the cultural “memory” that the Anti-War Movement 
had systematically discouraged, even demoralized, U.S. combat troops in 
Vietnam. There is little in the actual history of the Anti-War Movement to 
support this “remembrance,” which like most historical reconstructions 
conflates different historical moments. The slogan’s implicit negative, 
“We did not support our troops in Vietnam,” refers less to isolated inci-
dents of anti-war demonstrators “spitting” on returning soldiers, chanting 
“Murderers!” or otherwise condemning military personnel for the con-
duct of U.S. foreign policy than it refers to the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War, in which veterans were ignored or considered “embarrassments” 
both by their government and the general population. The belated pa-
rades, monuments, and memorials often served only to remind veterans 
of the Vietnam War of the long silence that they met on their return.
That silence, however, was not merely a consequence of war-weariness, 
apathy, or even contempt for those who had served in Vietnam; it rep-
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resented a genuine moral confusion on the part of most Americans. In 
many cases, embarrassment was entangled with shame—a sense of guilt 
regarding widespread support for a war whose purposes we did not un-
derstand. In short, our cultural shame had something to do with our 
unarticulated sense that patriotism had not been based on knowledge, 
reason, and justice. Slogans from the Vietnam era, such as “My country, 
right or wrong” and “America, love it or leave it,” returned to haunt us 
not simply when we lost the war but when we began to recognize how 
misguided and misinformed our foreign policies had been. The lesson of 
Vietnam was simple: never again should sheer emotional support for our 
sons and daughters blind us to our patriotic responsibility to assess the 
reasons and motives for military action—that is, action that would put 
those very sons and daughters at risk.
The “Vietnam syndrome” meant for President George H. W. Bush 
a national sense of failure and powerlessness—a “habit” to be “kicked” 
as one would drugs or alcohol. Yet, the “drug” of the Vietnam era was 
the uncritical support for foreign policies we did not understand—the 
emotional enthusiasm for “victory” that cost 58,000 American and mil-
lions of Vietnamese lives. But this was precisely the drug that intoxicated 
us during the First Persian Gulf War, and our one-sided victory virtually 
guaranteed our repetition of the key mistakes of the Vietnam era. Presi-
dent Bush, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, Vice 
President Quayle, and General Schwarzkopf have repeated ceaselessly: 
“Our action in the Persian Gulf will not be another Vietnam.” The bomb-
ing of Iraq and Kuwait was designed to prevent just such a repetition of 
the military quagmire in Vietnam. The United Nations resolutions and its 
sanctioned military coalition were designed to protect the United States 
from criticism of neo-colonialism comparable to our policies of “winning 
hearts and minds” in Vietnam. Diplomatic negotiations with Iraq, de-
spite obvious and enduring intransigence on both sides, were extensively 
covered in the press and on television, in part to demonstrate how we had 
exhausted all peaceful alternatives to military action.
For the American public, the political situation seemed convincingly 
different from that of the Vietnam era. Between November 2, 1990 and 
January 15, 1991, Tariq Aziz spoke almost nightly to the American tele-
vision audience on Nightline and other news shows; Ho, General Giap, 
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even Le Duc Tho (the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister interviewed 
frequently during the Paris Peace Talks) remained shadowy, elusive fig-
ures for the American public during the Vietnam War. Whereas Congress 
had waffled and equivocated during Vietnam, this time the televised 
congressional debates, often showcasing “eloquent” statements by con-
gressmen both for and against military involvement, resulted in what 
was publicized as a clear mandate for our military presence in the Gulf. 
In fact, Congress merely delegated responsibility to the President, effec-
tively mooting the long and important discussion since Vietnam regard-
ing the issues of what assumed juridical form in the “War Powers’ Act,” 
by granting President George H. W. Bush even greater freedom to con-
duct war than Presidents Johnson or Nixon had during the “undeclared 
war” of Vietnam. Political scientists like Mark Petracca tried to remind 
Americans that the narrow but nonetheless decisive majority by which 
Congress delegated authority to the President constituted as significant 
an issue for protest as the threat of military conflict in the Gulf.
But the public discussion of such crucial issues of democratic gover-
nance depended to a large extent on remembering the continuing legacy 
of Vietnam. And it was precisely this sort of cultural memory that the 
decisive military victory in the Gulf helped to erase. The First Persian 
Gulf War was mercifully swift and relatively bloodless for the Coalition’s 
forces. The “Vietnam without Trees” that some anti-war activists had 
predicted never came to pass in the desert along the Gulf. We have been 
encouraged to believe a “clean,” “sanitary,” and “smart” war was the result 
of the superior technology, organization, and justness of the Coalition’s 
leaders, both in the field and Washington. As Kuwaiti coalition troops 
led the way into Kuwait City, to be met by resistance fighters, and as U.S. 
forces swept into southern Iraq, driving Iraqi troops across the Euphrates 
or into Basra, the fears of another Vietnam vanished. Anti-war organiza-
tions, put together with impressive speed and efficiency in the months 
leading up to the January 15, 1991 deadline the Coalition gave Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait, collapsed overnight. This time it was the tiny mi-
nority of stubborn protesters who were met with silence, if not outright 
censorship. The word on the streets was that protesters “had better shut 
up.”44 Public debate was over before it had begun, and patriotism had 
become an undisguised spectacle of cheering congressmen or replays of 
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Whitney Huston, tears streaming down her cheeks, passionately singing 
the “Star Spangled Banner” at Super Bowl XXV on January 27, 1991 in 
Tampa Stadium. On April 3, 1991, CBS-TV would broadcast its All-Star 
Salute to the Troops, which TV Guide described as a “patriotic orgy”.45
From President George H. W. Bush’s comparison of Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait with Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia to the ceaseless re-
runs of World War II combat melodramas on TNT (as well as on many 
local channels) during the war, the improbable analogy with the Allies’ 
efforts against Axis forces has been emphasized in several media. That 
analogy has had the rhetorical effect of underscoring the negative exam-
ple of the Vietnam War. “Contained” between World War II and the Per-
sian Gulf victory, Vietnam could be treated as an “anomaly,” a unique case 
of failure whose mistakes might be “corrected” the next time. Contrived 
as this historical “containment” is in rational terms, its rhetoric helped 
strengthen revisionist historians’ arguments that our failure in Vietnam 
had little to do with our general foreign policies (especially those framed 
in the so-called “Cold War” period) and much to do with Congressio-
nal interference in the military conduct of the Vietnam war. In short, the 
rhetoric and spectacle of patriotic support for the Persian Gulf War was 
not the simple instrumentality of mass media propaganda, whether en-
gineered or not by the government, but integral to the re-legitimation of 
foreign policies that since Vietnam and now in the aftermath of the Cold 
War have been subject to effective rational criticism.
Many opposed to the First Persian Gulf War argued that the “crisis” de-
veloped conveniently at the moment when defense budget cuts seemed 
inevitable and advocates of a “peace dividend” for much-needed domes-
tic programs were gaining popular support. This argument has led some 
to speculate that the bombing of Iraq was a sort of “showcase” for new 
U.S. military technology, both to support new and even larger defense 
spending and to provide a long-term economic rationale for military 
“research and development” in the export markets for such hardware 
as the Patriot Missile system. Although it is well worth considering that 
advocates of substantial defense budgets may recognize the need to use 
other arguments than “national defense” in the post-Cold War era, the 
general thesis that the First Gulf War was fought primarily for reasons of 
economic expediency or military self-interest is far too crudely material-
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ist. Defense spending is simply one among many of the signs of politi-
cal power; the grammar of such power remains U.S. foreign policy, which 
since Vietnam has relied on a strategic slippage from the purposes of “na-
tional defense” to the regulation of “international law and order.”
In the Vietnam era, the war was often defended on the grounds that our 
containment of Communism was directly related to our national defense. 
Few arguments of this sort were offered by President George H. W. Bush, 
Secretary of State Baker, or Secretary of Defense Cheney in justification 
of the First Gulf War, although arguments connecting the global econo-
my to the economic interests of the United States were made. In response 
to the anti-war slogan, “No Blood for Oil!,” some followed Secretary of 
State Baker’s claim that there was “nothing wrong with fighting for oil” 
and that we were in the Persian Gulf to “protect American jobs.” Such ar-
guments, however, seemed to have little influence on popular support for 
the war, and not simply because they could be so easily refuted. By con-
trast, the claim that “national security” was at stake in the Vietnam War 
was widely accepted, despite the difficulty of its demonstration. What 
made arguments regarding “national defense” ineffective, even half-heart-
ed, in the justification of our military presence in the Persian Gulf was 
their incompatibility with the prevailing principle of U.S. foreign policy: 
the regulation of international law. Indeed, the success of this moral pos-
ture is evident in the public indifference to the fact that the United States 
conducted diplomatic negotiations with Iraq in the place of the United 
Nations. Once the U.N. resolutions and sanctions against Iraq had been 
approved, the United States was accepted as the representative of the U.N. 
both in the forging of a military coalition and in virtually all diplomatic 
negotiations with Iraq. Even after the First Gulf War was concluded with 
the Iraqi acceptance of the formal cease-fire of March 3, 1991, the United 
Nations debated new resolutions that supported the presence of Coali-
tion forces in northern Iraq.
The First Persian Gulf War declared the United States to be the arbiter 
of international law; the United Nations, arguably the most appropriate 
organization for new power and authority in the “new global order,” ap-
pears even less significant in the public’s mind than during the Cold War. 
In this regard, the “Vietnam Effect” enabled President George H. W. Bush 
to reaffirm his authority as Commander-in-Chief by insisting that the 
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Pentagon would “not fight this war with one hand tied behind its back.” 
Once again, George H. W. Bush’s metaphors are significant, in this case 
implicitly judging debates in the Congress regarding the conduct of the 
Vietnam War—especially the debates leading to the reduction of fund-
ing for the War between 1971 and 1973—to be the causes for our failure. 
The rhetorical isolation of the Vietnam War had the effect of reaffirming 
the continuity, coherence, and justness of U.S. foreign policy from World 
War II to the Persian Gulf crisis. It follows the logic of what Robert Di-
vine has termed the “Quagmire Thesis” argued by Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. and David Halberstam during the Vietnam War: “Schlesinger’s quag-
mire thesis, while condemning American involvement, nevertheless ex-
cused American leaders of any real responsibility. It was all an accident, 
a tragic series of mistakes, but not one that called for a reconsideration 
of America’s Cold War policies or for a searching reappraisal of men and 
decisions.”46
During the First Persian Gulf War, the veterans of Vietnam, whose 
political grievances were about to be erased from the American agenda 
along with very name of “Vietnam,” responded generally as if this were 
the “Welcome Home” they had been awaiting for more than fifteen years. 
With the exception of organizations like Vietnam Veterans against War 
(VVAW), the majority of Vietnam-era veterans organized and partici-
pated in pro-war demonstrations and helped the emotional slogan, “Sup-
port Our Troops,” sweep the land and divide protesters. The Vietnam 
Veterans of America was first organized because of the exclusion of Viet-
nam veterans from Veterans of Foreign Wars and to serve as the means of 
sponsoring veterans’ political and economic grievances, but during the 
First Persian Gulf War local chapters of the VVA became rallying points 
for pro-war demonstrations. Efforts to challenge the slogan itself were 
met with fierce opposition. Any attempt to remind people that many 
Vietnam-era veterans still suffered from PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder) resulting from combat and shared by British veterans of the 
Falklands’ War was flatly rejected. The elementary distinction between 
“support” for human beings and “opposition” to combat activities was 
considered “too intellectual” in a time when only emotion made sense. 
The term “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” was barely mentioned dur-
ing the First Persian Gulf War (with the exception of a brief, midday spe-
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cial report on CNN, which included interviews with veterans from the 
Vietnam and Falkland Island wars). In effect, this serious disability suf-
fered by many veterans of recent wars had been re-diagnosed. No lon-
ger referring to the psychological after-effects of combat, the “trauma” of 
Vietnam-era veterans in particular seemed to refer retrospectively to the 
American public’s failure to “support the troops.”
Amid such emotion, there were still implicit and recognizable “argu-
ments” with respect to the meaning of Vietnam in U.S. culture. By virtue 
of their uncritical support for the troops in the Persian Gulf and their ne-
glect of such crucial issues as PTSD, pro-war veterans implicitly argued 
that we had not fought to win in Vietnam but merely to maintain a sym-
bolic presence in Southeast Asia against Soviet and Chinese challenges. 
In effect, they were favoring a version of the “Stalemate Thesis” best rep-
resented by Daniel Ellsberg (to be sure, an unlikely political ally for pro-
war veterans), who blamed Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Ken-
nedy for trying to juggle the contrary demands of not losing Vietnam to 
the Communists and not committing U.S. troops to an unwinnable land 
war in Vietnam.47 Strong support of the First Persian Gulf War by veter-
ans of the Vietnam War strengthened President George H. W. Bush in his 
resolve to avoid the historical trap, according to the Stalemate Thesis, that 
President Johnson had inherited from his predecessors’ equivocal foreign 
policies in Vietnam. What the veterans of Vietnam seemed to have over-
looked as they cheered the President and supported their fellow soldiers 
in the Gulf was that the Vietnam War and its consequences for so many 
veterans were being erased from the historical map of U.S. foreign policy. 
“Quagmire” or “stalemate,” Vietnam had finally been “explained” in just 
the manner that the U.S. government had struggled unsuccessfully to do 
between 1968 (the Tet Offensive) and 1990. All along, what the govern-
ment desired was an explanation that would allow us to isolate and then 
forget “Vietnam.”
Under these conditions, the American people did not simply “forget” 
Vietnam, but like the President and other government officials repeat-
edly denied Vietnam in the manner of some collective repression. Such 
widespread denial helped the general public deny as well the carnage of 
this brief war. Few U.S. citizens have ever expressed much concern about 
the sketchy information about civilian and Iraqi troop casualties in the 
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six-week war, even though those figures are two to three times greater 
than the American casualties suffered in the nine years of U.S. combat 
in Vietnam.48 In all of this, dismissed by some as the inevitable euphoria 
of victory, but criticized by others as a dangerous symptom of long-term 
intolerance for political dissent in this country, the parallels between our 
foreign policy errors in Vietnam and our conduct in the First Persian 
Gulf War have been virtually ignored, despite the unavoidable “Vietnam 
Effect” of the official rhetoric, which has been mimed so well in the press 
and the general population.
We lost the war in Vietnam, because we had no plan for peace. We lost 
the war in Vietnam before we landed troops in Danang in 1965, because 
we utterly misunderstood the political situation in both South and North 
Vietnam. We lost the war in Vietnam in 1954 as decisively as the French 
lost the battle of Dienbienphu, because in that year we assumed author-
ity for the political future of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. With the best 
intentions and noblest sentiments, we took over the colonial project the 
French had pursued for a century in Indochina. To be sure, our colonial-
ism was different from that of Vietnam’s many previous invaders. We 
did not want their latex or tin, as the French did, their hardwood or rice, 
as the Japanese did; we wanted to win hearts and minds. We wanted “a 
sphere of influence,” which would “balance” the influences of the Soviet 
Union and China in Asia. We spoke loudly and tirelessly of political self-
determination, economic self-reliance, and democratic institutions, but 
we viewed Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia as simply “dominoes” 
in an elaborate game of balance-of-power politics. We knew little of the 
Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians whose governments and soci-
eties were destabilized by our larger ambitions. We didn’t want to know 
much about them.
As we moved massive military force to the Persian Gulf in late 1990, 
we could not understand why demonstrators in Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, 
Malaysia, and other so-called “third world” countries both in the Middle 
East and other regions of the world should express such rage against our 
well-intentioned efforts to pursue a “just war,” to “punish” and topple the 
dictator and aggressor, Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein is not a na-
tionalist leader like Ho Chi Minh. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 
1990 is not comparable to the Vietnamese people’s struggle to rid their 
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country of the French, the Japanese, the British, and the Americans. In 
these respects, President George H. W. Bush was right: this war was not 
another Vietnam. The war in the Persian Gulf was not waged as a neo-
colonial effort against popular nationalist movements, like the National 
Liberation Front, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the 
Vietnamese Communist Party. And yet massive demonstrations against 
the presence of Coalition forces in the Gulf seemed united in their oppo-
sition to foreign intervention, especially by the U.S. and European forces 
represented in the Coalition.
A crucial part of the President’s argument that military action in the 
Persian Gulf was not another instance of western imperialism was the 
strength of the military coalition. For many liberals, the fact that the Co-
alition “held together” is convincing evidence that our purpose in the 
Gulf is part of a larger policy of “collective security” by which nations 
join together to maintain international law. As Harold Meyerson argued 
during the First Persian Gulf War, the internal divisions of the American 
Left caused by the Vietnam War assumed new characteristics in the face 
of Saddam Hussein’s expansionism: “Todd Gitlin calls this wing of the 
left ‘the collective security gang’—pro- and anti-warriors who believe in 
some form of international action against Iraq, with a legitimate U.S. role, 
but who oppose the establishment of a new Pax Americana—as distinct 
from the ‘anti-imperialist gang’—opponents of the war who elevate U.S. 
anti-interventionism to a universal principle.”49 The “collective security” 
argument, however, tends to confuse the procedures and, in this histori-
cal instance, resolutions of the United Nations with the decisions of a 
group of nations that have decided to “act” in the best interests of interna-
tional law. The United Nations’ resolutions did not authorize the bomb-
ing of Iraq or the occupation of southern Iraq. These military decisions 
were made by a coalition forged by the United States. From the very be-
ginning, the “Coalition” was an obvious front for a Pax Americana.
We ought to have recognized the rhetorical slippage from “U.N.” to 
“Coalition” to “U.S.” as a kind of historical déjà vu. In 1954, Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower formed a coalition 
that Dulles called at first “United Action” and later renamed the “South-
east Asian Treaty Organization.” Both were designed to “guarantee the 
security of Southeast Asia.” Neither proved very effective in the Vietnam 
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War. To be sure, some members of “United Action”—Australia and New 
Zealand—and some members of SEATO—South Korea, for example—
sent token troops, advisors, and military support to the Army of the Re-
public of Vietnam (ARVN) and American forces fighting in Vietnam. 
But the “coalitions” were not politically effective; they were not strong 
organizations based on reasonable political and diplomatic solutions to 
the many problems left by European colonialism in Southeast Asia. They 
were symbolic coalitions patched together by the United States to justify 
its conduct in Vietnam.
There is a striking parallel between “United Action” and SEATO with 
the coalition forged to fight the First Persian Gulf War. Although the 
number of Middle Eastern countries participating in the Coalition Forces 
was impressive, a significant number of those countries are not demo-
cratic: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, for example. It is 
not just that we once again threw our lot together with repressive regimes 
in the “interests” of fighting another repressive regime—the “greater evil” 
of Saddam Hussein and Iraqi militarism; it is also that we mistook the 
support of these governments for the support of their peoples. Turkey’s 
official support for our conduct in the Persian Gulf, for example, was not 
maintained by opinion polls of average Turkish citizens, most of whom 
opposed Turkish involvement in this war. What did we hear from the 
Egyptian on the streets of Cairo, the Syrian worker in Damascus? Pre-
cious little. Did they share the views of those “coalition” partners, Egypt 
and Syria, and their leaders, Hosni Mubarak and President Hassad? 
Without access to mass media, without effective means of voting against 
their governments’ participation in our military coalition, people in these 
countries had only demonstration as their means of expressing their 
discontent. But President George H. W. Bush insisted he would not be 
“swayed” by these demonstrations and that they would have no “influ-
ence” on our national “resolve.” One characteristic feature of more tradi-
tional western imperialism has been a refusal to listen to the interests of 
the people and treat instead exclusively with undemocratic rulers, who 
have notoriously found “foreign interests” to be in their self interest.
Just as we constructed something of a political “fiction” in the alliance 
of SEATO, so we manipulated the “consensus” of the United Nations, not 
in its condemnation of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait but in the U.N.’s dead-
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line for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and its tacit authorization of the 
United States’ government as the United Nations’ diplomatic representa-
tive. U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar was treated as if he were a 
middle-level U.S. diplomat when he arrived in Baghdad at the eleventh 
hour to negotiate a peace settlement with Iraq. The Iraqi response to the 
U.N. Secretary General reflected accurately the secondary role he himself 
had assumed in the diplomatic negotiations.
In Geneva in 1954, while the French and Vietnamese ostensibly 
worked out the Geneva Accords, the United States was represented by 
Dulles and other high-ranking diplomats. Although claiming to be mere 
“observers,” we were active participants in the drafting of the Geneva Ac-
cords, but we refused to sign them. Having refused to sign those Accords, 
we then proceeded to ignore their provisions, notably the mandate for 
free elections in Vietnam two years after the signing of those Accords. 
With the exception of the patently fraudulent elections of Diem, Khanh, 
Ky, and Thieu in the increasingly unstable political climate of South Viet-
nam between 1954 and 1973, no “free elections” were ever held in Viet-
nam after 1954. But why did we fail to encourage these South Vietnamese 
governments to conduct such elections, rather than wage an unwinnable 
war that only realized our worst nightmare: the destabilization of the en-
tire region? Our arguments in the years leading up to the successful coup 
against Diem and his assassination were simple: the government of South 
Vietnam under Diem was not sufficiently stable. Hardly a translation was 
needed at the time for those paying any attention: the government of 
Diem was unpopular; Diem would have been voted out of office in any 
free election held in the South during his nine years of power.
Have we effectively overcome the mistakes of Vietnam in the sixteen 
years since the conclusion of that war in 1975? Despite official arguments 
supporting the Coalition as representative of Middle Eastern opposition 
to Saddam Hussein and support for foreign intervention, the Coalition 
was clearly the work of the United States. Even had the European and 
Middle Eastern members of the Coalition forces withdrawn or refused 
to cross the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, U.S. troops were 
obviously sufficient to carry out our military purposes. Seventy percent 
of the combat troops were provided by the U.S. military; the vast major-
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ity of air sorties were flown by U.S. aircraft. The Coalition was quite obvi-
ously a thin disguise for U.S. military operations.
We sent troops to the Middle East to counter what appeared to be a 
political destabilization of the region comparable to the “collapse” of the 
“dominoes” in Southeast Asia. Yet, there is considerable evidence that we 
took such action without much knowledge of the political consequences. 
While diplomacy was still possible, President George H. W. Bush insisted 
tirelessly that there would be “no linkage” of the Palestinian question and 
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Yet even before the ground war had begun, 
the President announced in his “State of the Union” address in January 
1991 that “some resolution” of the Palestinian issue would be a neces-
sary part of the peace settlements following the war. Supporters of our 
policies might argue that we intended from the beginning to negotiate a 
peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian controversy, but only when we 
could do so from a position of regional strength.
Yet President George H. W. Bush could have announced such an in-
tention before the January 15th deadline expired, if only to strengthen 
the U.S. hand in diplomatic negotiations and win wider popular support 
among Arab peoples. Had we expressed clearly a plan for establishing a 
Palestinian homeland, guaranteeing their political and judicial rights in 
the region, and promptly entered into negotiations with the Palestinians 
and the Israelis, then we might have gained far more credibility in the re-
gion and diminished Saddam Hussein’s effort to appropriate the Palestin-
ian cause for his own purposes. In short, we could have used our influ-
ence in this crisis to initiate serious negotiations between the Israelis and 
Palestinians independent of Saddam Hussein’s demands and the future of 
Kuwait. Our lack of a positive policy with respect to the Palestinian ques-
tion is reflected both in our equivocation regarding the “relevance” of the 
Palestinian question to the stability of the Middle East and our postwar 
failure to do more than support a multinational Middle Eastern peace 
conference on the issue. Having just participated in a military action that 
has reorganized the political balance of power in the Middle East, we as-
sumed in 1991 the position of having “no position” on the appropriate 
solution to what is arguably the most significant issue in the Middle East: 
the fate of the Palestinians. Such equivocation, if not outright foreign pol-
icy flimflam, recalls nothing so well as our indecision in Southeast Asia 
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during the Vietnam War. If our government hoped to maintain a “sym-
bolic” position by merely endorsing the “desirability” of a “peaceful so-
lution” to the issue of a Palestinian homeland, then we may well under-
stand why the next twenty years were marked by political stalemate in 
any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question. History demonstrates in 
those two decades that we have indeed slipped into a “quagmire” in the 
Middle East no easier to escape than the political trap in which we threw 
ourselves during our two decades in Southeast Asia.
Since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, our opposition to Saddam 
Hussein has grown from “concern” about his growing military power in 
the region to the outright demonization of the Saddam who appeared on 
posters during the War, complete with bulls-eye and the slogan, “Now, 
It’s Personal!” As war fever spread in this country, debates concerning the 
“fate” or “future” of Saddam grew proportionately. With the war under-
way, there was ceaseless discussion about whether or not Saddam Hus-
sein had been targeted by the U.S. military and whether or not he should 
be “terminated.” Discussions of the “morality” and “legality” of murder-
ing Saddam Hussein took center stage from the other, more reasonable 
question for the State Department and the U.S. public: what are the other 
political parties and who are the other viable political leaders in con-
temporary Iraq?
Anyone who recalls the years leading up to Diem’s and his brother, 
Nhu’s, assassinations must find some uncanny resemblances in this ob-
session with Saddam Hussein’s “liquidation.” Truong Nhu Tang, one of 
the founders of the National Liberation Front, complains in A Viet Cong 
Memoir that the U.S. government never familiarized itself with the many 
well-qualified leaders of various opposition parties that developed dur-
ing Diem’s rule in South Vietnam.50 As he points out, we accepted Diem’s 
and Nhu’s caricatures of such opposition leaders and parties as “Com-
munists,” even though South Vietnam between 1954 and 1963 was alive 
with a wide variety of different political constituencies, despite Nhu’s ef-
forts to use his secret police to suppress every sign of political dissent. 
Even when the fall of Diem and Nhu’s government was understood by 
Henry Cabot Lodge and others in the State Department to be inevita-
ble, we did little to identify, much less encourage, opposition leaders. For 
Troung Nhu Tang, this failure on the part of U.S. foreign policy merely 
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strengthened the coalition of political groups formed in opposition to 
Diem’s government. In effect, our willful disregard of potentially popu-
lar political alternatives in South Vietnam helped turn the National Lib-
eration Front into an effective political and ultimately successful military 
organization.
In a similar fashion, we seem to have ignored the possibility of any 
legitimate political opposition in Iraq to the dictatorial rule of Saddam 
Hussein. At the same time, we have encouraged the “people” to revolt 
and overthrow Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party. Such conflicting 
messages have led to President George H. W. Bush’s recent embarrass-
ment regarding the plight of the Kurdish refugees, most of whom are 
fleeing the efforts of the Iraqi Army to suppress a rebellion tangibly en-
couraged by CIA radio broadcasts calling for open revolution against 
Saddam Hussein. Shi’ite Muslim rebellion in southern Iraq has received 
less attention, even though it has been just as ruthlessly suppressed by 
the Iraqi Army, but the U.S. administration’s “policy” seems once again 
to reflect the equivocations of the Vietnam era. After all, “Shi’ite” simply 
means “Iranian” to the Bush Administration, and that argues for an even 
more dangerous “imbalance” of power in the region. Rather than identify 
leaders with popular support and plans for better government, we have 
concerned ourselves once again with the “caricatures” of foreign politics 
and issues that we learned to sketch during the Vietnam period.
During the War, the only hint of the United States’ foreign policy in the 
Gulf in the postwar period was Secretary of State Baker’s plans for a “Mid-
dle Eastern Bank” to finance the reconstruction of Iraq. Amid the jokes 
about such a plan as a clever solution for the crisis in American banking, 
the obvious implication was that this was the only idea that the State De-
partment could formulate to meet the political crises after the war. Once 
again, the lessons of Vietnam seemed to have been forgotten. The enor-
mous foreign economic assistance we gave President Diem to bolster his 
shaky government was largely wasted on hasty efforts to industrialize 
South Vietnam and “build” an army with equipment but without popu-
lar support. The enduring myth of U.S. economic aid to Vietnam from 
our last-minute economic assistance of the French to the evacuation of 
Saigon in 1975 is that such assistance was squandered by corrupt offi-
cials. Yet, the real waste of U.S. aid to South Vietnam resulted from our 
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misunderstanding of the needs of the Vietnamese economy and people. 
As George Herring points out in America’s Longest War: The United States 
and Vietnam: 1950–1975, U.S. aid to South Vietnam between 1955 and 
1960 initially helped stabilize the South Vietnamese government, but the 
disproportionate military aid and efforts to rapidly industrialize South 
Vietnam “did little to promote economic development or to improve liv-
ing conditions in the villages where more than 90 percent of South Viet-
nam’s population resided”.51 In our enthusiasm to strengthen the central, 
urban rule of Diem, in imitation of the developed nations, we ignored the 
rural infrastructure for both the economy and politics of Vietnam.
How will the funds of Baker’s “Middle Eastern Bank” be distributed? 
In Vietnam, we confused buildings, factories, and consumer goods with 
what is vaguely designated by the word culture. Despite his militarism, his 
expansionist aims, and his tyrannical rule, Saddam Hussein enjoyed con-
siderable popular support in the Middle East in the months following his 
invasion of Kuwait. President George H. W. Bush insisted that we would 
not be “swayed” by such popular demonstrations, as if they reflected 
merely some sort of “mass hysteria” symptomatic of our worst ethnocen-
tric fantasies about the “Arab masses.” Yet what seems so obvious in those 
demonstrations was the expression of protest against the inequitable 
distribution of wealth in the region, whether that wealth be measured in 
oil, jobs, land, or merely “voice”—that is, some recognition for the many 
social and political constituencies in the Middle East who are effectively 
unheard in the West.
Viewed in this way, can the poverty of so many Middle Eastern peo-
ples, terrible when measured against the great wealth of the region, be re-
lieved significantly by a “Middle Eastern Bank,” however comprehensive 
its ambitions? Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, and 
other Arab nations of the Coalition have already benefited economically 
from the First Persian Gulf War. It is quite clear, however, that Jordan is 
to be punished economically for its neutrality and King Hussein’s pro-
tests against civilian casualties during the bombing of Iraq. Even in cases 
where popular sympathy has been elicited, such as for the plight of the 
Kurdish refugees, the economic future promises little more than infra-
structure, even if we generously assume that such “reconstruction” would 
be done selflessly in the interests of the Iraqi people. Who will rebuild 
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Kuwait? For that work, no “Middle Eastern Bank” will be needed. One 
of the world’s smallest nations, Kuwait is also one of the world’s richest 
nations. Even before the end of the First Gulf War, fifty billion dollars’ 
worth of contracts for reconstruction had been awarded by the Kuwaiti 
government-in-exile, virtually all to U.S. firms. The United States will 
rebuild Kuwait, and the United States will thus inevitably become the 
economic and military ruler of Kuwait. In this respect, we will succeed 
the British, who ruled Kuwait as a protectorate from 1914 to 1961, pro-
tected Kuwait from Iraqi territorial claims between 1961 and 1963, and 
worked out the agreements between the Kuwaiti royal family and British 
Petroleum, Getty Oil, and the Japanese owned “Arabian Oil Company” 
that shared Kuwait’s oil wealth in the 1950s and 1960s. In light of the 
grotesque scandals surrounding the U.S. banking industry in the 1980s, 
it seems absurd that our government should propose taking the initiative 
in developing a “Middle Eastern Bank” that would “solve” the postwar 
problems of the region.
How will we protect this tiny country against Iraq, against future ag-
gression in the Gulf region? Only by putting in power a puppet govern-
ment in Iraq, one whose subservience or fidelity to U.S. interests are so 
clear that we can withdraw the majority of our troops from what certainly 
will be the postwar “Occupation Zone” of Iraq. Who will “save” the Iraqi 
people—17.5 million of them before the War, who are even now begin-
ning to starve, to suffer the disease and pestilence that follow contami-
nated water supplies, whose doctors lack the most elementary medical 
supplies, who haven’t the fuel to cook what little food they have or purify 
what water they can collect from fetid ponds and bomb craters? Need-
less to say, I am speaking only of the survivors, not of the corpses in the 
bombed out buildings, in the terrible heaps of rubble that the joint “cen-
sorship” of the Pentagon and Saddam Hussein have virtually erased from 
our minds. There are hints, of course, from refugees that the civilian casu-
alties, even in the midst of the “smart bombs” and “non-civilian targets,” 
will horrify us when their sheer numbers come finally, as they must, to 
light. I need hardly remind you that “collateral damage” means people.
Of course, the United States will assume responsibility for humani-
tarian aid, as well it should, but it will be a humanitarian effort that, for 
whatever good it may do, will nonetheless assure our political sphere 
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of influence in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Like Diem, some well-in-
tentioned but hardly popular Iraqi will be “selected” to restore his coun-
try to economic stability and bring the survivors back to “normal” life. 
And such a leader will depend, of course, on Western financial support; 
whatever his good intentions, he will be a bought man. But what of the 
countries neighboring Iraq and Kuwait? President George H. W. Bush re-
fused to countenance what he termed “linkage” in the failed diplomatic 
negotiations with Iraq in the five months leading to this disastrous war. 
But how can the question of “linkage” be ignored when the war itself will 
command a new relation among the various states of the Middle East? 
The same questions were asked in the years following the landing of U.S. 
troops in Vietnam in 1965, when it became clear we were not just lending 
“advisors” but actively fighting the war for the South Vietnamese govern-
ment. What would happen to Cambodia, to Laos, to Thailand? We know 
that we share considerable responsibility for the Khmer Rouge’s military 
victory in Cambodia, following our bombing of NLF and PRG sanctuar-
ies along the Cambodian border with Vietnam. We know that the geno-
cide of 3 million Cambodians carried out by the Khmer Rouge govern-
ment was a consequence of the “madness” of the war waged in Vietnam, 
spilling over into Cambodia.
Is it possible for a sophisticated world leader to refuse to countenance 
“political linkage” of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait with the other wars and 
territorial ambitions of the various countries in the region over the past 
fifty years, when in fact foreign policy cannot be understood as anything 
else than an effort to “link” different national interests? “Linkage” is now 
inevitable, and even in the specific case of what President George H. W. 
Bush considered the most unthinkable “linkage” five months ago: the 
“linkage” of the issue of Kuwait with the issue of Palestine and the 2.5 
million homeless Palestinians. In his 1991 “State of the Union” address, 
the President suggested that some resolution of the Palestinian question 
will have to be part of the postwar peace settlement, if only for the prag-
matic reason that no peace will be lasting in the region without address-
ing the question of Palestine and the Palestinian people. If this was so 
clear to President George H. W. Bush, then why was it an issue before he 
ordered military action to begin?
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By refusing even to consider any “linkage” of the Palestinian question 
with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President George H. W. Bush initiated a 
military policy that made a wide range of “linkages” virtually unavoid-
able. Certainly Saddam Hussein’s military policies depend upon such 
political “linkages,” and they are likely to have disastrous military conse-
quences for our coalition. After the air war began on January 16, 1991, 
Jordan’s King Hussein protested angrily the military campaign and the 
growing civilian casualties. After the war began, Jordanians expressed 
strong support for the Iraqis and for Saddam Hussein. Our response 
was to threaten to cut foreign aid to Jordan and to trivialize the “military 
threat” of the Jordanian army and air force. In the meantime, Iraq has sent 
much of its remaining air force to bases in Iran, and we have trivialized 
the “military threat” of Iraqi planes in Iran. But the average Iranian citizen 
has expressed growing sympathy with the Iraqis and anger against the 
relentless bombing that continues unabated just beyond their western 
border. Should we simply fear the entrance of Jordan and Iran into this 
war on the side of Iraq? No, we should fear far more the lasting politi-
cal consequences of the deep-seated resentment of the United States that 
our military policies have created among the peoples of Jordan and Iran. 
Even barring their entrance into the military conflict, can we be certain 
that their moderate leaders, King Hussein and President Rafsanjani, will 
survive politically the growing popular sentiments against U.S. actions in 
the Persian Gulf?
The terrible future that our military policies in this war may well be cre-
ating has clear parallels with what happened in Southeast Asia. If that fu-
ture comes even close to what I have sketched—an Iraqi Diem, or worse, 
an Iranian Shah, propped up by U.S. economic aid and military support, 
then we already know the consequences. There will be no peace in the 
Middle East; there will be merely an acceleration of the wars that have 
troubled that region in the wake of French, British, and now U.S. colonial-
ism. Or perhaps more terrible still than overt warfare, there may come to 
power even more of the unpublicized political terror we condemn in Sad-
dam Hussein and yet supported in the Iran ruled with an iron fist by the 
Shah and his secret police, Savak, for more than a quarter of a century.
The Vietminh at Dienbienphu fought for a great military victory, 
which General Giap knew would serve primarily political ends. It was, of 
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course, a very real battle with terrible casualties and acts of extraordinary 
heroism on both sides, but the Vietminh, Giap, and Ho knew that it was 
primarily a symbolic victory that strengthened their hand in Geneva. In a 
similar sense, the Tet Offensive of 1968 was a military disaster for the Na-
tional Liberation Front as well as for the North Vietnamese Communists 
who supported it. It accomplished little, except for the atrocities in Hue 
and the destruction of that ancient city. The marines retook Hue with 
awful casualties, but they regained that ground. The U.S. combat troops 
in Vietnam were not zoned out, demoralized by anti-war protesters, and 
indecisive in military action. We won the battles, but we lost the war. Be-
cause we lost the peace before the war began.
In the First Gulf War, we also betrayed an utter ignorance of local poli-
tics—or perhaps it is simply a studied carelessness toward both regions 
and a lack of interest in their indigenous peoples and local politics. That, 
above all, seems to have been the cause of our failure in Vietnam. Our 
“Southeast Asian” experts were legion, scattered from the State Depart-
ment to universities throughout the U.S. But none seemed to have the 
slightest understanding of the complex political divisions in Vietnam, the 
different local leaders, the ethnic and religious diversity. We poured for-
eign aid into industrialization and urbanization programs encouraged by 
Diem, an urban Catholic, who was also deeply nationalist. We ignored 
the agrarian traditions of Vietnam, especially important in the rich and 
fertile lands of South Vietnam. We dealt with European-educated intel-
lectuals, often cosmopolitans with contradictory yearnings for western 
ways; we treated the village peasantry and their agriculture as “inconse-
quential.” In terms of our global foreign policies, they hardly mattered, 
but in Vietnam they were keys to popular support as well as our own 
democratic values. We never won their “hearts and minds,” because pro-
grams like the “Hamlet Resettlement Program” and the “Phoenix Pro-
gram” treated their centuries’ old traditions and values as the lingering 
traces of a “primitive” people in need of our enlightenment.
We repeated this pattern of arrogance in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, and the 
rest of the Middle East during and after the First Gulf War. Our allies, 
such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, suffered the 
consequences of their alliance with our imperial commitment to mod-
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ern, technocratic “civilization” as a political solution to regional problems 
exacerbated by EuroAmerican imperialism.
Most Americans agreed in the early stages of the War that the censor-
ship of the news imposed by our government was in the “best interests” 
of our nation. “Doesn’t anyone remember the old adage from World War 
II: ‘Zip the lip?’” a correspondent to the Los Angeles Times wrote shortly 
after the ground war began, complaining of CNN’s coverage of military 
operations in the Gulf. I do not agree that we should accept such censor-
ship, especially when it means keeping us in the dark regarding the casu-
alties in Iraq and Kuwait. But even granting hypothetically such a need 
for military censorship, then can an equal case be made for the de facto 
“censorship” of our political plans for peace? If such plans are reasonable, 
especially when what we mean by “reasonable” takes into account the in-
terests of the diverse peoples living in the Middle East, then shouldn’t we 
publicize them broadly in the interests of gathering support from those 
who now seem to hate us more every day? Wouldn’t a reasonable peace 
plan have helped bring the war to a more rapid conclusion, more convinc-
ingly encouraging the coup d’état that the U.S. government encouraged us 
would soon come to Iraq? Alas, it was the same in the Vietnam War. Our 
government encouraged us to believe that the “light at the end of the tun-
nel” would result from “internal” divisions of the Vietnamese Commu-
nists, disagreements between the North Vietnamese and Chinese, even 
the poor health and incipient death of Ho Chi Minh. Our hopes were as 
fantastic and as macabre as the CIA’s infamous plot to poison the cigars 
and beard of Fidel Castro.
Or is it that, as usual, at the end of the First Gulf War the United States 
had no effective plan for peace, could not imagine any “linkage” that 
would transform military action into human and social action of lasting 
consequence? In the place of the terrible scenario for a nervous “peace” I 
have sketched above, I offer my own version. Acknowledge that the “new 
global order” is not merely an occasion for the United States to take ad-
vantage of problems in Russia and China to reassert the same old U.S. 
dominance in world affairs, but a genuine opportunity to create a “United 
Nations” that will govern by way of the human diversity it is intended 
to represent. Scrap the “Security Council.” Cancel Veto-Power. Let ev-
ery country admitted have one vote. Make consensus the aim for power-
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ful and binding decisions regarding such matters as military aggression. 
Develop a genuinely multinational peace-keeping force, dividing the re-
sponsibility proportionately among the participating countries. Let this 
new United Nations negotiate settlements of issues of clear international 
consequence, and let this same United Nations delegate other issues of 
more local consequence to “subcommittees” composed of the nations 
in the region most immediately affected: in this case, a Middle Eastern 
Conference called by the United Nations and conducted according to 
general rules and guidelines established by the U.N. In effect, give the 
United Nations the powers to debate and finally decide legal, territorial, 
and economic issues of consequence to the world communities. In short, 
do not send James Baker III to Geneva to negotiate with Tariq Aziz in the 
“name” of the United Nations. After the Geneva Accords of 1954, who 
could believe in such a fiction? Why else did those last-minute diplomat-
ic efforts collapse so quickly and so ludicrously?
Give the United Nations economic powers as well, so that this inter-
national body might impose long-term, effective economic sanctions 
against an aggressor-nation. All the arguments about how the League of 
Nations and then the United Nations have failed to bring about this new 
means of reaching global consensus and resolving legally and economi-
cally such disputes must for the moment be put aside. We have never be-
fore tried to forge such an international body for judgment beyond the 
logic of “balance-of-power” politics, outside the framework of European 
colonialism, or in the aftermath of the Cold War. We have such an oppor-
tunity now.52
If such a “peaceful solution” strikes you as naive, unworkable, or 
hopelessly unrealistic, I ask you to consider one more factor. Those 
who opposed this war were asked ceaselessly and rhetorically by other 
concerned citizens, “But what can we do?” The implied answer to this 
question is always the same: “We had no choice, but to pursue military 
action against Iraq.” Of the many possible peaceful options available to 
us and the United Nations before military action began, none was given a 
reasonable chance to work.
We will not fight in the Persian Gulf with “one hand tied behind our 
backs,” President George H. W. Bush insisted. And we would not lose 
our “resolve” to “finish the job” that according to this logic we “left un-
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finished” in Vietnam. But President George H. W. Bush was wrong on 
both accounts. To pit young men and women on both sides against smart 
bombs and missiles, Abrams tanks and land mines—in short, to pit the 
frail and precious human body against flying bits of sharpened metal—
this is indeed to fight “with one hand tied behind our backs,” the hand, in 
short, that extends a human touch, a certain sympathy, not for a dictator 
like Saddam Hussein but for the 17.5 million Iraqis who suffer most from 
this war and for the homeless, displaced, impoverished peoples of the 
Middle East, who in their desperation look to Saddam Hussein as a hero. 
To imagine that “war” is a “job to finish” only ignores utterly the lessons 
of the Vietnam War. For some, it was our ignoble retreat from Vietnam—
from the rooftops of Saigon in 1975 or from the Paris Peace Talks in 
1973—that led to the repressive regime in contemporary Vietnam. But 
it was our conduct in that War that caricatured the best minds and talents 
of the Vietnamese nationalist movements as vulgar Communists, as “en-
emies of the people,” while we supported a succession of thugs, crooks, 
and megalomaniacs.
War is never a “job to finish,” as the veterans of the Vietnam War will 
tell you. For those who fought and served in Vietnam, the war will never 
be over. For the 58,000 Americans who died there, for the 75,000 who 
committed suicide after they returned home, for the estimated 2 million 
Vietnamese who died in the war, for the families who have suffered, and 
for the veterans from all sides of our ugly war who still suffer Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorder—for these and many other survivors of the Viet-
nam War, the parallels of this war, however “swift” and “surgical” it may 
have been conducted on the battlefield, are to Vietnam, the war we lost 
when we could not articulate the peace. The peace is made not when war 
is over, but before war has begun. The “just war,” if such a notion is pos-
sible, depends not on arcane ethical debates, but on the promise of the 
peace that will come from such war, so that we may assess the cost of our 
brothers and sisters on both sides.
We have no plan for peace in the Middle East, no “policy” for the fu-
ture of the region, unless it is a “secret” plan worked out in the offices of 
the Pentagon and the Executive branch of the government. Too often in 
our history, we have known how to make war but failed to imagine peace. 
217 times we have fought in our brief history, only seven times with Con-
76
gressionally approved declarations of war. It is not just the conduct of the 
war that we must protest; it is also our failure to pursue peace that we 
must protest. We should not be in the Persian Gulf to “win” the war we 
lost in Vietnam; we should be in the Persian Gulf to win the peace we 
never found in Vietnam.
During the First Gulf War, Harold Meyerson argued that the continu-
ing crisis in the Middle East resembles neither World War II nor Vietnam, 
insisting that opponents of the First Gulf War “insist on a politics rooted 
in the present”.53 Meyerson wisely argues we should avoid historical com-
parisons that distract us from particular circumstances in global conflicts. 
Comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler, the invasion of Kuwait to 
the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, confuses by conflating different dic-
tators, eras, regions, and peoples. By the same token, we should not rush 
to forget the lessons of the past, especially when they are hard lessons 
such as those learned in Vietnam. These are lessons to be studied by what 
Meyerson considers the “fractured” American left but also by all those 
who claimed a short-term victory in the six-week war in the Persian Gulf. 
Unless we articulate a detailed foreign policy, address the concerns of the 
politically and economically disempowered (both at home and abroad), 
and learn to deal with other cultures rather than with political celebrities, 
we shall be doomed to a “new global order”—the popular slogan of Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush’s administration—of ceaseless little wars. Let us 
remember that opposition to the Vietnam War was not the cause of losing 
an unwinnable, immoral war; it was simply one expression of the dissent 
and debate that are the true signs of democracy and rational patriotism. 
Silence and forgetfulness have often enough been the heralds of history’s 
most terrible epochs.
Afterword: 2010
It is chilling to read the previous pages after almost twenty years, a decade 
after 9/11, and realize how clear it was in 1991 that the unresolved prob-
lems in the Middle East, most of them resulting from the postcolonial ef-
fects of EuroAmerican colonial interference in the region, would only be 
exacerbated by the Coalition’s military action in the First Gulf War. The 
emergence of al-Qaeda is not anticipated explicitly, but some organiza-
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tion of political and military resistance to the West seems nearly inevi-
table given our foreign policy myopia in treating Saddam Hussein as an 
isolable dictator, who could be controlled with sheer military force. The 
ceaseless “little wars” predicted in the final paragraph are now integral to 
our foreign policy and daily lives, affecting the lives of so many Ameri-
cans and peoples in Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Gaza, Palestine, Lebanon, Israel, 
Egypt, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Philippines. These wars 
and their continuing after-effects are destroying our vaunted economy, 
even as some Americans have taken the oddly undemocratic tack of “cel-
ebrating” our neo-imperialism as a virtue or a sign of “success”. Instead, 
we seem poised on the brink of those collapses that have resulted from al-
most every imperial power in world history committed to a succession of 
wars to maintain its ever-expanding empire. As I write these lines, Presi-
dent Barack Obama struggles to extricate the U.S. from two costly wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, his own executive authority and liberal identity 
threatened by what Bob Woodward has dubbed in a just published book, 
Obama’s Wars.54 Even before its release, the book was condemned by 
right-wing journalists for contributing to the defeatism originally associ-
ated with the “Vietnam Syndrome”.55
Chapter 3
Covering Iraq in Our Time
Prologue: 2010
In the U.S. edition of In Our Time (1925), Ernest Hemingway includ-
ed among the well-known stories brief vignettes or “interludes”, many 
dealing with World War I and the unstable political situation in Europe 
before and during the war.56 These prose vignettes had been published 
separately the year before in Paris as a modernist experiment in prose po-
etry, in our time (1924), by William Bird in his Three Mountains Press.57 
When hand setting the type for the Paris edition, Bird considered fram-
ing “each page with a border of newsprint, carefully selected to serve both 
as decoration and illustration…fitting for a book by a young journalist”.58 
When combined with the Nick Adams’ and other stories of the Midwest 
in the U.S. edition, the vignettes were understood to suggest an oblique 
commentary, a sort of modernist palimpsest (perhaps recalling Pound’s 
influence on the young Hemingway), relating the volatile politics to the 
apparent normality of everyday life in the U.S.
What follows then is inspired by Hemingway’s interludes in In Our 
Time, as well as by his original idea that a collection of quasi-journalistic 
short pieces might be rendered as avant-garde prose-poems with the in-
tention of shocking his readers into some sort of recognition of the hor-
rors awaiting those living through the interwar years. William Bird may 
have been thinking of the newspaper headlines in James Joyce’s Ulysses 
(1922) and John Dos Passos’ Manhattan Transfer, even though the latter 
novel wasn’t published until 1925. It is by now a commonplace that high 
modernism competed with journalism by incorporating its media (both 
text and image) in order to re-function the message.
Although I want to call attention to this modernist heritage in my own 
brief “news story” from the Second Gulf War, I also want to suggest a 
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somewhat different role for the scholar in writing contemporary journal-
ism as part of a progressive cultural politics. Hemingway, Dos Passos, and 
Joyce imagined that by changing the form in which journalistic prose ap-
peared, the message might be more effective. People don’t read newspa-
pers carefully, Dos Passos argued implicitly in Manhattan Transfer, whose 
pages jumble together international and local news. What connects the 
global and the local is not clearly established, which is the task of the nov-
elist. Yet the modernist assumption relied on careful readers, who would 
take the time to ponder what related such disparate events as the Greco-
Turkish War, the subject of Hemingway’s “On the Quai at Smyrna”, and 
EuroAmerican and Native American relations in the U.S. Midwest in the 
story “Indian Camp”, for example, or how life in Manhattan in the 1920s 
might be affected by the colonial struggle over Morocco included in Dos 
Passos’s Manhattan Transfer.59
Yet writing for the thoughtful reader capable of understanding the im-
pact of colonial instabilities in Northwest Africa or the consequences of 
the forced expulsion of Greeks from the city of Smyrna, renamed Ismailia 
by the Turks, in the Greco-Turkish War may not be a luxury the politi-
cal activist can indulge. Today’s media are too various and too rapid in 
their treatment of the news to allow such avant-garde interventions to 
have significant impact. Of course, scholars routinely write op-ed pieces 
in newspapers, are interviewed as experts on television and radio and In-
ternet news, use their own web-sites and blogs to offer alternative news, 
and in many other ways realize the role of “public intellectual” I argued in 
Chapter 1 we all need to assume from time to time.
The activist scholar faces a number of problems as a public intellectual, 
including stereotypes of the scholar as left-wing, liberal, “politically cor-
rect”, or tenured-radical. Popular assumptions about the scholar include 
clichés about disciplines, which are difficult to dispel. There is also a cer-
tain randomness to the ways mass media representatives consult scholar-
ly experts. Ask a reporter how he or she “found” you and often the answer 
is through a departmental administrative assistant, a friend at another 
university hoping to dodge the assignment, or some hasty web-search. If 
scholar-activists are to make effective interventions in mass-media, then 
they must understand these variables and learn how to adapt to them.
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I was asked to write the following 200-word response to a question 
posed by a reporter from the Long Island, New York newspaper, News-
day, one day after images of four Blackwater security “contractors’” 
burnt corpses were shown in news media around the world on April 1, 
2004.60 The event is by now a famous prelude to Coalition forces’ mili-
tary assaults on the Iraqi city of Fallujah in al Anbar Province between 
2004 and 2006, resulting in the virtual destruction of much of the city 
and the displacement of most of the urban population. Scott Helvenson, 
Jerry ( Jerko) Zovko, Wesley Batalona, and Michael Teague, employed 
by Blackwater Security, hired by the U.S. Department of Defense to pro-
vide various forms of security for support services in Iraq, were attacked 
by members of the Islamic Army of Iraq while driving their Blackwater 
SUV to guard transport of food catering services for the military in Fal-
lujah. After their SUV was destroyed by a rocket-propelled grenade, the 
four dead contractors were dragged from the SUV and their corpses hung 
from a railroad bridge crossing the Euphrates River. Now informally 
called by Coalition forces the “Blackwater Bridge”, the site with its burnt 
and grotesquely hanging bodies quickly became an image of the ongoing 
conflict in Iraq following the rapid and seemingly successful invasion by 
Coalition forces in March 2003.
Given the subsequent military events in Fallujah, including the abor-
tive “Operation Vigilant Resolve”, which began shortly after the global 
outrage concerning the images of the Blackwater contractors’ burnt, 
hanging bodies, and the controversial Operation Phantom Fury, which 
began in November 2004 and resulted not only in widespread urban de-
struction and casualties but also lingering environmental damage, the 
question I was asked seems absurdly trivial in retrospect: “Is a picture 
worth a thousand words?”61 There was more, of course, to this question. 
The editors of Newsday wanted to know if an “expert” on representations 
of warfare thought that this particular image would stir anti-war or pro-
war responses in the U.S. They also wanted a response by the mid-day on 
April 1, so it could be revised and ready for publication on April 2.
This journalistic demand for immediate response leaves little time for 
reflection or research, which is why Joyce, Dos Passos, and Hemingway 
offered alternative literary responses to journalism. Yet with the Second 
Gulf War winding down in the imagination of the U.S. public, especial-
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ly after President George W. Bush’s infamous “Mission Accomplished” 
speech on October 29, 2003 on board the aircraft carrier, U.S.S. Abraham 
Lincoln, the Newsday assignment seemed a rare opportunity to call atten-
tion to the building problems in “postwar” Iraq. I entitled my one-page 
op-ed “Covering Iraq”, alluding to Edward Said’s Covering Islam (1981), 
especially its subtitle: How the Media and Experts Determine How We 
See the Rest of the World.62 Said’s main title is, of course, a pun on how 
the Western media stereotype Islam in ways consistent with the West-
ern “Orientalism” Said famously analyzes and criticizes in Orientalism 
(1978).63 In stressing the horrible consequences of military conflict on 
the four Blackwater Security “contractors”, the news media had indeed 
“covered up” the ongoing violence against Iraqis in the Coalition’s unjus-
tified invasion of the sovereign nation of Iraq.
Not only did I attempt to change the subject from the clichéd ques-
tion of whether or not a “picture is worth a thousand words” to the me-
dia’s “coverage” of the ongoing war in Iraq, but I also attempted to call 
attention to the little-discussed use of independent “contractors” in the 
Second Gulf War. In 2004, this issue had hardly been discussed, and 
Blackwater Security was little known to the general public. Founded in 
1997 by Erik Prince and Al Clark, Blackwater Security Consulting played 
an increasingly controversial role as a private security firm and militia in 
Iraq from 2003–2009, when the firm was expelled from Iraq by the Iraqi 
government. Struggling to refurbish its public image while doing little to 
change its paramilitary tactics, Blackwater changed its name in 2009 to 
“Xe Services”, a strategy apparently designed to frustrate independent In-
ternet searches of its personnel and corporate structure, and then on June 
8, 2010 was put up for sale.64 In 2004, long before public attention in the 
U.S. focused on “private contractors” in Iraq, I easily accessed the Black-
water Security Consulting site and was able to scroll through the names 
of employees, virtually all of whom were veterans of U.S., South African, 
and other national armies around the world. The impunity with which 
the U.S. Department of Defense was operating by employing such para-
military organizations and thinly veiling their activities with the euphe-
mism “private contractors” alarmed me, and I hoped in my brief op-ed 
to call attention to the issue, as the last line of the newspaper story does.
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Did it “work”? No, it did not, if we judge merely from the fact that 
Blackwater Security operated successfully in Iraq for another five years 
and that in the meantime Erik Prince used the wealth generated by this 
firm to support anti-Islamic, fundamentalist Christian causes.65 Resign-
ing as CEO of Xe Services on March 2, 2009, Prince not only put up the 
firm for sale on June 8, 2010, but he moved to Abu Dhabi on August 18, 
2010, because as some suspected the United Arab Emirates do not have 
an extradition treaty with the U.S.66 My allusion to Said’s Covering Islam 
was lost when the Editor retitled the one-page story, “Images from Fallu-
jah Will Stir Debate, But…Won’t Alter Policy”, drawing a conclusion he 
had wanted but did not get. My message instead focused on Iraqi anger 
at U.S. imperialism, Blackwater Security’s private role in the war, and the 
need for better information about casualties in the invasion and continu-
ing violence.
In another, immeasurable sense, the 200-word newspaper story does 
work, because it asked such questions before they became routine topics 
of conversation and public debate. Blackwater Security has been expelled 
from Iraq and lost its credibility; no one is any longer fooled by the eu-
phemistic term “private contractors”; few believe that the “civil war” in 
Iraq following our invasion was not directly related to our imperialism; 
information about casualties in the Second Gulf War and its aftermath is 
now provided by a variety of sources.
Covering Iraq: April 1–2, 2004
What should the news media show of the recent killing of four American 
civilians in Fallujah? Although debates revolve around what is proper to 
the victims and their families and how sensationalism should be avoid-
ed, the underlying concern is the political use of such imagery. Will the 
charred bodies of these four employees of Blackwater Security “intimi-
date” Americans and cause us to lose our “resolve”? Will we abandon our 
military and foreign policy missions in Iraq as the Clinton Administra-
tion was accused of withdrawing from Somalia in the now infamous af-
termath of “Blackhawk Down”? Or will still and moving photographs of 
an angry mob exulting in its abuse of four American citizens strengthen 
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a national consensus previously divided over the propriety of the Bush 
Administration’s invasion of Iraq and its “war on terror”?
However powerful we think media images, they will do little in and of 
themselves to strengthen or challenge our military and foreign policies in 
Iraq. As anti-war activists discovered in the Vietnam era, the mere display 
of damaged bodies—the infamous photos of the VietCong suspect ex-
ecuted by the Saigon Police Chief and the naked, screaming child burned 
by Napalm—has not alone changed policy or opinion. In too many cases, 
such photographs have taken the place of serious historical and politi-
cal discussion, substituting sentiment for reason. The mere exhibition of 
such human misery can at its worst take on a perverse allure, even aes-
thetic fascination, closer to the fetishistic use of human bodies in Fallujah 
than we care to consider. The fetish usually indicates a desire for power 
we do not have: our failure to comprehend the reason four more Ameri-
cans died; the mob’s inability to affect U.S. authority. If these deaths are 
not to be in vain, then we must look at what they tell us. The war in Iraq 
continues as a guerilla war against invaders, not a civil war. The rage of the 
mob in Fallujah is part of the anger felt by many in the Arab world toward 
the United States. The horrible deaths of four civilians call for better in-
formation about casualties to all combatants and noncombatants in this 
war. The role of private military companies in Iraq needs greater scrutiny.
Chapter 4
Areas of Concern
Area Studies and the New American Studies
The following chapter deals with the relationship between the micropoli-
tics of academic disciplines and the macropolitics of nation-states. When 
neo-conservatives complain about the “politicizing” of education, often 
insisting that all forms of education remain “free” of political interfer-
ence, they ignore the fact that educational curricula and pedagogies have 
always been deeply involved in specific political practices and positions. 
Insisting that we keep education free of political interests is simply unre-
alistic; students should learn instead how to negotiate specific political 
positions based on available information and defend their positions ac-
cordingly. It has often been argued that entire fields are shaped by specific 
epistemologies, which in turn represent particular political interests. The 
histories of both American Studies and various “area studies” are good 
examples, especially insofar as “area studies” have had close relations with 
state sponsorship, both intellectual and economic, since their beginnings. 
The following chapter treats the critical interpretation of these political 
interests of American Studies (both traditional and “new”) and of vari-
ous “area studies” as political practice, arguing that the activism of the 
new American Studies should not be restricted simply to macropolitical 
issues, such as those treated in the three preceding chapters.
American Studies has thus far avoided the heated debates concern-
ing the restructuring of area studies prompted by dramatic changes in 
the geopolitical and economic maps as a consequence of globalization. 
In view of the U.S. role in the economic, political, and cultural changes 
produced by globalization, we might expect that American Studies 
would be as fiercely contested in its disciplinary borders as East Asian, 
Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, Soviet, and Latin American Studies, to 
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mention only a few of the areas established by post-World War II schol-
arship and facing dramatic challenges since the 1970s, especially in the 
aftermath of Soviet decolonization. Of course, the area studies model has 
defined primarily the social sciences—economics, political science, and 
sociology—and interdisciplinary conjunctures of history and the social 
sciences, including “historical sociology” and “social science history”.67 
Given the centrality of cultural production, especially literature and the 
visual arts, and traditional history in the field of American Studies, it is 
not surprising that American Studies would be considered eccentric to 
the debates concerning the scholarly map of a new world order governed 
by new political, economic, and social forces. Whether treated as epiphe-
nomenal or superstructural, the objects of study dominating post-World 
War II American Studies—“myths and symbols” to use a convenient 
tag—hardly warranted the attention of serious scholars dealing with ur-
gent issues of global political instability, economic crisis, war, genocide, 
famine and drought, and the spread of infectious diseases.
In ancient Greece, geographers divided their field into three major con-
tinental areas: Europe, Asia, and Libya (Africa).68 The sixteenth- to eigh-
teenth-century voyages of European exploration and the consolidation 
of what Walter Mignolo terms the “modern/colonial world system” ex-
panded the ancient continental model while relying on many of its basic 
assumptions regarding both the hierarchy of civilizations and the unique-
ness of the peoples in these different regions.69 The “seven-continent 
model of the modern elementary school classroom” led to refinements 
and subdivisions, most of them reflecting specific European colonial 
interests. As Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen have written: “[S]cholarly 
divisions of labor showed that the tripartite global model of the ancient 
Greeks was deeply entrenched. The West (North America and Europe) 
was conceptualized as the site for serious history and the social sciences; 
the East (stretching from Morocco to Japan), as the zone where Orien-
talists could ponder the cultural flowers of supposedly fossilized civiliza-
tions; and the rest of the world was the domain of anthropologists, who 
specialized in ‘primitive’ cultural and social systems” (163).
According to the “Best is the West” thesis, the U.S. and Canada shared 
the privileged status of Europe in the traditional area studies model that 
dominated the social sciences from their institutional inception in the 
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nineteenth century through the formal reforms instituted by the Ethno-
geographic Board commissioned by the U.S. government in 1942 (Lew-
is and Wigen, 163). Certainly the confusion of nationalist and racialist 
ideologies in the nineteenth and early twentieth century contributed to 
such myths as “the March of the Anglo-Saxon”, whose “destiny” ranged 
from Northern Europe to England, Ireland, Scotland, and then across the 
Atlantic and the North American Continent in a “manifest destiny” that 
would civilize triumphantly the rest of the world. According to this famil-
iar notion that the United States in particular (although Canada first as 
colony and then as member of the British Commonwealth also qualifies) 
is merely an extension of European Civilization, creating the “greater” 
Western Civilization also thoroughly challenged from the 1970s onward, 
it would seem that the United States and Canada (North America) and 
their prototypes in Europe would constitute the most important “area” 
for study and thus draw as much as possible on complementary fields 
such as American and Canadian Studies.
Yet this was obviously not the case when modern “area studies” oper-
ated under the shadow of the modern/colonial world system. Neither 
American nor European Studies existed in the period of nineteenth-
century nationalism, the consolidation of European imperialism, and the 
emergence of U.S. imperial authority. The “serious history and social sci-
ences” Lewis and Wigen contend were devoted to North America and 
Europe offered primarily a model to the rest of the world for “civiliza-
tion”, both in its contemporarily achieved and its ideal or destined forms. 
Walt Whitman’s Democratic Vistas (1871/1876) is neither sociology nor 
history, but its incorporation of the rest of the emerging world into the 
“cosmic” destiny of U.S. democracy and individualism exemplifies this 
paradox that the privileged “areas” of Western Civilization—the U.S., 
Canada, Europe, and their Greco-Roman sources—are not “areas” at all, 
but conceptualizations or idealisms capable of thriving anywhere and ev-
erywhere, like the mind of God.70 Neither North American nor European 
Studies were necessary to “study” such a historically and geographically 
specific suite of phenomena, because they were indeed the intellectual 
complements of the modern/colonial world system, hardly subject to the 
internal critique or metanarrative that might have resulted from taking 
“America” or “Europe” as “objects of study”.
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When at the beginning of World War II, the “U.S. government called 
upon the Smithsonian Institution, the American Council of Learned So-
cieties, the National Research Council, and the Social Science Research 
Council to form a body known as the Ethnogeographic Board”, the 
charge to create “a new system of global divisions” was hardly intended to 
do away with imperialist hierarchies of the older “area studies” and their 
commitment to “the West is the Best” (Lewis and Wigen, 163). The Eth-
nogeographic Board was formally established in June of 1942.71 Carl E. 
Guthe, the anthropologist who chaired the new Board, characterizes it 
as “a non-governmental agency established in the name of the scientists 
and scholars of the country for the purpose of aiding the government” 
(Guthe, 189). This curious alliance of putatively independent founda-
tions, scholars, and governmental institutions—a “state-scholarly com-
plex”—continues to shape area studies to this day, even after the Cold-
War era and funding have passed. What motivated the U.S. government 
was the need for more effective “language training” and “cultural fluency” 
to enable the U.S. and its allies to conduct “the war effort across large 
spans of the globe” (Lewis and Wigen, 163).
The work of the Board is characterized by Guthe as “interdisciplinary 
in scope, seeking to use the facilities and knowledge of the earth sciences, 
the biological sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities, in so far as 
these relate to regions outside of the continental United States” (Guthe, 
189). Lewis and Wigen note that geography played a much smaller role 
on the Board than was initially imagined; Robert B. Hall is the only geog-
rapher on the original eight-scholar Board (Lewis and Wigen, 163). The 
Board membership in 1943 listed by Guthe includes two archaeologists 
(if you count Strong twice in this list), three anthropologists, a historian, 
a geographer, a biologist, a public health specialist, and an East Asian 
languages scholar.72 Chaired by Guthe, the Board was directed by Wil-
liam Duncan Strong (1899–1962), the Columbia University archaeolo-
gist and anthropologist (1937–1962), who specialized in the indigenous 
peoples of North and South America, especially the Incas of Peru.73 Thus 
Guthe’s specific exclusion of areas within “the continental United States” 
clearly did not include “indigenous peoples and their cultures”, reinforc-
ing the notion that this “area studies” model was fully committed to the 
modernizaton and development processes. Archaeology and Anthropol-
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ogy (especially if you count William Duncan Strong twice, as his exper-
tise in both disciplines warrants) account for more than half of the disci-
plines represented on the Board (5 of 9). Only two of these scholars can 
be considered vaguely connected with the “humanities”—the Sinologist 
Mortimer Graves and historian Carter Goodrich.74 Neither “American 
Studies” nor “American Literature”, indeed any literary or cultural spe-
cializations, other than those covered by the anthropologists and archae-
ologists, are represented on the Board.
The unmanageable “seven-continents” model and its “European colo-
nial” subtext of the prewar era was replaced by the more specific “areas” 
proposed by the Ethnogeographic Commission: East Asia, Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, North America, 
Russia and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Oceania (Lewis and 
Wigen, 163–164). The older colonial hierarchy was replaced by goals of 
“modernization and development”, whereby North America and West-
ern Europe still retained their status as “superior civilizations” by virtue 
of technological advances and claims to political innovations. The inter-
disciplinary alliance between the social sciences, the humanities, and ge-
ography was not realized. Lewis and Martin point out that although two 
“prominent geographers, Isaiah Bowman and Robert Hall, were appoint-
ed” to the Ethnogeographic Board, “few geographers became involved in 
the intellectual work of the board, and the task of delineating areas fell 
primarily to anthropologists and other social scientists” (163).75 Indeed, 
“the anthropological imprint is evident in the use of the term area (de-
rived from ethnological studies of ‘culture areas’), rather than region”, a 
symptom to my mind of how such “area studies” were already motivated 
by the “modernization and development” models isomorphic with neo-
imperialism, especially later versions of “free-trade imperialism”, and 
third-stage, postindustrial capitalism in its global form.
Interestingly, the work of the Ethnogeographic Board occurs contem-
poraneously with the emergence of American Studies as an “interdisci-
plinary field”, however we might quibble over exact “origins”, in the influ-
ential work of F. O. Matthiessen, whose American Renaissance is published 
in 1941. And yet American Studies, especially in the Myth-and-Symbol 
School so often traced back to Matthiessen, is by no means an “area stud-
ies” field as it was conceived by the anthropologists, geographers, biolo-
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gists, and other scholars serving on the Ethnogeographic Board. If there 
is a connection, then it must be made through the cultural idealism of 
American Studies supporting, often unwittingly, the “modernization and 
development” ideology of the area studies developed by the Ethnogeo-
graphic Board in the early 1940s and fully institutionalized during the 
Cold War, especially with the “1958 National Defense Education Act, Ti-
tle VI, […] which supplied the funds to establish university area-studies 
centers” that by 1990 totaled “some 124 National Resource Centers,[…] 
each devoted to the interdisciplinary study of a particular world region” 
(Lewis and Wigen, 164). Of course, since Donald Pease published his 
pioneering “Moby-Dick and the Cold War” in 1985, much valuable work 
has been done on how American Studies participated in Cold War ide-
ology, especially its articulation of an American Exceptionalism subse-
quently challenged by a “new” American Studies vigorously committed 
to transnational, postnational, postcolonial, indigenist, and multiethnic 
goals for understanding the “United States” in global contexts.76
Indeed, the critique of Cold-War area studies, initiated largely by left 
intellectuals in the 1970s, once again coincides historically with the criti-
cism of first-generation American Studies (primarily the ideology of the 
Myth-and-Symbol School) directed by feminists, ethnic studies, post-
modernists, gay studies, and other minoritized intellectuals at how their 
interests and rights were at worst neglected or at best “synthesized” in tra-
ditional American Studies. Lewis and Wigen attribute the “crisis” in area 
studies that begins in the 1970s to “the stalling out of the growth of U.S. 
universities in the 1970s”, the “end of the Vietnam War” resulting in “a 
major loss of funding for Southeast Asian Studies programs”, and extend-
ing to the more urgent crisis at the end of the 1980s “when the end of the 
cold war undercut the geopolitical rational for area studies expertise just 
as the demise of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence rendered 
the postwar area-studies map outdated” (Lewis and Wigen, 164). The 
Gulbenkian Commission convened by Immaneul Wallerstein in the mid-
1990s to propose alternatives to the area-studies model in its 1996 Open 
the Social Sciences, also cites “the challenge […] from […] ‘cultural stud-
ies’” according to “three main themes”: “the central importance of gender 
studies and all kinds of ‘non-Eurocentric’ studies to the study of historical 
social systems; second, the importance of local, very situated historical 
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analysis, associated by many with a new ‘hermeneutic turn’; third, the 
assessment of the values involved in technological achievements in rela-
tion to other values” (64, 65). Wallerstein’s Gulbenkian Report considers 
these developments to promise new relationships among humanists (es-
pecially “among scholars in literary studies of all kinds”), anthropology, 
and “the new quasi-disciplines relating to the ‘forgotten’ peoples of mo-
dernity (those neglected by virtue of gender, race, class, etc.), for whom 
it provided a theoretical (‘postmodern’) framework for their elaborations 
of difference” (65).
But this promise to “open the social sciences” beyond the Cold-War 
area studies model to include developments familiar to scholars of the 
“new” American Studies does not sufficiently take into account the enor-
mous institutional resistance of scholars trained in area studies, still com-
mitted to their specializations, and in some areas, notably “East Asian”, 
“South Asian”, “Middle Eastern”, and “Latin American”, benefiting, rather 
than suffering, from the collapse of “Southeast Asian Studies” and “Soviet 
Studies”. Area Studies are alive and well, defending their territories with 
the determination of scholars whose very existences depend on this fight 
and have at their command an impressive arsenal of “common-sense” ar-
guments opposing coalitions with “new” American Studies, Postcolonial 
Studies, Cultural Studies, and virtually any version of “postmodernism” 
and its assorted complements, “cosmopolitanism” and “post- or neo- 
Marxism”. In these intellectual fights, there are lots of interesting figures 
at the vanguard; Walter Mignolo’s “border thinking” and Juan Poblete’s 
Critical Latin American and Latino Studies (2003) force area-studies 
scholars to defend explicitly intellectual boundaries that still retain their 
imperial legacies, buried for a time beneath a certain pseudo-scientific re-
liance on empirical data and disguised in part by a post-World War II U.S. 
provenance casting a vaguely “democratic” aura in which the “modern-
ization and development” ideology is clearly announced.
Why should American Studies scholars engage in these fights, which 
are often staged in terms of national languages, local and regional histo-
ries, and institutional politics in which we are unevenly trained? And if 
we are committed, as I am, to the comparative study of Canada and the 
Americas, rather than merely U.S.-centric “American Studies”, however 
diverse we may make it, then how do we respond to the familiar challenge 
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from Latin American area specialists that our project is simply the next 
stage of U.S. imperialism stretching from the Monroe doctrine through 
the Spanish-American War to the Pan-Americanism of the Cold War era? 
Finally, is not this commitment to “hemispheric study” of Canada and 
the Americas merely a revival of the much older continental model for 
area studies, replacing contemporary problems with even more insidious 
difficulties haunting us from the European imperial past?
There are practical answers to each of these questions. American Stud-
ies must develop curricula that require foreign languages relevant to the 
different communities in Canada and the Americas, just as we should 
broaden our curricula to deal with local and regional histories beyond the 
United States. Of course, we must be attentive to the problems of linguis-
tic, cultural, and epistemological imperialism, especially in a global era 
shaped by neo-imperialistic practices that work as much through cultural 
and intellectual means as through military, political, and economic tac-
tics. But not all study of other societies is inevitably imperialist, especially 
when the method of scholarship is intended to investigate precisely the 
imperialist inclinations of knowledge to follow power. Comparative study 
of the different communities in the Western Hemisphere is intended to 
pay particularly close attention to the historical power dynamics that 
created hierarchies along the North-South axis as troubling as the impe-
rial assumptions implicit in an earlier East-West divide (monumentalized 
in Hegel’s ineluctable evolution of World-Historical Spirit from east to 
Western Civilization). Finally, the “Western Hemisphere” reproduces the 
older continental model of prewar area studies if we focus upon its “ex-
ceptional” status, either in its pre-Columbian, premodern indigeneity or 
in its extraordinary uniqueness as the “New World” that would realize the 
ideals of European imperialists. Understood as a particularly instructive 
instance of what Mignolo terms the “modern/colonial world system”, the 
Western Hemisphere cannot be disengaged finally from the global pro-
cesses in which it has been historically involved, including those that tra-
versed it long before the arrival of European invaders. In this context, we 
must begin to think less in terms of the pertinent “rims”—Pacific, North 
Atlantic, mid-Atlantic, Caribbean—and more in terms of certain “flows” 
describing the terrestrial, maritime, modern avian, and postmodern tran-
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sits of outer (military and communications’ satellites) and inner (bodily 
prostheses and virtual realities) spaces.77
These answers are not really what many area studies specialists want 
to hear, because the threat posed to their disciplines also involves an in-
ternal critique already well underway in U.S.-centric American Studies 
and increasingly evident in Latin American Studies. Despite the very dif-
ferent European imperialisms and their historical modalities informing 
traditional studies of the “Americas”, they have in common the Creole 
nationalisms that developed in rebellion against their imperial masters. 
Following Enrique Dussel’s The Invention of America, Mignolo points out:
“America”, interestingly enough, is a name that became the 
territorial identification not for the Spanish crown, or for the 
Spanish in the Indias Occidentales, but for the Creole popu-
lation and intellectuals, born in “America” from Spanish de-
scent and leaders of the independence during the nineteenth 
century. It was also the Creole population and its intellectuals 
who initiated a process of self-definition as “Americans”, with 
all its possible variations (“Spanish”, “Indo”, “Latin”) […]. 
The importance of the discourse of geocultural identity lies in 
the fact that it filled a space that was broken in the process of 
conquest and colonization. [130]
The “creoles” to whom Mignolo refers are the descendants of Spaniards 
or Portuguese born in the colonies, from whom “liberators” like Simón 
Bolívar and José de San Martín would emerge to lead the national revo-
lutions of the early nineteenth century in what they themselves would 
come to term “Latin America”.
Although we do not refer to the U.S. “founding fathers” or cultural na-
tionalists, such as Emerson and Hawthorne and Whitman, as “Creoles”, 
they fit Mignolo’s conception of the anti-imperialist aura of national ide-
ology in the Western Hemisphere.78 Despite the enormous differences 
between Bolívar’s struggle against Spanish imperial power in decline and 
Franklin and Adams’s struggle against British imperialism, increasingly 
triumphant around the globe, South American and North American 
“Creole nationalisms” commonly “filled a space that was broken in the 
process of conquest and colonization” (130). Mignolo is referring to the 
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massive destruction of indigenous societies by European conquest and 
colonization, and it is indeed remarkable how often U.S. and Latin Amer-
ican revolutionaries would invoke the imperial destruction of indigenous 
peoples as a justification for Creole revolution, despite the open hostil-
ity most Creoles displayed to their own indigenous populations. From 
American rebels disguised as native peoples their forefathers had slaugh-
tered in the Pequot War and King Philip’s War to the melodramatic out-
rage expressed by Bolívar regarding Spanish atrocities against Amerindi-
ans or José Martí’s paternalism with regard to North American Indians 
with whom he claims a tenuous bond, the political writings of the Creole 
nationalists in North and South America are full of passionate commit-
ments to the liberation of indigenous peoples from the slavery and ex-
ploitation of their common imperial masters.79
Despite very different national policies toward indigenous peoples 
throughout the Hemisphere, the “national” stage of the modern/colonial 
world system displays the perpetuation of colonial oppression under the 
guise of “national development” and “necessary modernization”. And al-
though these bourgeois, Creole nationalisms appear to have continued 
the policies of their imperial masters in ways that perpetuated the linguis-
tic, ethnic, and cultural differences distinguishing Spanish, Portuguese, 
and British imperialisms (to deal with only the three most powerful be-
tween 1500 and 1800), they developed a certain strategic commonality 
that persists to this day and may well be one reason why Latin American 
area studies’ scholars fight so vigorously against the hemispheric com-
paratism of the “new” American Studies. Mignolo is particularly clear on 
the development of an intriguing “commonality” of these diverse Ameri-
can “nations”:
[I]t is clear that between 1820 and 1830 the future historical 
paths of the two Americas, Anglo and Latin, were being de-
cided. Before then, roughly from 1500 to 1800, the differenc-
es between the two Americas were the differences dictated 
between the Spanish and British empires in the modern/co-
lonial world system. Language and race […] were two crucial 
components in the articulation of the modern/colonial world 
system imaginary.
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The commonality of the difference, however, lies in the way 
that, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, “America” 
was appropriated by intellectuals of the emerging states as dif-
ferent from Europe but still within the West. […]. [P]olitical 
independence was accompanied by a symbolic independence 
in the geopolitical imagination. (134–135)
Mignolo identifies in this passage a nineteenth-century “American Ex-
ceptionalism” of hemispheric and transnational scope. We recognize im-
mediately a host of possible examples ranging from the fierce struggle for 
“literary nationalism” in the antebellum U.S., which is haunted by Euro-
pean allusions and models, to comparable struggles of Latin American 
intellectuals to break free of European sources by adapting them to South 
American, Caribbean, or Meso-American human and natural environ-
ments. The latter project seems brilliantly represented and satirized in the 
Cuban novelist Alejo Carpentier’s Los pasos perdidos (1953), often cited 
as one of the first works of the so-called “Latin American Boom”.80
In the print-dominated era of nineteenth-century nationalism, litera-
ture played a crucial role in constructing and interpellating this national 
imaginary. The anti-imperialist rhetoric dominates not only the overtly 
“democratic” literature of the traditional “American Renaissance”, but 
also includes many key Latin American literary texts of the period. Jico-
téncal, the anti-imperial Mexican novel published anonymously in Phil-
adelphia in 1826 and attributed by some scholars to the revolutionary 
Cuban priest, Félix Varela, occupies a celebrated position in the Latin 
American literary canon, in part because its stinging indictment of Cor-
tès, his consort, Doña Marina (La Malinche), and the Catholic priests 
accompanying his military invasion appears written in support of the 
Mexican revolution against Spain, other revolutionary movements in 
Latin America, and the novel’s vigorous defense of indigenous rights as 
equivalent to those of the Creole revolutionaries realizing three centuries 
later the failed democratic aspirations of the Tlaxcalan eponymous hero, 
Jicoténcal himself, and his long suffering lover and wife, Teutila.81
The “commonality of the difference” Mignolo finds in Creole national-
isms in the Western Hemisphere links these emancipatory movements 
with the imperialist agendas they transcoded from their imperialist mas-
ters: Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, England, and France. Although the 
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North-South divide in the Western Hemisphere has long been defined 
by the radical differences in public policies regarding ethnic and racial 
identities, there is also a “commonality of the difference” across this bor-
der when we consider how these same Creole nationalisms treated indig-
enous peoples and Creoles of color. At the height of nineteenth-century 
nationalist ferment in the hemisphere, Creole revolutionaries rarely in-
voked the Haitian slave rebellion, arguably the first successful slave revolt 
in history, and consistently incorporated indigenous issues into their own 
nationalist platforms while perpetuating, in many cases worsening, the 
social and human conditions under which indigenous peoples struggled 
to survive (Mignolo, 139). Immediately upon establishing “national” 
boundaries, most emerging nations also initiated vigorous campaigns of 
territorial expansion, entering into struggles with neighbors that in some 
cases last to the present day.
I repeat Mignolo’s phrase “the commonality of the difference” in order 
to stress the point that a comparative study of the communities of the 
Western Hemisphere is not a question of identifying their deep-struc-
tural unity or their distinct “national exceptionalisms”, as an older Com-
parative Literature did with its largely European models in the misnamed 
“World Literatures” project. The imperialist subtext I have interpreted 
as “common” to Creole nationalisms hardly leads to positive answers to 
such questions as posed by Gustavo Pérez Firmat’s influential collection 
of 1990, Do the Americas Have a Common Literature?, or Mashall Eakin’s 
more recent query, “Does Latin America Have a Common History?”82 
There are nevertheless points of contact and commonality that allow 
us to conduct such comparative work at crucial intersections or contact 
zones, rather than producing yet another testament to a monumental 
“exceptionalism” that is at root neo-imperialist. I will conclude by iden-
tifying and then discussing briefly some of the more important of these 
intersectional sites as ways of following out the logic of what Mignolo 
terms “border thinking”.
National expansionist projects in contestation with other nationalist 
projects in the Hemisphere are particularly worthy of our attention. Mi-
gnolo focuses on 1848 and 1898 as crucial historical moments in “the 
early division between Anglo and Latin America” (136). The Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo concluding the Mexican War (1846–1848) “was a 
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conflict between new emerging nations”, Mexico and the United States, 
and the open imperialism of the U.S. has often been cited as one reason 
the War has until recently played such a small role in U.S. cultural and so-
cial history.83 Its significance in shifting the “border” between North and 
South, as well as incorporating in a very short span a significant “Lati-
nidad” into the United States, cannot be ignored by the “new” Ameri-
can Studies. In most accounts, the focus is on victimized Mexico, just a 
quarter of a century free from Spanish imperial control and continuing 
to struggle with internal political and economic problems at the time of 
the War’s outbreak. Lost in the course of most accounts, including liter-
ary and cultural histories, are the indigenous peoples, already systemati-
cally displaced, enslaved, and murdered during Spanish and subsequent 
Mexican colonization of Baja and Alta California, then subject to a host 
of new laws and rules imposed by postwar American officials and less for-
mal, but accepted, practices of genocide practiced by U.S. citizens well 
into the twentieth century.
For Mignolo, 1898 also redraws the hemispheric map, ostensibly by 
asserting overtly the imperialist agenda of the United States in its in-
vocation of the Monroe Doctrine and the collapse of Spanish imperial 
claims in the Hemisphere (136). I would add that U.S. negotiations with 
Great Britain for a Canal Treaty and during Secretary of State John Hay’s 
“Open Door Policy” in Asia have to be considered, insofar as the result 
of these negotiations was that Great Britain agreed basically to U.S. hege-
mony in the Western Hemisphere in exchange for British dominance in 
Asia.84 Too often forgotten in the invocation of 1898, however, is the U.S. 
co-optation of the republican struggles in Cuba and Puerto Rico, as well 
as in the Philippines. To study 1898, we must travel one of those strategic 
“rims” or follow one of those historical “flows” across the Pacific, recog-
nizing that the U.S. suppression of Philippine nationalism in the Philip-
pine-American War (1899–1902) followed out the foreign policy the 
U.S. applied in the Caribbean, especially to its current protectorate, Puer-
to Rico, and troublesome Cuba. The relationship between the U.S. and 
Spain in the Spanish-American War cannot be understood adequately 
without also examining the U.S. relationship to Cuban and Puerto Rican 
nationalisms. As scholars from Sundquist to Brickhouse have explained, 
the revolutionary ferment of Cuban nationalists in the nineteenth cen-
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tury is complexly entangled with different U.S. political and economic in-
terests, including pro-slavery interests in controlling Cuba as a source of 
slaves after the banning of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808.85
Once again, the “border thinking” required to understand the histori-
cal development of these Creole nationalisms in contestation with each 
other must involve recognition of the forgotten populations on these is-
lands. In Cuba and Puerto Rico, we cannot speak any longer in the nine-
teenth century of “indigenous” peoples, although Puerto Rican activists 
still refer to themselves as “Borricuans”, in reference to the first inhabit-
ants, because those indigenous populations were murdered by European 
imperialists. But in Cuba, Afro-Cubans and descendants of maroon com-
munities must also be identified as the “forgotten” populations who his-
torically demonstrate a repertoire of means to resist and evade imperial 
extinction and national incorporation. Once we think of the intersection 
among the different peoples and communities marginalized by Europe-
an and then nationalist imperialisms, we begin to recognize how “bor-
der thinking” leads to the several versions of “mondialization” Mignolo 
invokes in his recent work. Non-European populations in the Western 
Hemisphere brought with them and elaborated differently over time 
and in specific sites their African, Asian, Oceanic, and Amerindian heri-
tages, including non-European languages and religions and cultural prac-
tices. Sometimes these non-European influences were hybridized with 
EuroAmerican cultures, but there are many instances of what I would 
term “maroon” styles, forms, and practices surviving as resistant dis-
cursive practices that powerfully mark the “horizon” of the EuroAmeri-
can imaginary.
The troublesome linguistic divisions of the Hemisphere seem to con-
firm the strict divisions of the “Anglo” North, the “Spanish” Southwest, 
and the “Portuguese” Southeast, with epiphenomenal traces of linguistic 
imperialism scattered here and there, especially in the polyglot Carib-
bean from Dutch Aruba through French Martinique. Yet when we take 
these linguistic divisions in the historical, cultural, and geographic con-
texts of the entire Hemisphere, we must recognize that we are following 
the tracks of European and Creole nationalist imperialisms, ignoring the 
massive destruction of Amerindian languages and their related cultures 
as well as the suppression of non-European languages occasioned by 
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slavery’s systematic detribalization and its customary ban on literary and 
other formal education for slaves.
Werner Sollors’ and Marc Shell’s wonderful Multilingual Anthology 
of American Literature (2000) gives us barely a hint of what a genuinely 
“multilingual” account of Canada and the Americas would be like, if we 
were to overcome what Mignolo terms the systematic imperial “denial 
of coevalness” between European and Amerindian semiotics.86 Colonial 
semiosis depended crucially upon the destruction of the Amerindian ar-
chive of knowledge and the repression of that history, just as slavery de-
pends on the systematic denial of African retentions, including languages, 
religions, and cultural practices. A similar colonial semiosis is structurally 
integral to Creole nationalisms, as even the casual tourist cannot help but 
notice in the plethora of signs that testify to various nations’ presumed 
“rootedness” in their Amerindian histories, even as their policies toward 
indigenous peoples have been consistently genocidal. What would hap-
pen if we were to attempt “border thinking” that instead of “adding” 
Amerindian and diasporic semiotics to the variety of European-based 
languages would challenge the “commonality of the difference” in those 
imported languages and their epistemological protocols? In short, the 
traditional “problem” of different “languages” dividing the “areas” of the 
Western Hemisphere turns out to be even more complicated when we 
factor in the numerous languages (and semiotic systems) occluded by 
this apparent diversity of the imperial legacy.
The other “area” neglected both by “area studies” and by American 
Studies, new or old, also suggests how we might approach “Hemispheric 
Studies” from beyond the shadow cast by European power/knowledge. 
Mignolo’s emphasis on colonial semiosis at times ignores the biological 
transit of imperialism and the literal destruction not merely of the “texts” 
of pre-Columbian peoples but of their bodies and biochemistries. Charles 
Mann’s 1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus (2005) 
summarizes the new scientific evidence of the impact of European dis-
eases on indigenous peoples throughout the Hemisphere.87 Infectious 
diseases like smallpox, influenza, and measles had dramatic impacts on 
Amerindian populations between 1500 and 1900, and for many Euro-
peans appeared to support claims to the “superiority” of European “civi-
lization”, even when crudely calculated according to a Social Darwinist 
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standard of “survival of the fittest”. Area studies following the ideology 
of “modernization and development” would in many ways reinforce just 
such an ideology, often manifested in the “conflictive encounters between 
Old World Europeans and pre-Columbian peoples of the Andes, Meso-
american, and the Caribbean” in terms of a “dialectic of the filthy and the 
clean, the fetid and the fresh”, even the “healthy” and the “sick” (Mignolo, 
153). Indeed, the prevalence of public health programs and policies in 
the rhetoric of “modernization and development” is just one example of 
how this binary continues to do imperialist work, even with the most be-
nevolent and humanitarian purposes.
We now know that the “immunities” Europeans acquired over the 
centuries against the infectious diseases they spread with such devastat-
ing consequences in the Western Hemisphere had much to do with the 
domestication of livestock they had learned from Middle Eastern agri-
cultural practices they had followed and were thus hardly “inherent” to 
Europeans.88 And the inoculation practices Europeans would adopt ex-
perimentally and unevenly in the eighteenth century were adapted from 
practices employed in China as early as 1100 to prevent the spread of 
smallpox. Add to all of this that the genetic differences between Amerin-
dians and Europeans do not signal the superiority of one biology over the 
other, but simply human differences whose contact produced extraordi-
narily negative results for one group. Western “modernization and devel-
opment” take on rather different ethical meanings when we are forced to 
conclude that in the case of the Western Hemisphere, such “progress” re-
quired the deaths of anywhere from 40 to 60 million Amerinidian people 
between 1500 and 1900.
“Border thinking” should deconstruct the “differences” between Eu-
ropean imperial powers and Creole national powers, among European 
languages, and other manifest differences, such as those between the 
supposedly Catholic South and Protestant North, not only to expose the 
shared history of the “modern/colonial world system” worked out sys-
tematically for the first time in the Western Hemisphere. Such border 
thinking should also represent the histories and contemporary retentions 
of societies and communities that were overshadowed by the more im-
posing authority of their imperial masters. Adapting W. E. B. Du Bois’s 
model of “double consciousness” to the study of the Western Hemi-
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sphere and drawing thus explicitly from minority discourses, Mignolo 
suggests that such a comparative approach to the Western Hemisphere 
might open us to a broader “worldly” thinking he projects doubly as “the 
future planetary epistemological and critical localism” (157).
I am happy to conclude that I am not certain what he means by what 
he also terms a “border gnosis” that would allow us to think differentially 
across the divides of those geopolitical, imperial, and semiotic “borders” 
that have been imposed upon us as scholars, as citizens, and as humans. 
What I do know is that Mignolo’s challenging methodology enables us to 
achieve the sort of double-consciousness the “new” and “postnationalist” 
American Studies should welcome. With one consciousness, it enables 
us to understand the “conflicting homogeneous entities (Latin America, 
France, the United States, etc.) as […] part of the imaginary of the mod-
ern/colonial world system” (170). With another consciousness, we can 
understand that to “think ‘Latin America’ otherwise, in its heterogeneity 
rather than in its homogeneity, in the local histories of changing global 
designs is not to question a particular form of identification (e.g., that of 
‘Latin America’) but all national/colonial forms of identification in the 
modern/colonial world system” (170–171). I would add that Mignolo’s 
project, ostensibly the deconstruction of “Latin American” area studies, 
applies as well to North American Studies and “American Studies” as we 
know it in its modern and postmodern versions.89
I have focused on how the conflict between area studies and the new 
American Studies impedes the development of a comparative study of 
the many different communities in the Western Hemisphere, but Mi-
gnolo’s “modern/colonial world system” is not restricted to this region. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the ongoing U.S. occupation of Iraq, its central 
role in the war in Afghanistan, foreign policies that contribute signifi-
cantly to the imperial subjugation of the Palestinian people, and growing 
Arabic immigrant communities in the U.S., “the Middle East” is a crucial 
field in the new American Studies. Yet the field itself is already defined 
by the area studies model I have traced back to the politically motivated 
work of the Ethnogeographic Board of the 1940s. Edward Said’s criti-
cism of nineteenth-century Western Orientalism needs to be updated to 
take into account more recent developments, and in that work the U.S. 
role in restructuring what George W. Bush termed “the Greater Middle 
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East” needs to be challenged in relationship to U.S. academic models for 
studying “the Middle East”, global Islamic communities, Arabic cultures, 
and specific immigrant groups from these regions and communities 
now living outside their ancestral homelands as a consequence of dias-
pora or choice.
Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness 
(1993) fundamentally challenged “area studies” definitions of Caribbe-
an, African American, and black British communities, directing us both 
literally and figuratively to the “Atlantic world” in which transnational 
flows of people, goods, and cultures moved incessantly and diversely.90 
David Lloyd and Peter D. O’Neill’s The Black and Green Atlantic shows 
how the Black (African), Green (Irish), Red (Communist), and still oth-
er “Atlantics” have followed and broadened what we today understand as 
this oceanic complexity beyond the presumed stabilities of geopolitical 
states.91 We need similarly flexible, transnational conceptions in the new 
American Studies that will work cooperatively with “critical area studies” 
of Latin America and the Middle East to respect the diverse communi-
ties we find in these regions and provide the critical terms for challenging 
their marginalization, even exclusion, by more powerful nation states.
In re-conceptualizing the global scope that American Studies must 
undertake to respond to U.S. neo-imperialism, we must remain vigilant 
regarding the specific ways knowledge and power have been coordinated 
historically. We would be naive to think that the production and circula-
tion of knowledge in the late-modern research university can remain sep-
arate from the economic, political, and social interests of the states and 
industries that fund such work. Whether public or private, the research-1 
university still functions as a representation of the nation in which it is 
permitted to exist, but such universities are also today pulled in a num-
ber of competitive directions by different state and corporate interests. 
We are already witnessing the globalization of the student, faculty, and 
research components of these educational institutions, and we must find 
the intellectual means to assure that such globalization works dialectical-
ly, offering those peoples rendered stateless, culture-less, and otherwise 
economically and politically disempowered the means of “decolonizing 
the mind”, as the great Kenyan novelist and postcolonial theorist Ngũgĩ 
wa Thiongo, has put it.92

II
Cultural Practices

Chapter 5
Culture, U.S. Imperialism, and Globalization
The return of what was once termed gunboat diplomacy in the first de-
cade of the twenty-first century as part of the “new global order” en-
dorsed repeatedly and abstractly by George H. W. and then George W. 
Bush’s regimes, could not have occurred without the prior work of cul-
ture. U.S. cultural production, the work of what Horkheimer and Adorno 
termed “the culture industry”, conditioned American citizens to accept 
the undisguised militarism and jingoistic nationalism now driving U.S. 
foreign policy.93 In its inevitably globalized forms, the U.S. culture indus-
try continues to produce the deep divisions between local resistance and 
subaltern imitation so characteristic of colonial conflicts from the age of 
traditional imperialism to the neo-imperialisms of our postindustrial era. 
And the culture industry today does its work in ways that encompass a 
wide range of nominally different political positions, so that in many re-
spects left, liberal, and conservative cultural works often achieve comple-
mentary, rather than contested, ends. In this respect, little has changed 
since Horkheimer and Adorno argued in 1944: “Even the aesthetic ac-
tivities of political opposites are one in their enthusiastic obedience to 
the rhythm of the iron system”.94
As the U.S. military raced toward Baghdad in the Spring of 2003, there 
was considerable criticism of the “embedded reporters” allowed to report 
the war under the special conditions imposed by the Pentagon and De-
partment of Defense. Most of the criticism assumed that such reporting 
was biased or censored. When a Newsweek photographer was caught doc-
toring on his laptop a photograph of an encounter between Iraqi civilians 
and U.S. military personnel, his firing seemed to vindicate the news mag-
azine of prejudice. Anti-war activists circulated two photographs of Iraqi 
demonstrators tearing down a monumental statue of Saddam Hussein in 
Firdos Square, Baghdad on April 9, 2003: the first was a familiar photo-
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graph in the news of demonstrators beating on the sculpture’s foundation 
and then, with the help of an Abrams tank tow truck (equipped with a 
crane), toppling the hieratic image of the defeated dictator.
In the second photograph, not displayed in the popular press or eve-
ning news, the camera provides a wide-angle view of the scene at the 
square, where access roads have been blocked by the U.S. military and 
the “populist” demolition of the statue has been theatrically staged by 
U.S. forces. In a third photograph circulated on the Internet, the same 
Iraqis actively involved attacking the Baghdad statue are shown “one day 
earlier” in Basra, where they are preparing to board U.S. military aircraft 
for transport to Baghdad—identified in this photograph as members of 
the “Iraqi Free Forces”.95
Peter Maass argues in “The Toppling: How the Media Inflated a Minor 
Moment in a Long War” that the event was not engineered by the U.S. 
State for propaganda purposes but was a consequence of foreign report-
ers staying at the Palestine Hotel on Firdos Square urging U.S. military 
officers to help Iraqis topple the statue. Relying on his authority as one of 
the reporters to witness the event, Maass contends that the primary pur-
pose in staging the event was to produce a good news story.96 Whether 
this “minor moment in a long war” was designed by the U.S. government 
or staged by journalists is not finally a crucial issue. Western journalism 
and the U.S. “coalition” cooperated from the beginning to represent the 
Second Gulf War as crucial in the global war on terror and Iraq as a strate-
gic region in the building of a “Greater Middle East”.
Such exposures of U.S. military or journalistic propaganda during the 
war have continued in news coverage of the putative “rebuilding” of the 
political and economic infrastructure in Iraq. The debate regarding who 
was actually responsible for the disinformation regarding “Weapons of 
Mass Destruction” used as the principal justification for the invasion of 
Iraq is the most obvious example of public concern regarding the federal 
government’s veracity. For such propaganda to be successful, there must 
be a willing audience, already prepared for certain cultural semantics 
adaptable to new political circumstances and yet with sufficient “region-
al” relevance as to make possible the very widespread confusion between 
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, between a secular Iraqi state 
tyranny and an Islamic fundamentalist guerilla organization. How was it 
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possible that such a preposterous war could be permitted by Congress 
and by the U.S. population? The answer is not simply that the Bush Ad-
ministration ignored numerous international protests of the preparations 
for war and its eventual conduct. Nor is the answer simply that when 
the war began, the Bush Administration controlled the news and staged 
symbolic events to fool the public, although there is plenty of evidence 
to support these claims. The cultural preparations for a “just war” and for 
the U.S. as global “policeman” did not occur overnight; they are our cul-
tural legacy from the Vietnam War and integral parts of our emergence 
as a neo-imperial nation since 1945. Central to this legacy is the concep-
tion of the United States as a discrete nation that nonetheless has a global 
identity and mission. Although traditional imperialism works by way of 
expansion from a national center, U.S. imperialism since Vietnam has 
worked steadily to “import” the world and to render global differences 
aspects of the U.S. nation—in short, to internalize and “hyper-national-
ize” transnational issues. This “Vietnam-Effect” has taken on new features 
in U.S. neo-imperialism in the First and Second Gulf Wars and the ongo-
ing war in Afghanistan, but the historical legacy of U.S. diplomacy and 
military strategy in Southeast Asia from 1955–1975 is both coherent and 
fundamental.
It is commonplace, of course, to criticize the United States as one of 
the several first-world nations to employ cultural media to market its 
products around the world. Neo-colonialism generally connotes some 
complicity between a “multinational corporation covertly supported 
by an imperialist power”, to borrow Chalmers Johnson’s definition, and 
thus implies some entanglement of economic, political, and military 
motives.97 The globalization of consumer capitalism and the commodi-
ties of first-world economies (often manufactured elsewhere) are iden-
tified as specific targets by political movements as different as “Slow 
Food” in France, Earth First!, and al-Qaeda. Although the arcades and 
other defined shopping areas were developed in nineteenth-century Eu-
rope—Paris, Milan, Berlin, and other metropoles—the shopping mall is 
an American spinoff. With its emphasis on the “city-within-a-city”, the 
linkage of entertainment and consumption, the faux cosmopolitanism 
of its “international” and regionally specific shops (Cartier, Mont Blanc, 
Nieman Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue, “Texas Souvenirs”) and its ubiqui-
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tous, often international “Food Courts”, the American shopping mall was 
developed in the 1960s and refined over the past fifty years. Such mega-
malls as Minneapolis’ Mall of America, Houston’s Galleria, and Southern 
California’s South Coast Plaza have redefined the public sphere as the site 
of consumption and commodification both of products and consumers.
Whether directly exported by U.S. business interests or developed by 
multinational corporations to look like its U.S. prototypes, the interna-
tional mall is often traceable back to U.S. funding, design, and marketing 
sources or models. A PBS Frontline report, “In Search of Al-Qaeda”, which 
aired on November 21, 2002, includes footage of a shopping mall in Ri-
yadh, Saudi Arabia, which is physically indistinguishable from European 
and American malls and includes many of the same stores.98 Of course, 
the reporter calls attention to the presence of the Mu’tawah or religious 
police, who stroll through this mall looking for unveiled women or illicit 
liaisons between unmarried men and women. “In Search of Al-Qaeda” is 
a fine attempt by Frontline to explain the animosity felt by many different 
groups in the Arab world toward the United States. The mall in Riyadh 
represents quite clearly one common source of resentment: the rapid 
Americanization of Saudi Arabia and the tacit demand that everyday 
Muslim practices be adapted to the demands of the global market. From 
one perspective, the Mu’tawah operate comfortably within this typical 
mall, with its long, open corridors and the insistent appeal of its trans-
national commodities. In another view, the religious police seem already 
defeated by the cultural rhetoric of the mall, which encourages romance 
and consumption in the same free-wheeling space. As Anne Friedeberg 
has argued, the mall links consumer and psychic desires in ways that de-
pend crucially on “the fluid subjectivity of the spectator-shopper”.99
Commodities are neither passive nor politically innocent; they are per-
petually active in the specific kinds of desires they produce in consum-
ers and work by means of the social psychologies of commodity fetish-
ism analyzed by Marx in Capital and reification elaborated by Lukács in 
History and Class Consciousness.100 Specific consumer desires can also be 
traced back to hierarchies of specific kinds of capitalist labor. In modern, 
industrial economies, stores displaying high fashion and leisure-class 
products, such as designer clothing for women and luxury products for 
successful men, were central. The traditional display windows with their 
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mannequins of elegantly dressed and sexually alluring women belong to 
the era of the large department stores and, while still a part of the post-
modern mall, are challenged by stores displaying the most elaborate array 
of computerized bodily extensions and miniaturizations, labor-saving de-
vices, and high-tech tools promising greater access to the primary source 
of wealth and power: the control and manipulation of information and 
its assorted hermeneutic and representational protocols. In the crush of 
the crowds defining the public space of the mall, the consumer is prom-
ised some individuality apart from just what forces him/her through the 
doors of his/her local “Best Buy”. Such identity depends, of course, on 
its promise of communication, but not so much with other people, es-
pecially those who may be different from this consumer, but apart from 
others in the notable privacy of postmodern life. The new laptops, iPads, 
and smart phones are prized for allowing us to negotiate the crowd as 
we travel through it, but then saving from this mob our informational 
work, which can be stored, sifted, and processed in the privacy of our 
own homes. Of course, the peculiar desire for representational power 
and authority fetishized in computer hardware and software is rapidly 
displacing the public sphere created by the late-modern desire for more 
traditional commodities, such as fashion and luxury items. The mall is 
“morphing” into the Internet, an imaginary space so rapidly commercial-
ized as to terrify even the most recalcitrant critic and sometime defender 
of consumer capitalism.
In spite of the admirable efforts of intellectuals to find emancipatory 
possibilities in the new technologies—alternatives to traditional social 
forms and practices certainly do exist today—the speed with which the 
Internet has been commercialized and hierarchized is symptomatic of 
the huge inequities dividing corporations that can afford access, indi-
viduals who merely use the technology (and are thereby used by it), and 
the majority of the world’s population left entirely out of the new com-
municative practices. In What’s the Matter with the Internet? (2001), Mark 
Poster recognizes most of these problems while stressing the “underde-
termined” character of new digital technologies and thus their availabil-
ity for new transnational politics: “The Internet affords an opportunity 
for a contribution to a new politics [and] […] may play a significant role 
in diminishing the hierarchies prevalent in modern society and in clear-
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ing a path for new directions of cultural practice”.101 In Ambient Television 
(2001), Anna McCarthy acknowledges the ideological consequences 
of television’s portability and publicity in achieving a culture of surveil-
lance such as Foucault predicted, but she also imagines critical alterna-
tives and interventions capable of disrupting and in some cases even 
transforming unidirectional television.102 Such alternatives, however, are 
pushed increasingly to the margins of the Internet and television. Most 
television scholars agree that the “post-network era” has reconfigured the 
industry only by allowing more corporate giants to share the wealth of 
television programming. “Niche” television and “target audiences” have 
led to a wider variety of television only within certain limits of the liberal-
to-conservative political spectrum. Radical television, such as Dee Dee 
Halleck’s Paper Tiger Television, goes virtually unwatched, is financially 
marginal, and supported primarily by extramural grants. The networks 
long ago succeeded in defeating “public access cable” as a populist alter-
native to one-way television, and the short-term future of “interactive” 
television, especially when integrated with computers and the Internet, 
is likely to be little more than an extension of the enormously profitable 
video-game market.
Of course, blogs, personal websites and wikis, whether organized into 
“social networks” like Facebook or simply maintained by individuals, 
have offered inexpensive, multidirectional communications’ systems as 
apparent alternatives to unidirectional technologies, such as television. 
What lures consumers to new digital technologies is the general prom-
ise of social communication, ironically just the ideal offered by Marx and 
Engels in The German Ideology, but it is a false promise that substitutes 
complex programming, technological innovation and software upgrades 
for socially meaningful communication.103 Designed to serve business 
and commercial needs, predicated on the increasing privatization of the 
public sphere, whereby the illusion of sociability is simulated in the radi-
cal alienation and paradoxical exclusivity of the home office, commuter 
vehicle, or commercial airline’s reserved seat, such devices produce spe-
cific desires structured by their ideological motivations. Watching urban-
ites rushing from place to place focused intently on smart-phone screens, 
often while navigating a car or bicycle, the postmodern flâneur cannot 
avoid the conclusion that digital technologies have further alienated us 
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while promising the illusion of greater sociability. The imperial imaginary 
thrives upon these desires for what today is termed “connectivity”, but 
which is little other than the venerable dream of social belonging. Cul-
tural apologists for the “Americanization” of the globe, like Francis Fu-
kuyama, imagine that such homogenization will take us to that “end of 
history” fantastically dreamt by Hegel and other proto-moderns, because 
such conditions will produce a political consensus.104 Fukuyama is cer-
tainly right that one-way globalization is likely to result in an internation-
al consensus, even if it is one we can hardly condone, which we know will 
be not only excruciatingly tedious but finally “inhuman”, and will require 
periods of incredible unpredictable violence.
Such criticism of what may generally be termed a “postmodern econo-
my” focused on information, communications, and entertainment prod-
ucts, including their integrated research and development components, 
may seem strangely anachronistic when applied to the contemporary 
global situation. Today, we confront the revival of traditional imperial-
ism as the United States towers over all other human communities and 
exerts its unchallenged power in the most flagrantly militaristic manner. 
Not since the British Empire ruled the world by force and fear in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has there been such undisguised 
rule by military power. While recognizing important differences between 
contemporary U.S. global rule in the twenty-first century and that of the 
British in the nineteenth century, Chalmers Johnson traces a historical 
genealogy from British to U.S. imperial policies, especially in such criti-
cal regions as the Middle East and Southeast Asia ( Johnson, 138–139, 
217–218). In Somalia and most of Africa, Kosovo, Serbia, Cuba, Nica-
ragua, Panama, Salvador, Colombia, the Philippines, North and South 
Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Israel and Palestine, Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf states, Iraq, and Iran, the United States works by open mili-
tary action or threats. Such situations hardly appear to have much to do 
with the postmodern economics analyzed by theorists of postindustrial 
or late capitalist practices, such as Ernest Mandel, Fredric Jameson, and 
David Harvey.
But there is an important relationship between the emergence of U.S. 
military power, along with the complementary threats of inequitable and 
repressive policies toward peoples (especially but not exclusively non-
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U.S. citizens) at home and abroad, and the capitalization of “cultural ex-
ports” ranging from Hollywood entertainment and television program-
ming to digital technologies and their protocols for communication, 
work, and social “networking”. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s 
theory of “free-trade imperialism” is now half a century old and was for-
mulated long before the postmodern economy came to dominate global 
relations by restructuring other forms of economic production and trade 
(especially devastating for the “industrialized” developing nations, now 
cast in the shadow of new, privileged forms of capitalization).105 The the-
sis of “free-trade imperialism” still explains a good deal about how tradi-
tional imperial military power should emerge with such prominence and 
frequency as a “foreign policy” at the very moment when globalization 
seems the nearly inevitable consequence of U.S. economic triumphalism. 
Contemporary critics of U.S. foreign policy like Chalmers Johnson have 
also recognized that “free trade” is often used as a rationalization for the 
conduct of multinational corporations and for the U.S. government’s de-
velopment of “client states”, like Israel and, until recently, South Korea 
( Johnson, 31).
Gallagher and Robinson refute traditional theories that imperialism—
their principal example was British imperialism in Africa—proceeded 
historically from military conquest to consolidation of colonial rule only 
to be legitimated and transformed slowly through economic develop-
ment. Gallagher and Robinson argue that “free-trade” policies generally 
preceded historically the militarization of colonies and that such military 
force was required only by the failure to negotiate trade agreements be-
tween metropolitan and colonial centers. Military force is thus held in 
reserve, not out of humane considerations of course but primarily for 
reasons of practicality and economy, while the imperial power promotes 
trade agreements—either for raw materials or finished products—with 
the appearance of favorable and equitable terms to colonizer and colo-
nized. It is only when this illusion of “free-trade” is shattered that military 
force is required to re-impose imperial “order”, when the appearance of 
free trade can be resumed, under whose guise what in fact usually occurs 
is demonstrably inequitable exploitation of natural or human resources 
of the colony. As they write: “[t]he usual summing up of the policy of 
the free trade empire as ‘trade, not rule’ should read ‘trade with infor-
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mal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary’” (Gallagher and 
Robinson, 25).
Is this not the situation we are witnessing today in the Gulf and in 
other strategic locations around the world? At present, the relationship 
between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China can be de-
scribed accurately as one operating according to the logic of “free-trade 
imperialism” as China’s economy booms in large part thanks to the ex-
ploited labor required to manufacture products for the U.S. export mar-
ket.106 One of the assumptions of Fukuyama’s approach to globalization 
is that the “end of history” will bring an end of warfare and national 
struggle, that the “global village” and world peace are inextricably linked. 
From this perspective, whatever the cost of globalization in the medioc-
rity and uniformity of personal lives is more than compensated by the se-
curity achieved. In view of the everyday fear experienced by the majority 
of humankind, the sacrifices are well worth the enormous gains achieved 
by U.S. global hegemony. In his neo-liberal defense of the U.S. exercis-
ing power around the world in its own “defense”, Robert Kagan reaches 
a similar conclusion, albeit one that involves his condemnation of both 
the European Union and the United Nations—the closest competitors 
for U.S. global hegemony at the present moment.107
Late capitalism thrives on fear, even employing fear as a principal mar-
keting strategy. In the depressed U.S. economy of the past few years, one 
of the rare bright spots has been the booming market for self-defense 
goods, especially hi-tech gadgets, in response to 9/11 and the assorted 
xenophobic anxieties, such as the mailing of Anthrax, it prompted. In his 
documentary, Bowling for Columbine (2002), Michael Moore attributes 
violence in the U.S. primarily to a culture of fear propagated by the news 
media and federal government. If we accept the general outlines of his 
argument, then the globalization of U.S. cultural capital will involve the 
exportation of precisely this “culture of fear”, a phenomenon we are wit-
nessing as complementary with the increase in U.S. military actions as 
the Bush Administration took seriously its role as global policeman of the 
new world order. President George W. Bush left office insisting that his 
administration had made the U.S. more secure against terrorism, even at 
the expense of our civil liberties. Yet during the George W. Bush presi-
dency, incidents of global terrorism in England, Spain, Indonesia, Paki-
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stan, and India increased dramatically. The Obama administration has 
been criticized for not anticipating two abortive domestic terrorism “in-
cidents”—the attempted bombing on December 25, 2009 of a Northwest 
Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, and the attempted car bomb-
ing on May 1, 2010 of Times Square—and still does not acknowledge 
the mass murder in the Fort Hood shooting on November 5, 2009 as an 
act of “domestic terrorism”. Incidents of terrorism will continue to oc-
cur as long as the U.S. wages a global “war on terror”, and such incidents, 
wherever they occur, will provide continuing support to foreign policies 
based on militant neo-imperialism. I want to propose then a dialectical 
relationship between cultural or free-trade imperialism and military im-
perialism that is mediated by way of a “culture of fear” that helps market 
late-capitalist products and encourages, rather than diminishes, military 
conflicts in the place of international diplomacy.
The history of this dialectic is understandably as long as that of mo-
dernity itself, especially if we trace modernity back to the voyages of 
exploration and conquest of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centu-
ries. Modernization begins not so much with the technologies used to 
achieve such conquests—no new technology was, in fact, invented just 
for the voyages of exploration—but with the imagining of other worlds 
and peoples. It is commonplace to speak of how easily the early explorers 
substituted one people for another, as Columbus mistook Caribs and Ar-
awaks for “Indians” of the Far East (and the name continues to this day, 
albeit often contested by Native Americans and First Peoples). But there 
is a shorter history that tells us a good deal about this dialectic, especially 
in its present deployment in world politics, and that history begins with 
the military failure of the United States in Vietnam in the early 1970s. 
Beginning in that moment, U.S. culture attempted to explain and ratio-
nalize the war in a wide range of media and from virtually every possible 
political perspective. Sorting out these diverse outlooks on the Vietnam 
War remains crucial work for cultural and political critics, but the gen-
eral impression this cultural work offers is that of the re-narrativization of 
a military and colonial failure into a foundation for subsequent military 
ventures in the Caribbean, Central America, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and 
the warring republics of former Yugoslavia.
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What appeared in the mid- to late 1970s to be a series of critical inter-
pretations of U.S. involvement in Vietnam—such films as Coming Home 
(1978), The Deer Hunter (1979), and Apocalypse Now (1980)—were 
replaced by films and television programs that appropriated the liberal 
rhetoric of these predecessors but incorporated it into compensatory 
narratives intent on imaginatively fighting the war again and winning. Syl-
vester Stallone’s “Rambo” character is the locus classicus of just such he-
roic conventions. John Rambo fights the Vietnamese, the Russians, and 
other foreign enemies in the Rambo films, but he also combats Ameri-
cans in ways that clearly anticipate the contemporary “nationalization” of 
global issues in U.S. mass media. The opening scene of the first film, Ted 
Kotcheff ’s Rambo, First Blood (1982), establishes John Rambo’s motiva-
tion for fighting the local police department and eventually the Nation-
al Guard called in to hunt him down. As the opening credits roll, John 
Rambo walks down a charming Northwest dirt road to a modest house 
on the edge of a lake. The African-American woman, who is hanging her 
wash on a clothes line and who centers a sublime prospect of natural 
beauty, is the mother of Rambo’s best friend in Vietnam, Delmar Berry. 
In the opening dialogue of the film, Rambo learns from Delmar’s mother 
that his friend has died of cancer, a victim of the Agent Orange sprayed as 
a defoliant in Vietnam. I have elsewhere interpreted how Rambo conse-
quently appropriates the civil rights, anti-war, and countercultural move-
ments of the late 1960s and early 1970s to legitimate the militarism he 
represents in Rambo, First Blood.108
In the second film, George P. Cosmatos’s Rambo, First Blood, Part II 
(1985), Rambo’s rage is directed at the CIA’s reliance on high technol-
ogy rather than human agency. In the concluding scene of the film, John 
Rambo fires the large automatic weapons he has used on his mission into 
Vietnam to destroy the computer command center of the CIA in Thai-
land, and then he releases a primal scream to accompany this ritualized 
destruction of the new automated warfare he clearly condemns as inhu-
man. Ironically, the Emersonian self-reliance and natural identity of John 
Rambo in both films is set in explicit contrast with the automated milita-
rism employed by the Department of Defense and Pentagon in the first 
and second Gulf wars, which for many people were culturally justified 
by the revival of militaristic values exemplified by the character of John 
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Rambo. There is a direct line from the fictional John Rambo to Brigadier 
General Vincent Brooks, “the six-foot-plus, Hollywood-handsome Af-
rican American spokesman for Central Command” during the Second 
Gulf war, who at Camp as-Sayliyah’s state of the art, “$ 1.5 million, made-
for-TV ‘Coalition Media Center,’ […] gave hundreds of journalists his 
daily edited presentations” ( Johnson, 249).
Never very precisely defined as a culture, geopolitical region, history, 
or people, “Vietnam” became a flexible term, so that the war refought in 
cultural fantasy could take place at home in such films as Louis Malle’s 
Alamo Bay (1985) and Walter Hill’s Southern Comfort (1981), or in oth-
er global hot spots, such as the Grenada in Clint Eastwood’s Heartbreak 
Ridge (1986) or Central America in Mark Lester’s Commando (1985) or 
Afghanistan in Peter McDonald’s Rambo III (1988), where John Ram-
bo fights valiantly with the Afghani mujahideen against the Soviets. Of 
course, the anti-colonial resistance movement in Afghanistan, supported 
by CIA advisors and U.S. funds and weapons, would in the mid-1990s 
align itself with the Taliban (Students of Islam), which in turn would 
host Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda ( Johnson, 177). Screening Rambo 
III today in the U.S. is a bizarre experience, as the viewer watches John 
Rambo learning and even participating in folk rituals, such as horse rac-
ing, of Afghani “freedom fighters” who by 2001 would be our unequiv-
ocal enemies.
Contemporary with these films and such fiction television programs as 
China Beach and Miami Vice or documentary series, such as HBO’s Sol-
diers in Hiding, were military “tie-ins”, which traded official sites as mov-
ie sets and insider information about military procedures for films that 
promoted military heroism and honor, such as An Officer and a Gentle-
man (1982), Top Gun (1986), and the many spinoffs, which have by now 
helped establish a cinematic and televisual genre, including CBS’s long-
running series, JAG [Judge Adjutants’ General]). What came to be termed 
“the Vietnam-Effect” extended its aura to draw parasitically upon other 
wars, so that the revival in the 1990s of World War II as a topic in films, 
television docudramas, and print narratives (fiction, biography, and oral 
histories) had as much to do with the large-scale revision of the Vietnam 
War (and U.S. imperialism in Southeast Asia) as it did with such nomi-
nal historical markers as the 50th anniversary of D-Day or memorials for 
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the end of World War II. Billed as “anti-war films”, often because of their 
graphic and thus alienating violence, films like Steven Spielberg’s Saving 
Private Ryan (1998), Terrence Malick’s Thin Red Line (1998), and John 
Woo’s Wind Talkers (2002) helped remilitarize the United States not only 
because they drew on the conventions of World War II heroism and mili-
tary success but also because each in its own way borrowed liberal, often 
explicitly pacifist, sentiments for its purposes. Thus the Lieutenant (Tom 
Hanks) leading the soldiers assigned to rescue Private Ryan is a school 
teacher unwilling to risk human lives unnecessarily and obliged merely 
to do the unpleasant but necessary job of civilian soldier. Officers in Thin 
Red Line disobey orders from above when they put their troops at unrea-
sonable risk, and the Navajo “wind talkers” in John Woo’s film challenge 
the racism of their fellow soldiers. All end up fighting, however, thereby 
linking a “just war” thesis with liberal and anti-war sentiments. My point 
that combat films with radically different political perspectives often con-
tribute equally to pro-military sentiments is confirmed by Anthony Swof-
ford in his memoir of the First Gulf War, Jarhead (2003). Describing U.S. 
soldiers’ fascination with antiwar films about the Vietnam War, Swofford 
concludes: “But actually Vietnam War films are all pro-war, no matter 
what the supposed message, what Kubrick or Coppola or Stone intended 
[…]. The magic brutality of the films celebrates the terrible and despi-
cable beauty of their fighting skills. Fight, rape, war, pillage, burn. Filmic 
images of death and carnage are pornography for the military man”.109
In the years following the First Gulf War and before 9/11, mass me-
dia helped re-legitimate the U.S. military, reaffirmed “masculine” values 
(often in direct reaction to the women’s rights movement), and defused 
the sort of anti-war dissent that did contribute significantly to ending the 
Vietnam War. Incorporated into domestic concerns or located histori-
cally or geographically elsewhere than in the Middle East, U.S. militarism 
and “warrior culture” were reborn in post-Vietnam guises. Populist media 
and documentary film-makers, including the surprisingly popular Mi-
chael Moore and less visible producers of “alternative” television, such as 
Paper Tiger Television’s Dee Dee Halleck, rarely addressed the subtlety 
with which the mass media employed the rhetoric of its political oppo-
nents. In Moore’s Roger and Me (1989), the CEO of General Motors is 
a classic capitalist hypocrite and thief; in Bowling for Columbine (2002), 
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the President of the National Rifle Association is the senile, foolish, and 
contradictory Charlton Heston. Only demystify!
There were important exceptions, of course, in the aftermath of the 
First Gulf War and well before 9/11, such as Barry Levinson’s Wag the 
Dog (1998) and David O. Russell’s Three Kings (1997), both of which 
criticized the nationalist propaganda and media control that allowed the 
George H. W. Bush Administration to wage the First Gulf War with little 
public scrutiny and the illusion of an “international coalition” of allied 
forces. Wag the Dog is based on the premise that a “war” we are waging 
against Albania is entirely fabricated by a Washington spin-doctor (Con-
rad Bream, played by Robert De Niro) with the help of a Hollywood 
producer (Sidney Motss, played by Dustin Hoffman) to distract public 
attention from a sexual harassment charge against the incumbent Presi-
dent two weeks from his re-election. Wag the Dog brilliantly satirizes the 
increasing control the U.S. Federal Government has exercised over news 
reporting of its foreign military ventures. In many respects, Wag the Dog 
seems merely to elaborate in Hollywood film satire the claims made by 
Jean Baudrillard in his deliberately iconoclastic La Guerre du Golfe n’a pas 
eu lieu (1991).110
In a very different fashion, Three Kings attempted to peel away the mask 
of patriotic dedication in the Gulf War by exposing the greed of the U.S. 
soldiers for Kuwaiti gold looted by the invading Iraqi Army as a meta-
phor for U.S. self-interest in controlling the oil-rich Gulf. I admit that the 
pacifist and populist sentiments of Three Kings are noteworthy, especially 
in a period when Hollywood films were targeted increasingly at 12–17 
year-old moviegoers, who still pay the most dollars per person on films 
and associated products of any age group in the U.S. The grisly scene in 
Three Kings of an M-16 bullet penetrating human intestines in slow mo-
tion and producing the green bile that will slowly and painfully kill the 
victim is far more effective than the slow-motion melodrama of U.S. 
troops dying on the beaches of Normandy during the D-Day invasion in 
Saving Private Ryan.
Nevertheless, both Wag the Dog and Three Kings rely on a narrative of 
Americanization that plays a significant role in the general public’s under-
standing of globalization and anticipates how post-9/11 film and televi-
sion would rely on similar processes of nationalizing international prob-
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lems to “channel the nation back to normalcy—or at least [to] the normal 
flows of television and consumer culture”, as Lynn Spigel puts it.111 Wag 
the Dog does this cultural work in an obvious manner by locating all of 
the action of the film in the United States; the imprisoned soldier (De-
nis Leary), who is picked to simulate an actual U.S. soldier “downed” by 
hostile gunfire in Albania and miraculously “rescued”, has to be picked up 
by the media team from his maximum-security military prison in Texas. 
The liberal politics of Wag the Dog make what I have termed “hyperna-
tionalization” an explicit theme in the film, so that we are expected to un-
derstand immediately the irony of the Hollywood producer Motss and 
the Washington insider Bream inventing an international crisis to cover a 
domestic sexual scandal. The film satirizes Americans’ chronic ignorance 
of world events, thanks to news structured around entertainment and ad-
vertising, but it also reinforces the assumption that the United States is 
the center of the world and that even a fictional war can have meaning 
and value, as long as it is waged by the United States.
Carefully structured news stories about the Second Gulf war followed 
the example of Wag the Dog, despite its satiric and counter-cultural inten-
tions. The “saving” of Jessica Lynch, the U.S. soldier wounded and cap-
tured by Iraqi troops on March 23, 2003 during the invasion, follows just 
such a narrative of Americanization, from her heroic rescue by U.S. Spe-
cial Forces through her medical treatment and debriefing at a U.S. mili-
tary based near Frankfurt to her triumphant return to her hometown in 
Palestine, West Virginia. Even more interesting and relevant are the sub-
sequent events, in which Jessica Lynch denied the media’s representation 
of her “heroism” and disputed the facts of her “rescue” by U.S. Special 
Forces. What is now considered a deliberate effort by the Pentagon to 
mount a propaganda campaign in support of the U.S.-led invasion re-
sulted in a flurry of charges and counter-charges in news stories, books, 
television films, and news specials. As early as November 11, 2003, less 
than eight months after her capture and rescue, Lynch told Diane Saw-
yer in a CNN interview that the Pentagon “used me to symbolize all this 
stuff. It’s wrong. I don’t know why they filmed [my rescue] or say these 
things”.112 In her April 24, 2007 testimony before the U.S. House Com-
mittee on Oversight and Government Reform, Lynch referred specifi-
cally to how the Pentagon tried to turn her into the “Rambo from West 
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Virginia”.113 Susan Faludi reads Jessica Lynch’s story as part of American 
paranoia and xenophobia traceable back to Colonial captivity narratives, 
and she is undoubtedly right that the Lynch story lent itself well to the 
conventions of American mythopoeia.114 One characteristic of such na-
tional myth-making is incorporation of the foreign into the EuroAmeri-
can symbology. Mohammed Odeh al-Rehaief, the Iraqi who first brought 
Jessica Lynch’s captivity in a hospital in Nasiriyah to the attention of the 
U.S. military, not only was granted refugee status and allowed to emigrate 
to the U.S., but his book about his role in the rescue, Because Each Life Is 
Precious (2003), earned him a $ 300,000 advance.115 Amid the prolifera-
tion of books, news stories, Congressional hearings, and television mov-
ies, “Jessica Lynch” helped transform the politically unjustified invasion 
of Iraq and its destabilization of the Middle East into a thoroughly Amer-
ican narrative.
More conventionally, Three Kings challenges self-interested U.S. milita-
rism and foreign policy in the Gulf by condemning the command-struc-
ture of the U.S. military and countering it with the populist pacifism and 
humanitarianism of the “three kings”, who finally live up to their Bibli-
cal titles by guiding dissident Iraqis and their families to their “promised 
land” across the border in Iran. The familiar imperial narrative of U.S. 
paternalism, of the “white-man’s burden”, plays itself out once again in 
terms almost identical with those criticized so thoroughly in nineteenth-
century imperial narratives. The dissident Iraqis who save Archie Gates 
(George Clooney), Troy Barlow (Mark Wahlberg), Chief Elgin (Ice 
Cube), and Conrad Vig (Spike Jonze) from attack by the Republican 
Guard turn out to be primarily intent on “get[ting] rid of Saddam”, in 
order to “live life and do business”, as their leader Amir Abdullah (Cliff 
Curtis) says.
The film criticizes consumer capitalism and its globalization, but advo-
cates on the other hand the value of small businesses. When Troy Barlow 
is captured and tortured by Republican Guards, he is made to drink crude 
oil poured into his mouth propped open with a CD case. The consumer 
goods stolen from Kuwait and heaped in poorly guarded Iraqi bunkers 
exemplify the meretriciousness of multinational globalization—tape and 
CD players in their unopened boxes, tangled skeins of jewelry, heaps of 
cell phones, and other consumer “junk” are visually effective, but the po-
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litical dissidents these three kings will eventually save are committed to 
modest but meaningful businesses, such as hair-styling. Following a near-
ly schematic narrative of “education”, the three remaining kings (Conrad 
Vig dies and is prepared for a Muslim burial) use the gold they have sto-
len from the Iraqis (who have stolen it from the Kuwaitis) to “buy” safe 
passage for the political dissidents into the relative safety of Iran. The fi-
nal scene of the film in which the border crossing is enacted, replete with 
sentimental waves and sympathetic looks between the dissidents and the 
enlightened U.S. soldiers, is difficult to watch today as conservatives con-
tinue to call for the U.S. to extend its invasion and occupation of Iraq to 
include Iran.
The sympathy these U.S. soldiers establish with the Iraqi dissidents 
is certainly intended by David O. Russell to counter the Orientalist de-
monization of Arab peoples so common in U.S. mass culture since the 
nineteenth century, intensified as part of the build-up for the first Gulf 
war, and driven to near cultural hysteria in the months following the at-
tacks on 9/11.116 Yet the Iraqi dissidents are represented in what seem 
to be deliberately ambiguous regional, ethnic, and religious terms. The 
mercenary U.S. soldiers enter southern Iraq in quest of the stolen Kuwaiti 
gold, so the political dissidents they encounter in the aftermath of the 
First Gulf War would most likely be Shi’ite dissidents, similar to those 
who appealed to George H. W. Bush for military assistance and staged 
an unsuccessful rebellion against Saddam Hussein in the weeks following 
the conclusion of that war. Yet there is considerable cinematic evidence 
to conclude that the Iraqi dissidents are Kurds. Hair-dressing, for exam-
ple, is traditionally a respected profession among the Kurds, so that one 
of the dissidents’ plans to return to that profession hints at Kurdish af-
filiations, displaced of course from the main Kurdish population centers 
in northern Iraq to the film’s setting in southern Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s 
government did forcibly “resettle” Kurds in the South (including many 
who were murdered and buried in mass graves there) during the Anfal, 
the genocidal “ethnic cleansing” the Iraqi dictator conducted prior to the 
first Gulf war.117
The deliberate confusion of different dissident groups in Iraq seems in-
tended not only to achieve cinematic economy, but also to make these 
dissidents more accessible to the four U.S. soldiers. These soldiers rep-
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resented in the film offer a sample of U.S. multiculturalism: Chief Elgin 
is a devout Christian African American, Conrad Vig is an uneducated 
southern white racist, Archie Gates is a white career soldier taking early 
retirement, and Troy Barlow a model WASP. To be sure, the representa-
tiveness of this group is very narrow, but their respective sympathies with 
the Iraqi dissidents perform a narrative of cultural hybridity that unmis-
takably argues for greater understanding of other peoples as an alterna-
tive to unilateral globalization and to U.S. militarism. Chief Elgin appears 
to abandon Christianity for Islam, and he dons the traditional Arab male 
kaffieyeh (“head covering”) to announce his conversion. Conrad Vig 
learns about Islamic burial practices, overcomes his racism toward Chief 
Elgin by way of their shared interest in Islam, and is eventually prepared 
for an Islamic burial of his own. In fact, when the dissidents cross the bor-
der into Iran, they are carrying his body with them for a proper burial on 
the other side. The protagonists learn to sympathize with and understand 
not historically and regionally specific groups of Iraqis, but generalized 
“Arab” and “Muslim” types. In this way, the four Americans act out liberal 
multiculturalism, which is often criticized for what Lisa Lowe terms its 
contribution to the “ideological representation of the liberal imperialist 
state”.118 Thus the cinematic experience of viewing in 2004 the conclud-
ing scene of Iraqi dissidents crossing the border into the relative freedom 
of Iran is not a prophecy from 1997 of how the Bush Administration 
would turn to military power again in 2003 because it failed to follow the 
humane and politically liberal advice of Three Kings. Instead, the liberal 
ideology, itself deeply invested in U.S. nationalism, helped produce the 
circumstances that would make the Bush Administration’s invasion of 
Iraq a military and colonial reality and the “logical next step” of this for-
eign policy covert or military efforts at “regime change” in Iran.
What was particularly noteworthy in U.S. mass media since 9/11 and 
during the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq was a new twist 
on these old themes, but a turn that is compatible with them and read-
able as part of a history stretching from the Vietnam era to the present in 
the gradual, ineluctable control of the news and entertainment media by 
the U.S. government. Fiction and non-fiction television has understand-
ably paid great attention to the related events of 9/11 and the justifica-
tion of U.S. military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lynn Spigel 
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describes in some detail how “traditional forms of entertainment” rein-
vented “their place in U.S. life and culture” after 9/11, initially by reduc-
ing the number of violent films released and replacing them on television 
with “family fare” (Spigel, 235). Spigel goes on to argue that very quickly 
after this period of self-censorship, Hollywood and television turned in-
stead to familiar historical narratives to stabilize the myths of national 
cohesion and reaffirm a teleological narrative about the American experi-
ence (Spigel, 240–241). Spigel’s argument confirms my own sense that 
Hollywood and television quickly recycled old mythic narratives about 
America, rather than drawing the opposite conclusion: that the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 indicate that Americans need to know far more about the 
world they are so intent upon “globalizing”. As if in direct response to this 
promise of greater attention to the other peoples of the world, the media 
began to incorporate “terrorism” into the United States and strip it of its 
international threat. Like President George W. Bush’s continuing efforts 
to link Iraq directly with al-Qaeda, the nationalizing of terror helped de-
fuse its transnational, inchoate, and thus truly terrifying power. The con-
tainment of terror on contemporary U.S. television follows the logic of 
the cultural imperialism I have been tracing thus far, but now with the 
claim that the best weapons against such “terror” are those of traditional 
U.S. democracy: the fairness of the law and the populism of an American 
people that exceeds party politics, even national boundaries.
From its debut on September 13, 1990 to its final episode on May 24, 
2010, NBC’s Law and Order was the longest-running serial in television 
history. Beginning with the debut in the Fall of 2010 (September 29, 
2010) of Law and Order Los Angeles, the series will extend that record. 
The NBC legal-police melodrama has coincided with U.S. neo-imperi-
alism in the Middle East since the First Gulf War and not surprisingly 
has often taken up issues related to our foreign policies in that region. 
Starring Sam Waterston as the lead prosecutor of the District Attorney’s 
office in New York, the program makes moral claims specific to the me-
dium of television and distinguishes itself thereby from other police and 
crime shows, which rely primarily on the urban public’s anxieties about 
living in an increasingly dangerous America and world. The program is 
structured in two parts: in the first half-hour, police detectives investigate 
a crime, arrest a suspect, and present their case to the District Attorney’s 
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Office; in the second half-hour, the Chief Prosecutor, Jack Mc Coy (Sam 
Waterston) and his attractive Assistant D. A., Serena, bring the case to 
trial and judgment. Although the detective and legal work do not always 
coincide, the errors in the system seem to confirm the overall checks and 
balances built into the police-judicial system, as it is referred to in the 
voice-over prologue to the program.
Here I want to digress for a moment to anticipate my larger argument. 
I disagree with Michael Moore’s repeated claim in Bowling for Columbine 
that it is primarily the news media, rather than entertainment television 
and film, which have shaped the atmosphere of fear in the U.S. resulting 
in more than 11,000 gun deaths per year. Citing how other societies, like 
Canada and Japan, where gun deaths are less than 1,000 per year, still 
generate large audiences for violent films, television programs, and video 
games, Moore contends that in such societies even adolescent viewers 
can suspend their disbelief in fiction programs and understand the differ-
ence between fantasy and reality. But in the United States, there is a long 
tradition of confusing fiction and reality in the mass media, primarily for 
the purposes of maximizing the commercial advantages of each mode. 
We hardly need the examples of recent “reality television” to remind us 
that television thrives on what Baudrillard long ago defined as the “hy-
perreal”, a phenomenon seemingly explained best by the way television 
gives us the illusion of heightened knowledge and authority over an oth-
erwise baffling real. Law and Order certainly has this effect on its viewers, 
which may account for its huge success on network television otherwise 
challenged significantly by cable channels, such as “Lifetime” and “Oxy-
gen”, targeting specific market shares and trying to break up network he-
gemony in the so-called “post-network era”.
I have argued elsewhere that the socially conscious television of the 
early 1970s, such as Norman Lear pioneered in All in the Family, was 
transformed in the 1980s into much more conventional “moral problem 
solving” within the existing legal and social boundaries of U.S. democra-
cy (NAS, 170–71). All in the Family argued that racial and ethnic bigotry 
could not be overcome entirely by the law, but required changes in per-
sonal values. Sanford and Son joined that argument to claim that class and 
racial antipathies were inextricably bound together in psychological hab-
its difficult but still possible to change. But Law and Order imagines that 
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equality under the law, despite notable aberrations in U.S. legal history, 
is our best defense against injustices tied to class, race, ethnicity, gender, 
or sexuality. The cultural shift is clearly from television committed to po-
litical and social reform to television concerned with defending existing 
institutions, as indeed the title of the program—a slogan of conservative 
republican campaigns for the past forty years—suggests.
The episode of Law and Order I want to analyze focuses on the murder 
of a popular professor of Anthropology, Louise Murdoch, who is also the 
head of a community advocacy center for Muslim Women, and the even-
tual arrest and trial of a young American male, Greg Landen, who has 
converted to Islam. Of course, the most infamous American convert to 
Islam on October 2, 2002, the date this episode was first broadcast, was 
John Walker Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban”, who had left his 
upper-middle-class home in Marin, California to study Arabic and thus 
the Qu’ran in Yemen and Pakistan and then to join the Taliban in Afghan-
istan. Two days after this episode aired, Lindh was sentenced to a twenty-
year prison term in a “plea bargain” that reduced the charges against him 
to “one count of providing services to the Taliban and one count of car-
rying explosives during a felony”.119 In his sentencing hearing, Lindh was 
tearful and apologetic, denying he had any intention of taking up arms 
against the U.S., and his divorced parents stood by him throughout his 
arrest and trial.
Lindh is certainly the historical model on which the character of Greg 
Landen in Law and Order is based, but very important changes are made 
in his character and history. First, the young man in Law and Order de-
spises his parents, the legal system, and America in general, so that his 
courtroom tirades as he takes over his own legal defense for purposes 
of political propaganda remind the viewer of news accounts of Zacarias 
Moussaoui, the accused “twentieth” hijacker in the 9/11 attacks, who also 
insisted on serving as his own legal counsel and used the courtroom as a 
“bully-pulpit”. Testifying in his own defense, Landen makes some very 
reasonable connections between al-Qaeda’s possible motivations and the 
historical motivations of oppressed minorities in the United States to re-
sist domination:
“Since 1990, [the U.S.] has occupied our holy lands […] 
America doesn’t respect any culture but its own […].Amer-
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ica is a country that was born out of the mass murder of na-
tive Americans and built on the backs of Africans. If the native 
Americans could have defended themselves by flying planes 
into buildings, don’t you think they would have? If the slaves 
could have freed themselves by becoming martyrs, don’t you 
think they would have? And it wouldn’t have been terrorism; 
it would have been self-defense”.
In Muslim male dress and beard, Greg Landen is exoticized and Orien-
talized, even though his testimony echoes reasonable arguments made by 
many intellectuals in response to 9/11. In addition to his physical appear-
ance, Landen is also alienated by his father, who is shown in the court-
room shaking his head from side to side and mouthing the unheard word, 
“No”, as his son testifies.
The young man’s target in Law and Order is not the capitalist author-
ity symbolized by the World Trade Towers in New York City or the mili-
tary authority of the Pentagon, but a woman professor of anthropology, 
who has devoted her life to liberal social change and exemplifies that 
work in her diversification of the American university. Equating global 
terrorist attacks, such as al-Qaeda’s on the U.S. (or Israel, France, or In-
donesia), with “domestic terrorism” within the United States, such as 
Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, 
is a common response not only in the United States but in Islamic societ-
ies. But this episode of Law and Order constructs the plot in such a way 
as to swerve widely from such a conclusion. Instead, we learn that the 
young man believed his girlfriend, who worked at the professor’s Center 
for Muslim Women, was being drawn away from her responsibilities as a 
submissive Islamic woman by her feminist work with the professor. In a 
jealous, but also religiously motivated rage, he “smote” his enemy.
Cautious to protect itself against charges of insensitivity to Islamic 
Americans, Law and Order carefully disengages the young man from 
“true” Islam, but in much the same fashion al-Qaeda has been distin-
guished in the popular U.S. news from “true” Islam: by condemning the 
“fundamentalist” irrationality of both, rather than making any substan-
tive claims about the role of women in Islamic societies. In a decisive con-
sultation between the prosecutors and a woman psychologist whom the 
prosecution will call as an “expert-witness”, the psychologist concludes 
Culture, U.S. Imperialism, and Globalization 127
that Landen’s primary motivation for murder was his sexual insecurity, 
reinforced by his difficult relationship with his parents, and his desperate 
need to maintain absolute control over his girlfriend. I need hardly com-
ment on how such a conclusion reduces to triviality all of the important 
ethical questions raised by this episode. To be sure, Law and Order does 
not argue that this young man represents all American Muslims, but it 
reinforces virtually every convention the West has used to distinguish its 
“civilization” from Islamic “barbarism” since Romantic Idealist philoso-
phers, like Hegel.
The incorporation of left political dissent with Islamic fundamentalism 
has changed since 2002, gaining in rhetorical sophistication and working 
thereby to create further divisions among anti-war and other progressive 
groups in the United States and abroad. In an episode of Law and Or-
der aired on February 18, 2004, sixteen months after the “John Lindh” 
episode discussed above, Kenneth Silva, an African American U.S. postal 
worker, who has himself immigrated to the U.S. from Brazil, is charged 
with the murder of Brian Teague, a Hudson University college student 
actively involved in anti-war and anti-WTO demonstrations in New York. 
It turns out that Silva is himself a decorated U.S. veteran of the First Gulf 
War who has recently lost his son to the Second Gulf War and considers 
Teague’s “militant activism”, as the defense attorney describes it, to have 
“desecrated” his son’s memory. Silva is acquitted of the murder charge 
and the jury cannot decide on the “first degree manslaughter” charge, 
so a mistrial is declared. Although disappointed with the result, DA Jack 
McCoy accepts it, as his boss, the District Attorney (played by Fred Dal-
ton Thompson), concludes that Silva escaped justice thanks to the “blue-
collar workers” on the jury who sympathized with Silva’s rage. Conclud-
ing that “those who avoid jury duty” are the “same ones who avoid active 
duty”, McCoy’s boss suggests that if legal justice has miscarried, then at 
least the immigrant, African-American Silva has been exonerated by his 
“working-class” allies. This conservative immigrant, dedicated worker for 
the federal government both at home and abroad, has effectively silenced 
dissent, marshalling racial identity to “support our troops” as they con-
tinue to die in a quixotic war.
U.S. media have moved quickly from the recognizable body of the 
“American Taliban” Greg Landen/John Walker Lindh in 2002 to thor-
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oughly “Americanized” versions, usually identifiable with the misguided 
anti-war students and other dissenters. In a 2006 episode of Crossing Jor-
dan (March 12, 2006), “Death Toll”, two bombs explode on Boston sub-
way trains during rush hour, killing and injuring many, including many 
school children.120 Even before he is identified, the “domestic terrorist” 
is designated by one member of the Forensic Team as “worse than bin-
Laden”. Revealed in a climactic scene attempting to defuse the remain-
ing bomb he has planted in a manner that combines both Madrid’s 3/11 
and London’s 7/7 terrorist acts, the bomber turns out to be a “Harvard 
graduate student”, whose wife was killed in the bombing of the London 
Underground (7/7) and who had planted three bombs in hopes of alert-
ing Americans to the failures of our Homeland Security Administration.
Sadly, the naive graduate student failed to control his explosives (an 
allusion to the subsequent bombers in London whose main explosives 
failed to detonate), even though he himself had tried to stop the train 
by pulling the Emergency Stop cord. In his bumbling effort to defuse 
his own bomb, he saves others but is righteously killed in his heroic 
(but technically failed) attempt. Best to leave “terrorism” to the experts, 
whether they are from the Boston Coroner’s Office or the Homeland 
Security Administration. The representation of this “domestic terror-
ist’s” body is especially interesting in the final scene. Portrayed earlier as 
a pleasant, helpful, white, middle-class male, he is shown in the darkness 
of the tunnel as both a “shadowy” and “racialized” figure, much what the 
London Police must have “seen” as they gunned down a fleeing Brazilian 
electrician on July 8, 2005 as they looked for a scapegoat for 7/7.
I have focused on Law and Order and Crossing Jordan, rather than Fox’s 
24 (2001–2010), because the former television series do not take terror-
ism as their principal subject. Of course, Fox’s 24 and its chief investi-
gator, Jack Bauer (Kiefer Sutherland) have been the subject of countless 
interpretations of how U.S. popular culture and the mass media have rep-
resented terrorism, the U.S. role in the “war on terror”, and the domestic 
consequences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although eight sea-
sons of Fox’s 24 only confirm my arguments about the media’s “hyper-
nationalization” of foreign threats, especially terrorism, the series does 
so in terms of the overtly conservative politics, especially after 9/11, of 
the Fox network. Films like Wag the Dog and Three Kings, television series 
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like Law and Order and Crossing Jordan are overtly liberal in their political 
affiliations. It is not just that their liberalism coincides with the neo-lib-
eral strategies of U.S. conservatives in the post-9/11 era; such liberalism 
defines itself by way of U.S. national affiliations that make difficult, if not 
impossible, the transnational, global imaginary so desperately needed to 
address the social, economic, and political problems we face in the sec-
ond decade of the twenty-first century.
Talal Asad has argued in Genealogies of Religion that the “West” begins 
with the “project of modernization (Westernization)” that is inherently 
colonial and “defines itself, in opposition to all non-Western cultures, by 
its modern historicity. Despite the disjunctions of modernity (its break 
with tradition), ‘the West’ therefore includes within itself its past as an 
organic continuity: from ‘the Greeks and Romans’ and ‘the Hebrews 
and Early Christians,’ through ‘Latin Christendom,’ ‘the Renaissance,’ 
and ‘the Reformation,’ to the ‘universal civilization’ of modern Europe-
ans”.121 Western imperialism, then, is a story that is told in countless dif-
ferent ways, media, and genres, but with surprisingly few variations when 
looked at in this light, which allows “otherness” to be internalized and 
rationalized, historicized, and civilized.
It perhaps should not surprise or even shock us that popular American 
film and television contributes to this narrative teleology in such consis-
tently reductive ways. “Islam” is for a young American, like John Walker 
Lindh or his fictional alter-ego, merely “acting out” childish rebellion, a 
confirmation of the “undeveloped” features of those “backward cultures”, 
which like Hegel’s Africa are “without history”. In a similar fashion, con-
servative politicians and the general public accepted anti-war activism in 
the Vietnam War era as “college hi-jinks”, “adolescent rebellion”, a “rejec-
tion of their fathers’ America”. What the Vietnam War—and the ongo-
ing inchoate “war on terrorism”—have in common is a desperate desire 
to reaffirm national values by repressing utterly the history and reality of 
supposed “enemies” in Southeast Asia and the Islamic world. Few today 
would disagree that the Vietnam War marked a historic moment in which 
the United States needed to change its foreign and domestic policies, its 
ties between government and corporation, its neglect of public opinion, 
and the changing political economies affecting these historical crises. If 
we are to learn the lesson of the Vietnam era, then we must learn to rec-
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ognize, rather than repress, the complex, intertwined histories of Islam, 
its influence on the development of U.S. and other western societies, and 
our dependence on the economic means it has provided to “modernize” 
and thus “westernize”, often at its own peril, the world. Before we can 
even begin to learn this lesson, however, we will have to read critically 
that other narrative of Western historicity Talal Asad has so cogently in-
terpreted as dependent on a constant “assumption”: “To make history, 
the agent must create the future, remake herself, and help others to do 
so, where the criteria of successful remaking are seen to be universal. Old 
universes must be subverted and a new universe created. To that extent, 
history can be made only on the back of a universal teleology. Actions 
seeking to maintain the ‘local’ status quo, or to follow local models of so-
cial life, do not qualify as history making. From the Cargo Cults of Mela-
nesia to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, they merely attempt (hopelessly) 
‘to resist the future’ or ‘to turn back the clock of history’” (Asad, 19). It is 
time for us to think differently about how “history” is and has been made, 
to count the “local” as well as the “global”, and to develop new institu-
tions, not simply interpretive methods, to negotiate the inevitable con-
flicts of such histories. Without such critical knowledge, there is likely to 
be unending terror from all sides in a new era of global warfare only one 
stage of which is being enacted in the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its ongo-
ing war in Afghanistan.
Chapter 6
Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran in Idaho
I do not consider myself Western, but rather modern.
– Azar Nafisi, “Three Women, Two Worlds, One 
Issue”, SAIS Review (Summer-Fall 2000), 37.
There is nothing political in American literature.
– Laura Bush, New York Times (2001)
A neo-liberal cultural front opened quietly and effectively in conjunction 
with the George W. Bush Administration’s military imperialism in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. It was supported by the many private think-tanks, foun-
dations, and university foreign policy centers that have since the 1970s 
played significant roles in the success of political neo-conservatism. Al-
though the election of President Barack Obama and the near collapse 
of late capitalism in 2008 seemed to indicate a change in political and 
economic directions, the popularity of Sarah Palin and the rise of the 
Tea Party and Tea Party Express in 2009–2010 indicate the strength of 
conservatism even in the face of such political and economic reversals. 
The strategic use of women in the new conservative movements deserves 
special attention, because of what it tells us about both neo-liberalism as 
a tool of neo-conservatives and about the changing social and political 
issues facing contemporary feminists. A good deal of attention has been 
paid since 9/11 to the ways the U.S. has used the issue of the internation-
al rights of women to bolster diplomatic and military interventions in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Morocco, Iran, and Turkey. Barack 
Obama’s appointment of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State seems to 
have extended the entanglement of U.S. neo-imperialism with interna-
tional women’s rights, although my focus in what follows is primarily on 
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conservative uses of international women’s rights, women émigré intel-
lectuals, and EuroAmerican high culture during President George W. 
Bush’s administration.
Azar Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books (2003) is an 
excellent example of how neo-liberal rhetoric is now being deployed by 
neo-conservatives and the importance they have placed on cultural is-
sues.122 For the past decade and especially in the critical period follow-
ing 9/11, I have argued the importance of studying the long history of 
U.S. imperialism in order to understand the continuity of our current im-
perialist ventures abroad with traditional modes of political, economic, 
and cultural imperialism.123 I have also consistently recognized the need 
to theorize and interpret new methods of cultural imperialism appropri-
ate to the postmodern economic conditions fundamental to globalizing 
capitalism. Within these new transnational flows of goods, information, 
services, research and technology, cultural products, lifestyles, and po-
litical institutions, the U.S. nation continues to play a crucial role, despite 
the apparent “post-national” character of these phenomena. In the after-
math of 9/11, U.S. nationalism has taken on a peculiarly isolationist aura 
that is at the same time compounded by a deep investment in its own in-
ternational deployment. The nearly hysterical patriotism legitimating the 
military build-up for the Second Gulf War and our continuing occupa-
tions of Iraq and Afghanistan are compounded by a rhetorical emphasis 
on the United States as the democratic model for the rest of the world.124 
Although this emerging mythology cannot be read with complete clarity 
at this moment, it has certain precedents in nineteenth-century Manifest 
Destiny, even its late nineteenth-century variant, “the March of the An-
glo-Saxon”, insofar as both depend upon a U.S. democratic utopianism 
built upon the heritage of Western Civilization.125
The defense of such Anglo-Saxonism has traditionally been conducted 
by white male politicians, intellectuals, and writers. Neo-conservatives 
have varied this pattern by supporting ethnic minorities who share their 
views and thus give legitimacy to the cultural diversity of their presumed 
meritocracy. George W. Bush Administration’s Secretary of State Condo-
leeza Rice, Dartmouth graduate and American Enterprise Institute Fel-
low Dinesh D’Souza, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, and Judge 
Janice Rogers Brown, George W. Bush appointment to the U.S. Court of 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia, are familiar examples of ethnic mi-
norities celebrated for their endorsement of this neo-conservative agen-
da. Azar Nafisi represents an important variation of these models, insofar 
as her defense of literary culture, especially in the EuroAmerican exam-
ples she uses to organize her book, appeals powerfully to liberal cultural 
values in ways specifically geared to attract intellectuals disaffected by the 
so-called “culture wars” of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Liberal and 
leftist intellectuals have readily dismissed Rice, D’Souza, Thomas, and 
Brown as puppets of the neo-conservative agenda, but Nafisi represents 
a more complex figure whose defense of the aesthetic critique of social 
tyranny carefully imitates the rhetoric of classical liberalism.
In a 2006 article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Richard Byrne de-
scribes the controversy surrounding Hamid Dabashi’s article criticizing 
Nafisi as a forerunner of U.S. plans to invade Iran.126 Byrne cites several 
scholars, who like Karimi-Hakkak of Maryland’s Center for Persian Stud-
ies insist that Dabashi’s criticism of Nafisi is too “shrill”, especially in the 
claim that Nafisi’s literary criticism somehow prophesies “war” (Byrne, 
A16). My own approach was developed well before the controversy sur-
rounding Dabashi’s article in “the Egyptian-language newspaper Al-Ah-
ram” appeared (Byrne, A12), and I will try to work out the scholarly and 
historical terms that are often lacking in Dabashi’s more strictly political 
analysis. Nevertheless, even as I wish to distinguish my approach from 
Dabashi’s, I want to agree at the outset with his conclusions. Although I 
do not think that there is a direct relationship between Nafisi’s work and 
U.S. plans for military action in Iran, I do think Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in 
Tehran represents the larger effort of neo-conservatives to build the cul-
tural and political case against diplomatic negotiations with the present 
government of Iran. Nafisi also brings together micropolitical academic 
issues, such as the “new” aesthetics, and macropolitical questions, such as 
the role of the U.S. in contemporary world affairs.
Drawing on the enthusiasm among some intellectuals for a “revival” of 
the “aesthetic function”, including its left-intellectual heritage of “nega-
tive dialectic” in Adorno’s famous phrase, Nafisi appears to be following 
the consensus forming around Elaine Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just 
(1999) and other contributions to the “new aesthetics”.127 Scarry’s argu-
ments in favor of the aesthetic function as deeply involved in reformist 
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struggles for greater social justice are politically radical, however one 
might dispute her claims, and she has made her own politics explicit in 
other works, including Dreaming by the Book (1999) and Who Defended 
the Country? (2003).128 Although Nafisi’s work is easy to confuse with 
Scarry’s or other figures among the “new aestheticists”, Nafisi’s political 
affiliations are indisputably neo-conservative. After leaving Iran in 1997, 
Nafisi found an “academic and intellectual home” at “the Paul H. Nitze 
School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins 
University”, where she was able to complete Reading Lolita in Tehran 
and “pursue my projects at SAIS” with a “generous grant from the Smith 
Richardson Foundation” (346–347).
The Smith Richardson Foundation is based on the Vicks Vaporub for-
tune of H. Smith Richardson, and uses its $ 500 million in assets to make 
“nearly $ 25 million in grants a year”, emphasizing work in political sci-
ence, public policy, and international relations. The Foundation also “pro-
vides significant support to conservative think-tanks across the country”, 
especially the American Enterprise Institute.129 The Smith Richardson 
Foundation website traces its support of “conservative causes” to “1973 
when R. Randolph Richardson became president” and “funded early 
‘supply-side’ [economics] books of Jude Wanniski and George Gilder”.130 
The Foundation’s board includes some of the most influential neo-con-
servatives from government, the military, and higher education, includ-
ing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Christopher DeMuth, Samuel Huntington, 
General Edward D. Meyer, Ben Wattenberg, and E. William Stetson.131 
Of course, the mere fact the Foundation supported Nafisi’s work is by no 
means incontrovertible proof of her own neo-conservative politics; the 
Foundation’s recent grantees have included Columbia University, the 
City University of New York, Boston University, and Cornell Universi-
ty, along with such neo-conservative groups as the American Enterprise 
Institute, the Hoover Institution, the History of Neo-conservatism, and 
Brigham Young University.132
Further circumstantial evidence for Nafisi’s neo-conservative creden-
tials is her association with Johns Hopkins University’s The Paul H. Ni-
tze School for Advanced International Studies, where she is Director of 
the Dialogue Project, “a multi-year initiative designed to promote—in a 
primarily cultural context—the development of democracy and human 
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rights in the Muslim world”. According to the Dialogue Project’s website, 
the research group addresses topics “that have been the main targets of 
Islamists and, as a result, are the most significant impediments to the cre-
ation of open and pluralistic societies in the Muslim world, including cul-
ture and the myth of Western culture [sic] imperialism, women’s issues, 
and human rights, among others”.133 Located on 1740 Massachusetts 
Ave., N.W., in downtown Washington, D. C., 200036–1983, independent 
of Johns Hopkins University’s main Homewood campus in Baltimore, 
SAIS was founded to train members of the diplomatic corps and a vari-
ety of other government services, including positions in the intelligence 
communities. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense and President of the 
World Bank Paul Dundes Wolfowitz (b. December 22, 1943) taught at 
Yale University (1970–1973) and briefly at SAIS in 1980, just before 
heading the Policy-Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department (1981–
1982) in the first term of President Reagan’s Administration.134
SAIS is an unusual institution for a scholar with Dr. Azar Nafisi’s cre-
dentials: a Ph.D. in English literature from the University of Oklahoma 
and previous positions as an Assistant Professor of English Literature at 
the University of Tehran (1979–1982), the Free Islamic University, sev-
en years as an Associate Professor of English at the University of Allameh 
Tabatabai in Iran, and in 1994 as a Fellow at Oxford University who gave 
“tutorials on women and cultural change”.135 As far as I know, there is no 
connection between SAIS and Johns Hopkins University’s English De-
partment or other literature-based curricula, except for programs, such 
as the “3-2 year” program, which allow undergraduates at Johns Hopkins 
to move directly from their B.A. degrees to complete Masters’ degrees 
(of several varieties) offered by SAIS. On the one hand, Azar Nafisi’s pro-
fessional identity as a “Professor at Johns Hopkins University” should 
raise no questions, except perhaps our admiration for the distinction of 
such a prestigious appointment. On the other hand, for a Ph.D. in Eng-
lish Literature to hold her appointment in SAIS, a school for the train-
ing of diplomats, certainly does pose a set of intriguing questions. In fact, 
Nafisi is listed by the SAIS website as “Research Associate” and her De-
partment as “Instruction—Substantive”, and in several other places on 
the Johns Hopkins University website she is listed as a “Visiting Research 
Associate”.136
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Of course, Reading Lolita in Tehran testifies to Nafisi’s understanding 
of the complex political, social, and cultural realities of modern Iran from 
the fall of the Shah’s regime through the Islamic Revolution and the rule 
of Ayatollah Khomeini to the status of that revolution under the current 
government of the Islamic Republic. After all, the purpose of Nafisi’s 
book is to expose the extensive corruption of the ideals of the original 
revolution and the tyranny under which many people suffer in the cur-
rent Islamic Republic. Given her credentials as an informed and native 
witness to social and political transformations in her home country, Naf-
isi would be an appropriate consultant to a school of international rela-
tions, like SAIS, but hardly eligible for a professorial appointment. Her 
specific professorial credentials have little to do with these questions and 
derive exclusively from the study of Anglo-American literature, support-
ed by her two book-length studies: Anti-Terra: A Critical Study of Vladi-
mir Nabokov’s Novels (1994) and Reading Lolita in Tehran (2003).137
All of these factors are extrinsic to Nafisi’s compelling narrative in 
Reading Lolita in Tehran and its interesting hybrid form, suggested in 
its subtitle, A Memoir in Books. Widely publicized, a # 1 New York Times 
bestseller in the year of its release, and winner of the 2004 Book Sense 
Book of the Year Award, Reading Lolita in Tehran has been praised by a 
wide spectrum of writers, intellectuals, and cultural commentators, rang-
ing from politically identifiable leftists, like Susan Sontag and Margaret 
Atwood, to respected neo-liberal writers, like Cynthia Ozick.138 Selected 
by countless reading groups as a title and used as “summer reading” for 
first-year college students at Mount Holyoke College, Reading Lolita in 
Tehran has quickly become a classic work, anthologized in the second 
edition of the popular college textbook, The New Humanities Reader.139 
As a consequence of her book’s success, Nafisi has given numerous lec-
tures, such as her appearance at the National Association of Independent 
Schools’ annual conference in Denver, where she was promoted as “an 
educator and liberator”.140
What accounts for the fascination and publicity stimulated by this 
book, which combines traditional literary criticism of four canonical 
western authors with an insider’s commentary on the political failures 
and repression of the Islamic Revolution and Republic? In the aftermath 
of 9/11, many intellectuals have discussed the notorious lack of interest 
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by the general public in the Middle East, Muslim religion, and related is-
sues. I need hardly remind my readers who are professional literary crit-
ics how little interest there is today among the broad U.S. reading public 
in the hermeneutic problems of modern Anglo-American literature. The 
once thriving market for belles lettres has dwindled since the early 1960s 
to a professional niche market barely able to survive on substantial sub-
sidies from major universities to their financially desperate presses. Even 
the brief public interest in the 1980s and early 1990s in “academic mem-
oirs” and “autobiographies” by scholars as intellectually diverse as Frank 
Lentricchia, Edward Said, and Marianna Torgovnick hardly compares 
with the wide circulation and discussion of Nafisi’s best-seller.141
Some scholars have suggested that the popularity of Nafisi’s book has 
much to do with our interests in how literary and other cultural texts de-
pend for their meanings on where they are read. Nabokov, Fitzgerald, 
James, and Austen may no longer be “radical” writers in the United States, 
but the enthusiastic responses Nafisi claims these authors attracted 
among her students in Tehran signal a culturally different reception his-
tory. In his analysis of Reading Lolita in Tehran, Steven Mailloux contends 
that “where you are does matter in reading Western classics, indeed, in 
reading anything”.142 Susan Friedman emphasizes how Nafisi’s aesthetic 
values do very different political work in Tehran, where the U.S. and Eng-
lish novels Nafisi prizes are judged decadent, than in the United States or 
England, where their aesthetics are judged merely to be part of the cul-
tural past.143 The problem with this approach to the location of reading 
in the specific case of Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran is that it reinforces 
Nafisi’s own substitution of her reading group for “Iranian women” or 
even Iranians opposed to the policies of the Iranian state. Yet the intense 
privacy of Nafisi’s reading group, according to her necessitated by state 
censorship, does virtually nothing to affect Iranian politics. Written by an 
Iranian immigrant educated and living in the United States and published 
only in English for Anglophone readers, Reading Lolita in Tehran relies 
primarily on its location within the United States.144
Nafisi’s cultural politics in Reading Lolita in Tehran and in all of her 
journalism supports the “modernization” process we often identify with 
one-way globalization by the first-world nations, especially the United 
States. In Reading Lolita in Tehran, Nafisi makes only two brief references 
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to the Shah’s regime, leaving the reader with the overall impression that 
the Islamic Revolution occurred in a political vacuum and that its repres-
sive rule was not motivated at least in part by the tyranny of the U.S.-
backed Shah’s regime and the brutality of its secret police, SAVAK.145 In 
her journalism, Nafisi praises more clearly the Shah’s era in terms of its 
advocacy of western-style modernization:
Iran is interesting because during the Shah’s time the laws 
passed in relation to women were very progressive, and one 
reason for that was that many among the Iranian women since 
the end of the nineteenth century had been fighting for wom-
en’s rights, too, so there was a degree of consciousness among 
women. Also, the government wanted to be modern, so it ac-
cepted the modernity of Iranian women. But many in the tra-
ditional and religious families were opposed to this.146
Nafisi’s phrasing “a degree of consciousness among women” is interest-
ing, insofar as it recalls the second-wave feminist strategy of “conscious-
ness raising” as a crucial stage in feminist activism. The “secret seminar” 
Nafisi organized for her students in her home in Tehran seems modeled 
on such “consciousness raising”, which in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
in the United States often occurred by means of reading groups. She 
tells her readers in a matter-of-fact manner that, “It is said the personal 
is political. That is not true, of course”, denying one of the basic tenets 
of second-wave feminism, but Nafisi nonetheless clearly emulates other 
second-wave feminist political practices in her university classes and the 
seminar she teaches in her Tehran home (273). This private seminar, or-
ganized after she left the University of Tehran in protest of its repressive 
practices, is composed exclusively of her women students. Nafisi argues 
that “to teach a mixed class in the privacy of my home was too risky, even 
if we were discussing harmless works of fiction”, but she also permits “one 
persistent male student, although barred from our class, […] [to] read 
the assigned material, and on special days […] come to my house to talk 
about the books we were reading” (3).147
The success of Reading Lolita in Tehran is undoubtedly based in part on 
the book’s appeal to many Western readers with feminist commitments, 
especially the feminist universalism that ignores the different histori-
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cal and cultural situations of women around the world. Nafisi’s reading 
group in her Tehran home differs only superficially from those held in 
the United States, despite Nafisi’s bare gestures to give her class a regional 
flavor. Introducing her students at the beginning of the book, Nafisi por-
trays each woman in Islamic dress, which each student removes to reveal 
the Western clothes she wears in the safety and privacy of Nafisi’s home 
(4–6). Mitra Rastegar notes how several reviewers of the book interpret 
this ritual of unveiling “as a process whereby the women ‘emerge as in-
dividuals’ […], revealing ‘vivid personalities’ […] and ‘shedding their 
inhibitions, speaking openly’ […]”.148 Inspired by the Anglo-American 
novels they study with Nafisi, her students are effectively transformed 
into Western subjects, who are thus capable in Nafisi’s view of recogniz-
ing and protesting the repressive policies of the Iranian government.
Many feminists around the world have criticized such feminist uni-
versalism as readily adaptable to Western cultural imperialist projects. 
Shortly after the United States invaded Afghanistan, Laura Bush justi-
fied our actions as opportunities to “liberate” Afghani women from the 
gender hierarchies of the Taliban. Lisa Yoneyama has argued that there 
is a long history of the U.S. government justifying its foreign policies and 
military actions in terms of “feminist emancipation”, as the United States 
did during the occupation of Japan (1945–1952).149 In his classic study 
of how cultural work helped legitimate U.S. policy during the Mexican-
American War (1846–1848), Robert Johannsen interprets the “visions 
of romance and chivalry” in which U.S. forces “saved” Mexican women 
from barbarous Mexican men.150 Less obviously, the “critical universal-
ism” advocated by Martha Nussbaum as a measure of women’s quality of 
life in different societies risks linking the ethics of human rights with eco-
nomic developmental programs driven by first-world nations, especially 
the United States.151
In her analysis of the Anglophone reviews of Reading Lolita in Teh-
ran, Mitra Rastegar observes that the book’s popularity in the West has 
much to do with readers’ desires to understand the authenticity of Ira-
nian women: “Despite ambivalence about Nafisi’s own ‘authenticity’ as 
‘representative’ Iranian woman, her representation of other women and 
their interests and desires is read [by reviewers] as ‘authentic,’ as is her 
account of the appropriate solutions”.152 The tendency to transform per-
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sonal memoirs, however idiosyncratic, into ethnographies of foreign 
peoples has long been recognized as integral to cultural imperialism, es-
pecially in the history of the literature of exploration and travel. As Ras-
tegar notes, Nafisi’s autobiography is difficult to accept as “representative” 
of a typical Iranian woman, but by stressing the diverse personalities of 
the women students in her private reading group she offers the reader a 
deceptive synecdoche for Iranian women. Within the reading group, Naf-
isi’s students are quite equally committed to the aesthetic values of the 
Anglo-American literary texts they read together, but Rastegar notes that 
the “views of female students who actively supported the revolution are 
never described”.153
The popularity of Reading Lolita in Tehran among liberal feminists 
committed to such western universalism is noteworthy, because Nafisi’s 
own views on women’s rights are so inconsistent and at times contradic-
tory. For example, she consistently criticizes second-wave feminists, like 
Germaine Greer, often confusing them with “postmodern feminists”, 
whom she usually identifies as dogmatic and inflexible: “But what post-
modern feminists deny us is the right to change”.154 Actually, postmodern 
feminism, sometimes equated with “third-wave feminism”, usually distin-
guishes itself from second-wave feminist values and strategies, especially 
the tendency of the latter to universalize their own privileged situations 
as white, middle-class, American women.155 Nafisi not only confuses the 
distinction between second-wave and postmodern feminist positions, 
she also reverses the usual postcolonial critique of both feminisms for 
their privileged Western perspectives by insisting that as an Iranian émigré 
to the United States (her father was Mayor of Tehran during the Shah’s re-
gime) she is hardly privileged: “Now for the past twenty years I have not 
been privileged at all. In Iran, my family, power, and money, if I had any, 
was taken away from me. The right to dress, to act the way I wanted, all 
of this was taken away from me”.156 This observation, valid in its reference 
to Nafisi as an individual who has suffered in her diaspora from Iran the 
consequences of the Islamic Revolution, leads her to an odd conclusion 
regarding the postcolonial critique of Western civilization and values: 
“Because Western is equal to privileged, not class, not power, just being 
Western […] I think that is such an insult to those societies”.157 Nafisi’s 
confusion of herself with the West is here quite significant, because it in-
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dicates how amenable she is to serving as a non-Western representative 
of a renewed defense of Western civilization and its liberal promise, re-
gardless of its historical failures to realize those ends.
We are familiar from the culture wars of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
with the neo-conservative confusion of such discrete political and intel-
lectual positions as neo-Marxism, feminism, postcolonial theory, decon-
struction, poststructuralism, and a loosely deployed “postmodernism”. 
During the culture wars, many academics attempted to sort out this con-
fusion, assuming that once neo-conservative “mistakes” were identified 
the terms of the cultural and political debates might be more effectively 
conducted. But it now appears that the confusion of different positions 
and their respective terms may have been a well managed rhetorical and 
cultural strategy from the beginning, much as other propaganda cam-
paigns have worked to combine different groups into a single “enemy”. 
Something of this sort seems evident in the particular uses to which Azar 
Nafisi’s own political and cultural values have been put in the period of 
her association with SAIS.
In Power and the Idealists (2005), Paul Berman uses Nafisi’s career and 
book to exemplify the shift within Muslim political radicalism to “liber-
al antitotalitarianism”.158 Berman focuses on Nafisi in the first half of his 
chapter on “The Muslim World and the American Left”, another install-
ment in his larger argument that the “New Left” has warped into a new 
“liberal and anti-totalitarian thinking”, which has abandoned the “radi-
calism” of its past. Crucial to Berman’s argument in this book, which he 
considers “a freestanding sequel” to his 1996 A Tale of Two Utopias: The 
Political Journey of the Generation of 1968, is his contention that the “ide-
alism” of the New Left survives in “liberal antitotalitarianism”, whereas 
the American Left’s failed bid for power lingers only in the political cor-
rectness of tenured radicals.159 Berman considers Reading Lolita in Tehran 
a “classic in this particular genre” of books that recount the “evolution” 
“from the revolutionary leftism of the student movement […] to a mor-
al or philosophical crisis, to a new stage of antitotalitarian liberalism in 
adult life” (152). He also judges the book “doubly dramatic, not just be-
cause of the revolutionary past that it recounts, but because of its date of 
publication, which was March 2003: the very moment when the invasion 
of Iraq was getting underway” (152).
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Berman has very little to say about Nafisi’s literary analyses or aesthet-
ics, except to endorse the general liberal values represented by the Anglo-
American authors she discusses. Berman is far more interested in Nafisi’s 
conversion from “radical” leftist at the University of Oklahoma, where 
she wrote her doctoral dissertation on Mike Gold, to the neo-liberalism 
Berman advocates: “Here, then, in Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran, is the 
story of someone who enlisted in the leftism of circa ‘68, and went on 
to discover moral and political failures in the left-wing movement, and 
came to adopt a different attitude altogether—an attitude of respect for 
the individual imagination. A liberal attitude” (165–166).160
Just why Berman considers it important for Nafisi’s book to have ap-
peared at the same time as the U.S. invasion of Iraq is clear enough: 
“antitotalitarian liberalism”, Berman’s neo-liberalism, finds the same to-
talitarianism represented by Saddam Hussein as it does by the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini and his heirs to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Like George 
Bush’s infamous reduction of Iraq, Iran, the PLO, and North Korea into 
related parts of an “Axis of Evil”, Berman’s liberalism creates a simple bi-
nary between liberal democracy, represented best by the United States, 
and totalitarian regimes around the world. Dismissing arguments that 
Islamic fundamentalism is very different from the modern fascist states 
ruled by Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco, Berman equates Iraq, Iran, Fran-
co’s Spain, Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, Soviet Communism, and 
Maoist China: “The political scientists, some of them, may go on wav-
ing their European check-lists and objecting that Khomeini’s Islamism 
cannot possibly be a modern totalitarianism. But I think that readers of 
literature, who judge by smell and feel, will sense at once that Nafisi is 
speaking of familiar experiences” (170).
Yet what does this curious adaptation of neo-liberal discourse by neo-
conservative political interests have to do with the cultural values Nafisi 
defends with such passion in Reading Lolita in Tehran, especially when we 
consider how her enthusiasm for aesthetic “radicalism” accounts in part 
for the success of this book in the United States? Nafisi’s literary examples 
constitute a short history of Anglo-American literary modernism and 
thus constitute a spirited defense of its internal critique of modernization 
we have often identified with positions as various as classical liberalism 
and the Frankfurt School’s cautious defense of an “aesthetic function”, 
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either in Adorno’s “negative dialectic” or Brecht’s “Verfremdungseffekt”.161 
Nafisi’s cultural history is arranged in her narrative in a chronologically 
reversed order, beginning with Nabokov’s Lolita (1955 in Paris; 1958 in 
US) and followed by F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby (1925), Hen-
ry James’s Daisy Miller (1878) and Washington Square (1881), and Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813) and Mansfield Park (1814). Nafisi’s 
regressive literary history interestingly culminates with a sort of intertex-
tual reading of Austen and Saul Bellow (1915–2005), the contemporary 
U.S. novelist and neo-conservative intellectual who figures prominently 
in “Part IV: Austen”.162
One of the powerful appeals of Nafisi’s uses of these canonical West-
ern authors must be the possibility that they do new political work in 
the radically different cultural context of the repressive regime of the Is-
lamic Republic. Such aesthetic and political re-functioning has often been 
praised by liberal and left intellectuals as one means of challenging the 
hegemony of Western Civilization and its cultural colonialism. There are, 
of course, many circumstances in which we can interpret just this sort 
of effective ideological critique in even the most traditional literary and 
aesthetic works. Indeed, I will try to suggest some of the ways in which 
alternative interpretations might bring forth this potential in the Western 
literary examples Nafisi offers us, even as I argue that Nafisi’s own literary 
interpretations work to re-legitimate the broadly defined Anglo-Ameri-
can modernization process. In developing this dialectical argument, I do 
not presume to know the appropriate terms for an effective criticism of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, I confess my ignorance of the in-
ternal workings of that state’s political institutions and its social habitus, 
simply as a statement of fact that I am incapable of challenging Nafisi’s 
account of the repressive conditions under which she and many others 
lived (and many died) from her return to Tehran in 1980 (at the age of 
30) to her departure in 1996. In my confession of ignorance, I also do 
not mean to turn a blind eye upon the conditions Nafisi describes in Iran. 
Those conditions may well be as terrifying and terroristic, especially to-
ward women, minorities, and political opponents of the state as Nafisi 
claims. My concern is with her proposed alternative: the cultural, eco-
nomic, and political “modernization” offered by liberal western democra-
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cies, especially as they are exemplified in the liberal idealism of what she 
judges our “best” literature.
A full study of how scholarly studies of Nabokov, Fitzgerald, James, 
and Austen have changed under the influences of deconstruction, femi-
nism, New Historicism, postcolonial studies, and cultural studies of the 
past twenty years would be very long and complicated. There is very little 
mention of these professional studies in Nafisi’s book. In the few places 
she comments on the general status of “critical theory” in literary study, 
she follows the neo-conservative tendency to dismiss many different 
competing approaches as “postmodern” or “relativist”. Nafisi’s colleague 
Mina, a specialist in Henry James, who loses her university position, com-
plains that critical studies like Leon Edel’s The Modern Psychological Novel 
and Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel “aren’t so fashionable these days”, be-
cause “everyone has gone postmodern. They can’t even read the text in 
the original—they’re so dependent on some pseudo-philosopher to tell 
them what it says” (236). One of Nafisi’s students, Nassrin, who has fall-
en in love, complains that “girls like me, […] who talk about Derrida and 
Barthes and the world situation […] know nothing, nothing about the re-
lation between a man and a woman, about what it means to go out with a 
man” (297). Of course, Nafisi’s book is aimed at a non-professional audi-
ence, but her literary interpretations come from a much older generation 
of professional criticism. For Nafisi, “a novel is not an allegory” and the 
best novels, like The Great Gatsby, are “non-political” (111, 129). Novels 
offer us “the sensual experience of another world”, which requires us to 
suspend our disbelief and enter them with the “empathy [that] is at the 
heart of the novel” (111). Several different formalist approaches to lit-
erature from the late 1930s to the early 1960s advocated similar values, 
including Anglo-American New Criticism (Murray Krieger), the “liter-
ary phenomenology” of the Geneva School (Georges Poulet and J. Hillis 
Miller), and the “reader-response” theories of Wolfgang Iser, David Ble-
ich, Jane Tompkins, and Steven Mailloux in the1970s and 1980s.163
Such critical approaches rejected overt political intentions in literature 
and made sharp distinctions among propaganda, mass culture, popular 
culture, and literature—the last term reserved for a special discourse that 
transcended its historical circumstances and appealed to audiences be-
yond the time and place of the literary work’s production. Much scholarly 
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work has been devoted to the ways American New Criticism in particular 
reacted to the presumably “failed” project of the 1930s Left and the un-
successful “cultural fronts” announced at various times by the CPUSA.164 
In “Part II: Gatsby”, Nafisi contrasts Fitzgerald’s novel with Mike Gold’s 
orthodox Marxism. Both authors “had written about the same subject: 
dreams or, more specifically, the American dream”, but “what Gold had 
only dreamed of had been realized in this faraway country, now with an 
alien name, the Islamic Republic of Iran. ‘The old ideals must die[…]’ 
he wrote. ‘Let us fling all we are into the cauldron of the Revolution. For 
out of our death shall arise glories.’ Such sentences could have come out 
of any newspaper in Iran. The revolution Gold had desired was a Marxist 
one and ours was Islamic, but they had a great deal in common, in that 
they were both ideological and totalitarian” (109).
Fitzgerald imagines instead “the American Dream”, which is what 
makes The Great Gatsby “an American classic, in many ways the quintes-
sential American novel”, alongside of which Nafisi considers some of the 
“other contenders: The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Moby-Dick, The 
Scarlet Letter” (109). Her desire to identify the “Great American Novel” 
recalls a nearly forgotten era in American literary criticism, satirized ef-
fectively by Philip Roth’s The Great American Novel (1973), when crit-
ics struggled to identify the novel most representative of the “American 
Experience”.165 A significant number of scholarly studies between roughly 
1950 and 1970 focused on the elusive “American Dream”, with its prom-
ise of an ideal democracy characterized by the individual’s capacity to re-
alize his promise and as a consequence the civic virtue of the self-reliant, 
self-conscious citizen. Myth critics in this same period often keyed their 
own specific studies of Manifest Destiny, the Brooklyn Bridge, the Mis-
sissippi River, and Pastoralism to an Ur-myth, such as R. W. B. Lewis’s 
American Adam.166 Circulating through both of the main American liter-
ary critical discourses of the post-World War II era, the New Criticism 
and the Myth-and-Symbol School, the “American Dream” was firmly 
grounded in the liberal tradition, especially identifiable with Emersonian 
self-reliance and Walt Whitman’s expansive “democratic vistas”. What I 
have criticized elsewhere as the “Emersonianism” that urges “aesthetic 
dissent” in the place of political activism and genuine social reform is yet 
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another way to describe the liberal tradition informing the myth of the 
American Dream.167
In her classroom at the University of Tehran, Nafisi finds that Fitzger-
ald’s novel provokes such widely divergent responses from her students 
that she proposes the students stage a mock-trial of the novel. Con-
demned by Islamic fundamentalists as an “immoral” novel for romanti-
cizing the adulterous relationship between Gatsby and Daisy Buchanan 
and as “decadent” by the Communist students for its idealized portrayal 
of Gatsby’s aristocratic pretensions and corrupt accumulation of wealth, 
the novel is vigorously defended by a handful of Nafisi’s women students 
and Nafisi herself, who has the last word in this trial: “‘You don’t read 
Gatsby”, I said, “to learn whether adultery is good or bad but to learn 
about how complicated issues such as adultery and fidelity and marriage 
are. A great novel heightens your senses and sensitivity to the complexi-
ties of life and of individuals, and prevents you from the self-righteous-
ness that sees morality in fixed formulas about good and evil…’” (133). 
Of course, Gatsby’s deep conflict between crass materialism and lofty 
idealism has long distinguished Fitzgerald’s novel as an eloquent defense 
of liberal individualism. Zarrin, a woman student who defends the nov-
el, points out that Nick Carraway’s strict insistence on “honesty” as the 
moral standard against we should judge all of the characters, including 
Gatsby, reinforces this myth of American individualism, distinguishing 
its ideal form from mere selfishness.
Professional readers of The Great Gatsby know there are profound iro-
nies in both Gatsby’s idealism and Nick’s standard of “honesty”. Claiming 
descent from “the Dukes of Buccleuch”, an English aristocratic line “in-
vented” by King James II to secure his power after the Restoration, not-
ing that other family members had sent paid “replacements” to the Civil 
War, Nick hardly comes from an “honest” family.168 Indignant that Jordan 
Baker cheats at golf and is a reckless driver, Nick is himself a bond bro-
ker in the highly speculative economy of the roaring 1920s and obviously 
enjoys rubbing shoulders with the rich and famous at Gatsby’s elabo-
rate parties. Long after Gatsby’s funeral, when Nick leaves Long Island 
and the “big shore places”, closed for the season, he makes a final visit to 
Gatsby’s shuttered mansion. He finds “some boy with a piece of brick” 
has scrawled “an obscene word” on the steps, which he erases with his 
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shoe to preserve Gatsby’s “Platonic conception of himself ”, rather than 
tell Fitzgerald’s story of Gatsby’s personal and public corruptions.169 In-
terestingly, both the Islamic fundamentalist and Leftist condemnations 
of Gatsby’s immorality are easily readable in Fitzgerald’s novel, but Nafisi 
allows both groups only the most dogmatic rants in her classroom trial, 
noting explicitly how little they cared to read the novel, enjoying instead 
their own tendentious speeches about religious or political proprieties.
Quite predictably, Nafisi urges careful attention to the literary text—
close reading—as our only way to access the “magical” aesthetic experi-
ence offered by the novel. Equally important for her is how a great novel 
“disturbs us”, recalling the Russian Formalists’ emphasis on the aesthetic 
function of ostranenie, strategic “estrangement”, as an integral part of lit-
erature’s ability to subvert the automatizing processes of modernization 
(129).170 To be sure, her repeated claims that we must read the novels she 
assigns (either in her classes or her book) are irrefutable, but the sleight-
of-hand comes when she argues that the Islamic and Leftist students 
refuse to read. There is a rhetorical slippage between her suggestion that 
these students are simply bad students for not doing their homework or 
they are not reading according to Nafisi’s hermeneutic protocols. Such de-
bates over “close reading” should remind us of similar disputes within the 
academy during the culture wars when the entrenched method of liter-
ary explication de texte was under considerable pressure and its academic 
defenders fought back by claiming that other approaches “failed” to “read 
the text”.171
Nafisi recalls her “radical” past as a college protestor against the U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam and later as a graduate student participant in 
the Islamic Students Confederation at the University of Oklahoma, cit-
ing her research on Mike Gold’s leftist fiction and journalism. Like other 
recent “converts” to more moderate, even conservative, political posi-
tions, Nafisi attributes her early enthusiasm for leftist politics to a naive 
idealism. She credits her students at the University of Tehran, especially 
the young women repressed under the religious patriarchy of the Islamic 
Republic, for reviving her own passions for Western canonical writers 
identifiable with “what we generally label as culture […] one domain 
where ideology played a relatively small part” (39). These Iranian women 
students had “a genuine curiosity, a real thirst for the works of great writ-
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ers, those condemned to obscure shadows by both the regime and the 
revolutionary intellectuals, most of their books banned and forbidden. 
Unlike in pre-revolutionary times, now the ‘non-Revolutionary writers,’ 
the bearers of the canon, were the ones celebrated by the young: James, 
Nabokov, Woolf, Bellow, Austen and Joyce were revered names, emissar-
ies of that forbidden world which we would turn into something more 
pure and golden than it ever was or will be” (39).
These sentiments sound like thinly disguised warnings to U.S. readers 
that neglect of our “great writers”, the “bearers of the canon”, by the ad-
vocates of “political correctness” may well result in a totalitarianism in 
the U.S. analogous to what Nafisi finds in the Islamic Republic. “Be care-
ful what you wish for”, Nafisi frequently reminds her leftist and Islamic 
fundamentalist students, and that monitory tone seems directed as well 
to U.S. readers, who given the English-language text and its publication 
by Random House constitute the largest percentage of Nafisi’s readers. 
Reading Lolita in Tehran can be read productively with John Ellis’s attack 
on cultural studies and assorted other “new” approaches in his Literature 
Lost: Social Agendas and the Corruption of the Humanities (1998).172 What 
makes Nafisi’s approach more appealing and less obviously reactionary 
than Ellis’s denunciation of anti-literary approaches is her neo-liberal 
feminism, which she positions carefully apart from the radical “postmod-
ernist feminism” she consistently condemns in her journalism.
Not only do her women students in Tehran find radical potential in 
these non-ideological writers of the Western canon, but the canonical 
texts themselves are read with a keen eye for the emancipatory possibili-
ties offered their women characters. Thus Humbert Humbert projects 
onto Lolita all of his aesthetic passions, his love of beauty, and the high 
cultural, European ethos he finds so absent in meretricious America. Yet 
Humbert is, like the immoral characters in Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 
“careless” with other people, treating them with a “cruelty” that includes 
the murder of Lolita’s mother and his kidnapping and rape of Lolita her-
self (43). Responding to recent criticism of Nabokov’s Lolita as a narra-
tive that verges on and for some participates in a culture of pedophilia, 
Nafisi defends Nabokov by condemning Humbert’s misguided aesthetic 
sense and reading within the novel a subtle “sympathy for Humbert’s 
victims”, especially the victimized “child”, Lolita (42, 43). Lolita thus be-
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comes a rather improbable proto-feminist narrative, which Nafisi subtly 
links with the situations of her young Iranian women students, each of 
whom as young as nine years’ old “would have been […] ripe for mar-
riage to men older than Humbert” under the laws of the Islamic Republic 
(43). Although we are warned repeatedly not to confuse Humbert Hum-
bert with the Ayatollah Khomeini or other representatives of the Islamic 
state, Nafisi draws exactly this analogy on repeated occasions. Nafisi’s 
conclusion is that Nabokov motivates our compassion for Humbert’s 
victims (and our condemnation of Humbert’s misuse of his considerable 
aesthetic powers) in order to teach us “the first lesson in democracy: all 
individuals, no matter how contemptible, have a right to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness” (42). Of course, Nafisi’s claim about Nabokov’s 
moral purpose is profoundly political, even if we agree with it, and it is 
recognizably part of the “classical liberalism” often touted by neo-conser-
vatives. It is no coincidence that the Bush Administration’s foreign policy 
of “regime change” and military occupation was legitimated in Bush’s sec-
ond inaugural address with his appeal for the U.S. to “take up the cause 
of liberty […] to seek and support the growth of democratic movements 
in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in 
our world”.173
Nafisi interprets her two other canonical authors, Henry James (Part 
III) and Jane Austen (Part IV), in much the same fashion as she reads 
Nabokov and Fitzgerald as champions of liberal individualism and its 
democratic protections. James and Austen have been traditionally read 
from a wide variety of feminist perspectives, unlike Nabokov and Fitzger-
ald, so the narrative order gives the reader the impression that the femi-
nist themes of Parts I (Lolita) and II (Gatsby) are becoming more explic-
it, even working out a progressive sequence, even though we are moving 
backwards historically. It is also interesting that Nafisi begins her book 
with two sections devoted to novels whose protagonists—Lolita and 
Gatsby—exemplify their authors’ liberal ideals, whereas the last two sec-
tions deal with authors—Henry James and Jane Austen—who embody 
Nafisi’s models for liberal individualism.174
James’s Daisy Miller and Catherine Sloper and Austen’s Elizabeth Ben-
net have long attracted interesting, divergent scholarly interpretations of 
what each character tells us about changing gender and sexual relations in 
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nineteenth-century America and England. Although she cites very little 
recent scholarship on James and Austen, Nafisi claims to have selected 
these particular heroines to demonstrate how “the novel, as a new nar-
rative form, radically transformed basic concepts about the essential re-
lationships between individuals, thereby changing traditional attitudes 
towards people’s relationship to society, their tasks and duties” (194). 
Nafisi’s theoretical claim about the novel is profoundly political, insofar as 
she claims for the genre the power for social change. Although she men-
tions Ian Watt’s influential Rise of the Novel (1963), she does not draw 
on his argument that the novel helped legitimate middle-class socioeco-
nomic authority, especially by placing special emphasis on bourgeois 
individualism (236). Instead of analyzing bourgeois individualism in 
the novel, as Watt does, Nafisi stresses how Daisy, Catherine, and Eliza-
beth “come from a long line of defiant heroines”, who “create the main 
complications of the plot, through their refusal to comply” (194–195). 
Tempting as it would be to suggest that this genealogy of “defiant hero-
ines” extends from Daisy Miller to modern feminists, like Gertrude Stein 
and Virginia Woolf, to the radical artists and intellectuals of second- and 
third-wave feminisms, Nafisi explicitly rejects this heritage by claiming 
these protagonists are “more complicated than the later, more obviously 
revolutionary heroines of the twentieth century, because they make no 
claims to be radical” (195).
Nafisi’s disavowal of virtually the entire tradition of twentieth-century 
women’s writing and political activism is not as bizarre as it seems when 
we recall how vigorously she rejects “postmodernist feminism” in her 
journalism. For Nafisi, Daisy Miller, Catherine Sloper, and Eliza Bennet 
are not feminists, but rather courageous individuals who defy social con-
ventions through their imaginations and thus empathy for different peo-
ple (333). Daisy Miller can flirt with both Winterbourne and Giovanelli, 
relying on her sexuality, rather than avoiding it, as Nafisi suggests both 
western-style feminists and the repressive Islamic Republic require, even 
if Daisy’s iconoclasm means her ultimate social exclusion, even symbolic 
death. Catherine Sloper rebels against the hypocrisy of her suitor, Mor-
ris Townsend, the sneakiness of her Aunt Penniman, and the tyranny of 
her father, Dr. Sloper, affirming in her truculent spinsterhood her moral 
rigor and honesty (225). Eliza Bennet insists upon courtship and mar-
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riage on her own terms, rather than those dictated by her class, her family, 
or the broader standards of social respectability. Each character individu-
ates herself in the course of the narrative, achieving the specific sort of 
identity that liberal democracy at its best makes possible for everyone, 
regardless of race, class, gender, or sexual identifications.
It is this “ideal democracy”, especially as it is embodied in idiosyncratic 
and thus individual characters, that Nafisi argues the greatest novels of-
fer us. Interestingly, Nafisi’s male confidante, her “magician”, delivers this 
message toward the end of Reading Lolita in Tehran, but only to remind 
Nafisi of her own words.175 It is a strange ventriloquism:
“You used to preach to us all that [ Jane Austen] ignored poli-
tics, not because she didn’t know any better but because she 
didn’t allow her work, her imagination, to be swallowed up 
by the society around her. At a time when the world was en-
gulfed in the Napoleonic Wars, she created her own indepen-
dent world, a world that you, two centuries later, in the Islam-
ic Republic of Iran, teach as the fictional ideal of democracy. 
Remember all that talk of yours about how the first lesson in 
fighting tyranny is to do your own thing and satisfy your own 
conscience? […]. You keep talking about democratic spaces, 
about the need for personal and creative spaces. Well, go and 
create them, woman! Stop nagging and focusing your energy 
on what the Islamic Republic does or says and start focusing 
on your Austen”. (282)
These sentiments express clearly liberal “aesthetic dissent” by stressing 
the “revolutionary” power of the imagination to preserve “the personal” 
and the “private” from contamination by the “political” (237). When Mr. 
Nahvi, one of her Islamic fundamentalist students, criticizes Austen as a 
“colonial writer”, noting that “Mansfield Park was a book that condoned 
slavery”, she is at first dumb-founded, because “I was almost certain Mr. 
Nahvi had not read Mansfield Park” (289). What her student has been 
reading, she claims to learn on a subsequent trip to the U.S., is the “revo-
lutionary” work of “Edward Said’s Culture and Imperialism”, reminding 
her readers once again how dangerous it is when students don’t “read the 
text in the original”, instead relying “on some pseudo-philosopher to tell 
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them what it says” (236). Sad, indeed, Nafisi opines that “reactionary ele-
ments in Iran had come to identify with and co-opt” Said’s radicalism, 
and her moral for the U.S. reader seems quite clear (290). Yes, right and 
left do meet in their extremes—another truth that must be universally 
acknowledged.
What Nafisi values in these literary texts is their ability to transcend 
politics and offer social and personal ideals uncontaminated by ideology. 
And yet there is plentiful evidence from the authors she has chosen how 
their own and other literary works are deeply invested in the political 
and ideological conditions of their production. Nafisi is following Dan-
iel Bell’s conservative argument that liberal democracy is “beyond ideol-
ogy” and Francis Fukuyama’s contested claim that laissez-faire capitalism 
in its global stage has taken us to the “end of history”.176 What Nafisi adds 
to these neo-conservative arguments is her claim that “great” literature 
provides us with the role models—either the authors or their heroes and 
heroines—that will lead us beyond the impasses of political conflicts re-
solved usually by force and violence. It is, after all, the imagination which 
Nabokov’s Cincinnatus employs so skillfully at the end of Invitation to 
a Beheading, thus causing by verbal magic “the scaffold and all the sham 
world around him, along with his executioner, [to] disintegrate” (77). 
Nafisi makes passing reference to other writers who might approach this 
same literary “greatness”—Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston 
from African American culture, a handful of Persian titles, including A 
Thousand and One Nights, Iraj Pezeshkzad’s My Uncle Napoleon, and Mar-
jane Satrapi’s Persepolis—but the overall impression of her book is that 
Western Civilization, especially in its British and U.S. variants, has pro-
vided the largest number of aesthetically triumphant testaments to this 
universal model for democratic individualism.177
Is Azar Nafisi part of a neo-conservative conspiracy to co-opt neo-lib-
eral rhetoric for its own purposes, including the manipulation of “culture” 
as a weapon in the ongoing war for the “hearts and minds” of Americans 
and the citizens of those states we hope to convert to our forms of democ-
racy? The extrinsic evidence of her position as Director of the Dialogue 
Project at SAIS, her support from the Smith Richardson Foundation, and 
her participation in the public relations’ campaigns of SAIS to promote 
the United States as the “protector” of the Free World is compelling. The 
Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran in Idaho 153
intrinsic evidence of Reading Lolita in Tehran is even more convincing, 
suggesting not that Nafasi has fallen into the conservative “traps” read-
ied these days for unwitting liberals, but that she actively participates in 
the agenda of an overtly “depoliticized” cultural study that is in fact pro-
foundly political. My purpose is not to pose as a cultural “whistle-blower”, 
some policeman for Political Correctness. Nafisi is free to write what she 
wishes and advocate whatever retrograde and fallacious aesthetic ideas 
she chooses.
Nafisi’s second memoir, Things I Have Been Silent About: Memories of a 
Prodigal Daughter (2008), relies primarily on Persian and Middle Eastern 
literary texts in its account of Nafisi’s family life and education in Iran, as 
the “Suggested Reading List” at the end of the book indicates.178 Three of 
the four part divisions of the book use epigraphs from Emily Dickinson’s 
poetry (the fourth is a quotation from the émigré writer, Joseph Brod-
sky) and there are frequent references in this memoir to the importance 
of Western literature in Nafisi’s life and work, especially after the 1979 
Revolution. She briefly recounts why she “started writing about Vladi-
mir Nabokov partly because of my students’ enthusiasm for his works”, 
as well as her own sympathy with Nabokov’s “preoccupation with exile, 
a firm belief in the portable world of the imagination, and the subver-
sive power of the imagination” (Things, 289). Although she details her 
personal and political activities at the University of Oklahoma, Norman 
while an undergraduate and then graduate student, including her partici-
pation in anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and membership in the Con-
federation of Iranian Students, opposed to the Shah, Nafisi only refers in 
passing to her doctoral dissertation on Mike Gold’s fiction and the 1930s 
Left. Nevertheless, she tacitly links her participation in anti-government, 
anti-Shah demonstrations in the U.S. with her work on her doctoral dis-
sertation: “I turned the living room of our rented apartment [in Washing-
ton, D. C.] into my office, and as soon as I woke up and showered I would 
take my coffee back to bed and read the news about Iran. One corner of 
our bedroom was soon filled with old coffee-stained copies of The Wash-
ington Post and The New York Times. Some mornings I would go to the 
Library of Congress, where I spent delicious hours looking through old 
microfilms of The Masses, The New Masses, and other publications from 
the thirties for my dissertation” (Things, 212–213).
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Things I Have Been Silent About ends with her departure with her hus-
band, Bijan, from Tehran for Washington, D. C. in 1997, although the 
last two chapters (30 and 31) deal with her mother’s death in 2003 and 
her father’s death in 2005. Little mention is made of her two-year “fel-
lowship […] at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced Interna-
tional Studies” (Things, 294). In short, she remains silent about the ways 
in which she came to be associated with SAIS, the terms of the fellow-
ship, the faculty at SAIS (or elsewhere) who supported her application, 
and her professional reasons, beyond simply her husband, Bijan’s work in 
Washington, D. C., for doing research at an institution designed to train 
diplomats and intelligence officers. Things I Have Been Silent About does 
not answer questions about how a scholar with a Ph.D. in English litera-
ture, as well as experience teaching Persian and world literatures in Iran, 
should be of interest and herself interested in the School of Advanced In-
ternational Studies.
Things I Have Been Silent About does address in great detail her father 
Ahmad Nafisi’s political career, culminating in his position as Mayor of 
Tehran, his arrest and imprisonment by the Shah, and his eventual exon-
eration and release by the Iranian court. Nafisi also recounts in detail the 
personal difficulties between her mother, Nezhat, and father, as well as 
Nezhat’s position in the Iranian Parliament until she was forced to resign 
after the 1979 Revolution. Nafisi’s account of her family history is indeed 
a fascinating story of how upper-class, politically moderate Iranians, like 
the Nafisis, found themselves historically tossed between the extreme re-
gimes of the Shah and the Ayatollah Khomeini. It makes perfect sense to 
me that Azar Nafisi would want to write about the complexities of this 
history, especially as it is represented in a single family, in order to explain 
the human consequences of both regimes.
Yet such family and macropolitical histories are not the center of her 
best-seller, Reading Lolita in Tehran, the book she tells us she was com-
pleting when on January 2, 2003, her mother died in Tehran (Things, 
304). By then, Nafisi’s “two-year fellowship” at SAIS had evolved into an 
appointment as “visiting professor”, then into “director of the Dialogue 
Project at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University” 
(Things, endpaper). Things I Have Been Silent About is another volume in 
the melancholia experienced by families and individuals caught between 
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colonial and postcolonial societies. Reading Lolita in Tehran is a narrative 
of recolonization, in which the exiled subject embraces new conquerors. 
The larger issue is the extent to which “culture” has undergone a para-
digm shift from the “property” controlled by those Spirow Agnew, Rich-
ard Nixon’s Vice President, dubbed “effete intellectuals” or the “tool” of 
those “tenured radicals” (Roger Kimball) and “feminazis” (Rush Lim-
baugh) attacked by conservatives in the heyday of the culture wars to a 
resource of the new imperialism. Some time after Nixon’s disgrace in the 
Watergate Scandal and his voluntary resignation to avoid Impeachment 
and likely conviction on those charges, neo-conservatives in the United 
States organized to retake the “liberal media”, not just by creating com-
petitive, alternative media but by co-opting the idea of “liberalism” it-
self and along with it the very concept of “cultural critique”. Azar Nafisi’s 
Reading Lolita in Tehran re-legitimates Western cultural texts as forerun-
ners of the political revolution and regime change in Iran that the George 
W. Bush Administration openly advocated, especially in its identification 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran as part of a global “Axis of Evil”.
Although Barack Obama’s Administration has softened the diplomatic 
rhetoric, military action against Iran remains an “option”, especially in 
response to Iran’s growing nuclear threat. President Obama’s repeated 
invocation of the “American Dream” and the uniqueness of the “Ameri-
can experience” helped him achieve wide popularity with the elector-
ate, but such nationalism also helps sustain the illusion that the “West 
is the Best”. The conservative Tea Party movement has flourished in part 
as a consequence of the Obama Administration’s determination to chart 
a middle course. The greatness of America is its tolerance of everything 
and anything. In view of the conservatives’ strategic battle for cultural 
power I have analyzed in this chapter, I am not confident that the Obama 
Administration’s meliorism and nationalism are capable of responding ef-
fectively to the cultural politics of neo-conservatives.
I first began reading Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran in Idaho, where 
Kristin and I spend most of our vacations. High in the Rocky Mountains, 
in the tri-state border region of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, we are 
often told by our neighbors that we are in “God’s country”. Fiercely inde-
pendent ranchers fight the hated Bureau of Land Management, National 
Forest Service, and National Park Service, imagining that these federal 
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agencies are determined to erode the ranchers’ freedoms. In stores and 
restaurants, bearded frontiersmen, or at least their late modern simula-
tions, pay cash for everything, drive pick-up trucks outfitted for any pos-
sible emergency, and pride themselves on their abilities to field strip and 
rebuild anything from an agricultural pump to a handgun and to hunt and 
“dress” in the woods a grizzly bear, elk, or moose—all of which can still 
be hunted in that region. Suspicious of strangers, especially California 
“tree-huggers”, the locals tend to be profoundly religious, openly racist, 
and incurably sexist. To be sure, Idaho is hardly a match for the repressive 
regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but “God’s country” is certainly as 
fanatically political and ideological in its fantastic commitment to its ver-
sion of “liberal individualism”. Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran in Idaho 
is an object lesson to the attentive cultural critic that we face our own 
dangers in the U.S. of a growing intolerance and political extremism that 
have more similarities with the extremism Nafisi criticizes in the recent 
politics of Iran than most Americans are willing to recognize. It is even 
more troubling that such political extremism openly employs cultural 
materials and academic disciplines to achieve its ends.
Chapter 7
The Death of Francis Scott Key and Other Dirges
Music and the New American Studies
I think it’s a despicable thing that someone is going into our society 
from another country and […] changing our national anthem.
– Charles Key, great-great-grandson of Francis Scott Key
The first verse of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ should 
be kept in English, but the other verses should be 
given to whoever wants them, because those are the 
verses Americans don’t want or won’t sing.
– Jon Stewart, comedian
September, 1964, 150 years to the month after Francis Scott Key com-
posed his famous poem, “The Defense of Fort McHenry”, while wit-
nessing the bombardment of Fort McHenry from a British Man-of-War, 
I reclined at my ease on one of the grassy embankments separating the 
outer fortifications from the inner Fort McHenry on Baltimore Harbor. 
Three months shy of my nineteenth year, I was killing time before the Fall 
Semester began at Johns Hopkins, where I would begin my sophomore 
year. A naive Californian in Baltimore, ignorant of history and yet deter-
mined to major in that discipline, I rationalized my idleness as “study”. 
Not quite the Grand Tour, my little tourism in Baltimore followed the 
high-cultural path my parents and teachers had beaten for me. Visit muse-
ums, look at paintings, read the “best that has been thought and written”, 
become a leader in “… Hey, you! What are you doing there?” I was hustled 
to the Commandant’s Office—Fort McHenry was still administered in 
those days by a quasi-military command—and brought immediately to 
the Commandant himself.
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Gaping and dawdling, dreaming of the misty grandeur of an Ameri-
can past about which I knew very little and such knowledge a passel of 
schoolboy’s clichés, I had missed the official closing of the Fort and been 
caught “after hours”, like some burglar trapped in the central vault by the 
Bank of England’s time lock or a cat burglar cornered by searchlights on 
the parapet of the Monte Carlo Casino. What they feared even then in the 
innocent early 1960s must have been some sort of “terrorist” act, which 
in those days went by the more modest names of “vandalism” and “va-
grancy”, each with its imperial heritage. Somehow, I talked my way out 
of my tight spot, avoiding arrest with a quick rhetorical flourish. I don’t 
quite know what I said, but somehow it worked. All I know is that from 
that day forward I hated Francis Scott Key.
Behind the patriotic sentiments of Key’s lyrics and his venerated cap-
tivity on board that British naval ship, the familiar song that would be-
come our National Anthem directly derives from our global ambitions in 
the early years of the nation. Michael Oren notes that the lyrics of “The 
Star Spangled Banner” were first “composed for [William] Bainbridge 
and [Stephen] Decatur in 1805 and set to an old English drinking tune”, 
in response to Bainbridge’s and Decatur’s roles in America’s Barbary 
Wars. The anthem that celebrates our defense of the young nation against 
the British originated in response to our naval victories over North Af-
rican leaders, whose “‘turbaned heads bowed’ to the ‘brow of the brave’ 
and ‘the star-spangled flag or our nation.’”179 Although Francis Scott Key 
would revise the lyrics “after the Battle of Fort McHenry in the War of 
1812”, the echo remains of the Barbary Wars, arguably the U.S. nation’s 
first adventure in foreign warfare. As Oren argues, America’s involvement 
in the Middle East has a history that stretches from the Revolution to our 
contemporary military occupation of Iraq (Oren, 596). Although Oren’s 
purpose is to show that on balance this history displays America’s “benef-
icence” more than its “avarice” toward the Middle East, he also demon-
strates our consistent imperial designs on the region as part of our larger 
imperial ambitions for global power (Oren, 603). The origins of Francis 
Scott Key’s “Star-Spangled Banner” in the celebration of American vic-
tory over the Barbary states is by no means the exception in the cultural 
history of U.S. patriotism: patriotism functions culturally by way of con-
structing enemies, thus working out an imperial logic.
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It should not be necessary to criticize the rhetoric of patriotism, but it 
is a sign of our desperate times that American patriotism must be chal-
lenged and replaced with something that will bond our affections and our 
thoughts in less deadly ways. During the George W. Bush Administra-
tion’s pursuit of its “war on terror” in utter disregard of public opinion, 
signs emerged of a “new” expatriotism of intellectuals intent on reaffirm-
ing the promise of U.S. democracy by criticizing the Bush Administra-
tion’s imperial “democracy”.180 What the Bush Administration accom-
plished has lasting results, as well as deep historical roots. It is clear that 
President Obama has chosen not to abandon the use of patriotic rhetoric 
that reinforces American Exceptionalism, despite the broad international 
support for his presidency. His foreign policies in the continuing occu-
pation of Iraq, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and political instability 
in Pakistan depend upon his repeated affirmation of U.S. moral superior-
ity and the relevance of U.S. democracy and capitalism to the far corners 
of the globe.
I still respect our customary intellectual means to criticize social and 
political practices in conflict with our understanding of justice, equal-
ity, and humane behavior, and these include scholarly discourses of the 
most sophisticated kind, high-cultural work in which imaginative solu-
tions are considered and worked through, popular cultural resistance 
to inequitable social norms, and everyday political practices from legal 
to performative activism. We have long known, of course, that none of 
these activities will in itself be sufficient to bring about social and politi-
cal change, but each requires the complement of other practices and all of 
them depend upon propitious, contingent historical circumstances. The 
Berlin Wall did not fall, the Marcoses did not flee, Havel did not suddenly 
rise to popular power, slavery did not end, and women did not win the 
vote merely because people acted courageously and in concert. History 
happened, too, often well beyond such human agencies.
I do not want to mystify (or even capitalize) “H”istory in this regard. 
What exceeds our active reach and we call for want of a better term “his-
tory”—paradoxically, I think, because we are referring to everything that 
is in fact not historical—may refer in part to what occurs beyond our 
rational powers at the affective level of individual responses, multiplied 
vastly, to social and political conditions that eventually become unbear-
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able and must be overcome. American popular disgust with the Viet-
nam War developed in this manner, I think, aided significantly but not 
comprehensively by a vigorous and multifaceted anti-war movement in 
the U.S. and around the world. Emotional transformation is crucial in 
bringing about necessary social and political changes, because it affects 
the truculently unconverted and unconvinced, those citizens who oth-
erwise find every provocation from activists to bind them more firmly to 
their own positions and the reasons they have given for discrimination, 
war, genocide.
Most American Studies scholars, whatever their specific disciplines, 
are students of literature and know how its rhetoric works both rational-
ly and affectively to shape readers into what Étienne Balibar has termed 
“citizen-subjects”. And, of course, music is a crucial part of American 
Studies, but I think it has remained until quite recently marginalized as a 
“specialization”, not enjoying the centrality we have reserved for histori-
cal and literary texts as agents of social and political change. This chap-
ter is thus an effort to re-conceive popular music as central to the new 
American Studies and to political activism, in short as an integral part of 
the cultural politics of the new American Studies.
U.S. popular music can employ emotionally appealing lyrics and music 
for extremely effective ideological purposes. The Congressional adoption 
in 1931 of Francis Scott Key’s “The Star Spangled Banner” as the Nation-
al Anthem is itself an excellent illustration of this ideological purpose. 
Music is a crucial component of U.S. nationalism. For this very reason, 
the use of popular music for the purposes of challenging U.S. nationalism 
and patriotism ought to be a crucial part of any activist agenda, especially 
in those historical periods when the distribution and reproduction of 
music makes it one of the fastest communicative media. The hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic functions of music are well known both within 
and outside scholarly discussions, and it is this very political malleability 
that poses a third part of this thesis: because critical music often relies on 
familiar musical melodies and motifs, it is especially susceptible to con-
servative re-functioning. Bruce Springsteen’s famous “Born in the U.S.A.” 
was intended to criticize the collusion of U.S. domestic and foreign poli-
cies during the Vietnam War to exploit American workers and colonial 
subalterns. With the greatest ease, of course, President Ronald Reagan 
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turned “Born in the U.S.A.” from an ironic commentary on U.S. citizen-
ship into a patriotic theme song for his re-election campaign.
Since the First Gulf War, conservative political interests in the United 
States have co-opted “American patriotism” for their own purposes, rel-
egating the traditional role of the self-conscious, skeptical, and question-
ing citizen to the social and political margins and sometimes into effective 
exile. “Support our troops” was a popular slogan in the First Gulf War, 
which in the invasion and occupation of Iraq has become a nearly hys-
terical mantra to silence dissent and control a large but still minority anti-
war movement in the United States. Displayed proudly on the windows 
of cars and trucks, the doors of businesses, even on T-shirts and jackets 
and dresses, the twisted “ribbon” used first to represent the solidarity of 
those people committed to fighting the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, then 
adopted as the symbol of those contributing to the fight against breast 
and other cancers, is now the national symbol for those who “support our 
troops” in Iraq.
The twisted ribbon as a sticker or decal derives in part from the “yellow 
ribbons” tied around trees during the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1980–1981 
in both the Carter and Reagan Administrations to show support for the 
release of the 52 Americans held hostage by students in the U.S. Embassy 
in Tehran. When those hostages were finally released by the Iranian gov-
ernment on January 21, 1981, Tony Orlando and Dawn’s 1973 popular 
hit, “Tie a Yellow Ribbon Round the Old Oak Tree”, was played as a joy-
ous homecoming theme. During the First Gulf War in 1991, the George 
H. W. Bush Administration urged Americans to “display” yellow ribbons 
outside their homes to “support the troops” by expressing our desires 
to “welcome them home”, combining thereby the original populist and 
ostensibly anti-war sentiments in the Iran Hostage Crisis to “bring the 
hostages safely home” with the tacit conservative criticism of how vet-
erans returning from the Vietnam War had been mistreated by anti-war 
demonstrators.181
Tony Orlando and Dawn’s song was based on an actual incident on 
board a southern bus heading for Miami, Florida. One of the passengers 
told the driver that he had just been released from prison, where he had 
served three years for passing bad checks. While in prison, the man wrote 
his wife to tell her she did not have to wait for him to serve his sentence, 
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but if she was still interested she should let him know by tying a yellow 
ribbon around the only oak tree in the city square of White Oak, Geor-
gia. When the bus passed through town, the driver slowed down and to 
the convict’s tearful relief the wife had tied a yellow ribbon around the 
town’s central oak tree. The driver phoned this story to the wire servic-
es, which spread it all over the country. Songwriters Irwin Levine and L. 
Russell Brown read it in the newspaper, then composed their million-
selling song, which was released by Bell Records in February 1973 and 
by the week of April 23, 1973, was the number one popular song in the 
United States.
Although Saigon did not fall to the North Vietnamese and the U.S. did 
not hastily evacuate military and diplomatic personnel until 1975, 1973 
is the year of the negotiated peace accords between the U.S. and North 
Vietnam. Tony Orlando and Dawn’s popular song certainly owes its suc-
cess not only to its reliance on the conventions of country pop music, 
a hybrid musical genre of growing popularity in the early 1970s, but to 
the optimism in the United States that the Vietnam War was finally over 
and at that date had been concluded “honorably”. The prisoner return-
ing home to his devoted wife was a figure for the POW, many of whom 
like today’s Senator John McCain, had been tortured in the “Hanoi Hil-
ton” in explicit violation of the protections of prisoners-of-war guaran-
teed by the Geneva Convention. Of course, insofar as the Vietnam War 
remained to the very end an “undeclared war”, claims to violations of the 
Geneva Convention’s protections of combat troops could not be legal-
ly maintained.
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the “yellow ribbon” originally 
representing public relief at the end of an unpopular war and personal 
hopes for family members to come home safely, has come to represent 
an unequivocal patriotic zeal that substitutes “troops” metonymically for 
“our foreign policies”. The “yellow ribbon” has now taken on numerous 
different color combinations, the most popular of which is the red, white, 
and blue ribbon arranged to combine the American flag with the ribbon’s 
multiple connotations.
We know from Benedict Anderson that patriotism is an elaborate fic-
tion sustained by countless cultural and symbolic acts, but we still find 
ourselves “stirred” and “moved” as flags wave, anthems play, and foot-
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ballers score points.182 It is still difficult to understand how such patrio-
tism motivates individuals to die for a foreign policy toward a distant and 
relatively powerless nation—Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan—posing no im-
mediate threat to those individuals before they enter combat. How is it 
possible that large numbers of people from many different backgrounds, 
most of whom will never meet each other or, if they did, would find they 
have nothing in common, will embrace and sing together as “their” flag 
is displayed and “anthem” is played? Although this is the typical “patri-
otic scene of instruction”, it is rarely performed with much enthusiasm or 
even consensus. In a televised broadcast on Memorial Day (2006), Presi-
dent George W. Bush praised the sacrifices of the military in a speech at 
Arlington National Cemetery, and he was joined by Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and others in singing the National Anthem. Like some 
distracted fan at a sporting event, Rumsfeld clearly had difficulty with the 
lyrics, lip-synching at times and others remaining silent. “Patriotism” is 
thus not performed simply as the repetition of certain symbolic acts, like 
the singing of the National Anthem or the recitation of the “Pledge of Al-
legiance”. Patriotism depends on a much wider culture industry, whose 
products are generically and temporally diverse. Without “new” produc-
tions, patriotism would simply fail. Much of its vitality depends, then, 
on a ceaseless re-functioning of older cultural myths adapted to new 
circumstances.
Since the First Gulf War, patriotic rhetoric has relied on the substitu-
tion of military personnel, often individualized or collectively represent-
ed through fictive individuals, for embattled political leaders and insti-
tutions. In the County-and-Western hit, “Arlington”, Trace Adkins sings 
in the voice of a dead veteran of the Second Gulf War, who has recently 
been buried at National Arlington Cemetery, “a thousand stones” away 
from his “grandad”, who died fighting in World War II.183
The veteran’s reward for service to his country is “this plot of land […] 
for a job well done”, just below “a big white house sits on a hill just up the 
road”. The “white house” is, of course, the Custis-Lee Mansion, the origi-
nal estate on which National Arlington Cemetery was built when Briga-
dier General Montgomery C. Meigs appropriated the house and estab-
lished a cemetery for the Union war dead on June 15, 1864. But Adkins’s 
“white house” also refers to the Executive branch of the government, thus 
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aligning the dead veteran’s sacrifice and patriotism with unquestioning 
support of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Adkins’s lyrics pun on the veteran’s “hometown” and his ultimate coming 
“home” to Arlington National Cemetery, glossing the “big white house 
[…] on a hill” as the proper destination for “the chosen ones” who have 
made such a sacrifice. The cemetery is “this peaceful piece of property”, 
which is “sacred ground” where the young man can “rest in peace”. Play-
ing on the promises of the Bush Administration to protect Americans 
against “terrorism” and guarantee their “homeland security”, Adkins sug-
gests that such policies represent a national consensus: “We’re thankful 
for those thankful for the things we’ve done,/We can rest in peace, ‘cause 
we are the chosen ones,/We made it to Arlington, yea dust to dust,/Don’t 
cry for us, we made it to Arlington”. Of course, the Biblical reference links 
the Bush Administration’s foreign policies with the civil religion, just as 
allusions to the “city” (in this case, “a white house”) on “a hill” and the 
“chosen ones” recall the Puritan doctrine of supralapsarian Election.
Some neo-conservatives have attempted to equate “civic virtue” and 
“good citizenship” with “patriotism”, effectively “rationalizing” patriotism 
(that is, giving it the aura of “reason”). In Who Are We? The Challenges 
to America’s National Identity, Samuel Huntington complains that “ele-
ments of America’s business and intellectual elites [identify] more with 
the world as a whole and [define] themselves as ‘global citizens’ […]”.184 
Huntington takes a populist stance in the book, lumping liberal academic 
and multinational corporate “elites” together in an improbable conspir-
acy to denationalize the United States with immigrants, who in their re-
fusal to accept the American consensus end up working out the “cosmo-
politan” agenda of their allies in the university and corporations. Fixing 
on immigrants with legal or de facto dual citizenship and tagging them 
“ampersands”, Huntington fuels the recent rage against undocumented 
workers in the United States by insisting: “Previous immigrants main-
tained an ethnic identity as a subcomponent of their American national 
identity. Ampersands, in contrast, have two national identities. They eat 
their cake and have it too, combining the opportunity, wealth, and liberty 
of America with the culture, language, family ties, traditions, and social 
networks of their birth country”.185 What links together these unlikely 
forces is finally their unpatriotic, anti-national, and perversely destruc-
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tive impulses. We are saved only by the grass-roots Americans who con-
stitute what Huntington terms the nation’s “‘patriotic public”, which is 
“foremost among peoples in their patriotism and their commitment to 
their country”.186 As rational or historically accurate argument, Who Are 
We? makes no more sense than the shifting symbolism of those “yellow 
ribbons”, but in both cases a vague rhetoric of “patriotism” as necessary 
“consensus” holds both symbolically in place.
Samuel Huntington is a frequent target of liberal criticism, of course, 
because his arguments rely so centrally on neo-conservative rhetoric, es-
pecially by linking “values”, “faith”, and “nationalism”. Yet even more so-
phisticated and less obviously politically interested criticism has been di-
rected in recent years at the new “cosmopolitanism” or what Robbins and 
Cheah have positively formulated as “cosmopolitics”.187 The new “world 
or global literatures”, “post-nationalist” and “transnational” cultural and 
political projects, “traveling theory”, and “postcolonial theory” have been 
criticized for their totalizing impulses, their impracticality, and their tacit 
acceptance of (or at least failure to distinguish themselves from) unilat-
eral, first-world globalization. Although Alan Wolfe’s notorious review of 
the so-called “Anti-American Studies” in The New Republic is an extreme 
example of this tendency, there are many more “reasonable” arguments 
against the “internationalizing” of American Studies, especially if this 
requires us to study comparatively the polylingual, ethnically diverse 
communities of the Western Hemisphere and their pertinent rims or 
“contact zones”.
In Cosmopolitanism, Kwame Anthony Appiah argues eloquently for the 
transnational ethics of the cosmopolitan, who takes “seriously the value 
not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means tak-
ing an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. 
People are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn 
from our differences”.188 Appiah’s approach respects human differences, 
including those established by national boundaries and customs, but in 
doing so tries to develop an ethics that is not restricted to nation-specific 
knowledge and morality. As Appiah acknowledges, it is difficult for us to 
acknowledge the cosmopolitan ideal “that we have obligations to strang-
ers”, but even the smallest “nation” is composed primarily of strangers.189 
What allows us to identify with “fellow Americans” (or Swiss or Ugan-
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dans) whom we do not know personally and not make the same con-
nection with other human beings? The problem is in part the result of 
nation-specific knowledge, especially in the disciplines associated with 
culture and history. Whatever critical and educational purposes these 
disciplines may serve in the interpretation of the nation, they have done 
considerable work toward the legitimation of nations as discrete “objects” 
of study.190
Cultural, economic, and political globalization makes patriotism and 
nationalism appear increasingly naive and irrational. At the same time 
that U.S. popular music reinforces sentimental patriotism in work like 
Trace Adkins’ “Arlington”, it also calls attention to an ineluctable global 
awareness critical of the provincialism of the nation. The cross-over Folk-
Country musician Steve Earle explains in the liner notes for his disc, The 
Revolution Starts Now, that he felt a special urgency when composing this 
album to “weigh in” on “the most important presidential election in our 
lifetime”, the 2004 Presidential election that would occur seven months 
after the album’s release in May 2004.191 The Country-and-Western melo-
dies sound much like those employed by Adkins in patriotic songs, like 
“Arlington”, but Earle’s message is distinctly radical—in the spirit of what 
he terms the “radical [U.S.] revolution”—and global in perspective. The 
music lyrics in “Home to Houston” recall countless Country songs cel-
ebrating the hard work of truckers, but Earle’s driver is making the run 
from Basra to Baghdad “with a bulletproof screen on the hood of my 
truck/And a Bradley on my backdoor”. The trucker’s refrain—“God get 
me back to Houston alive/and I won’t drive a truck anymore”—repudi-
ates the conventional celebration of the trucker’s hard but honorable life, 
as well as the freedom of the open road.192
Earle’s trucker may want to get back to Houston as quickly as possible, 
recognizing his mistake in participating in a war so far from home, but 
Earle makes it clear that one lesson of the Second Gulf War is that work-
ing people share common bonds that reach beyond national borders. In 
“Rich Man’s War”, Earle argues that U.S. grunts, like Bobby, are fooled 
by patriotism—“Bobby had an eagle and a flag tattooed on his arm/Red 
white and blue to the bone when he landed in Kandahar”—in order to 
fight “a rich man’s war”, leaving at home “a stack of overdue bills” while 
“the finance company took his car”. In the same song, the Palestinian 
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“Ali”, “the second son of a second son,/Grew up in Gaza throwing bottles 
and rocks when the tanks would come/Ain’t nothin’ else to do around 
here just a game children play/Somethin’ ‘bout livin’ in fear all your life 
makes you hard that way”.
Both Bobby and Ali answer the same call of “rich men”, who manipu-
late their workers as if they were children. When Ali gets “the call”, he 
“Wrapped himself in death and praised Allah/A fat man in a new Mer-
cedes drove him to the door/Just another poor boy off to fight a rich 
man’s war”.193
Customarily represented as religious fanatics in the U.S. media, Pales-
tinian suicide-bombers are identified by Earle as sharing a transnational 
cause with U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Cheah, Robbins, Appiah, and Earle are working out a new cosmopoli-
tanism that should guide our efforts to “internationalize” American Stud-
ies. The curious hybrid term “international American Studies”, which in 
its very name appears to combine incompatible categories of world and 
nation, offers us an excellent opportunity to offer a sustained criticism 
of nationalism and its emotional complement “patriotism” from perspec-
tives both transnational and “rational”. The first task in this work is, then, 
profoundly theoretical: how can we disarticulate “reason” and “knowl-
edge” from specific national or state interests? Denationalizing knowledge 
complements the work of decolonizing knowledge advocated by the post-
colonial theorist Walter Mignolo, especially if we understand the histori-
cal relationship between the nation-state and colonial expansion.194 And 
can we do so in ways that will escape the totalizing universals of the past, 
especially noticeable in the Enlightenment heritage of modernity? In my 
concluding remarks, I want to suggest that popular music offers one pos-
sibility of moving in these directions beyond the nation, beyond univer-
sal reason, and against neo-imperialist versions of globalization.
Liberalism within the nation-state is no longer a possible alternative to 
a “neo-liberal ideology” that is profoundly conservative in its politics and 
yet rhetorically liberal. The ease with which a well-intentioned intellec-
tual or artist can be captured by such neo-liberal rhetoric is exemplified 
by Richard Rorty’s Saving Our Country and by Neil Young’s recent album, 
Living with War. Young’s long career is an interesting mixture of his Ca-
nadian backgrounds, musically documented in Prairie Wind, the album 
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(and documentary film) released just prior to Living with War, his coun-
tercultural identification with the anti-Vietnam War generation when 
he was part of Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young, who performed memo-
rably at Woodstock, and his appeal to libertarian political positions in 
the Country Folk songs he produced in the late 1970s and through the 
1980s, after leaving the instrumental Blue Grass group to become an 
independent composer and performer. Often referred to as libertarian 
“anthems”, songs like “Long May She Run” tap into the individualist, 
anti-government values of political conservatives while his continuing 
critiques of U.S. imperialism, such as “Pocahontas” and “Powder Finger”, 
even the feminist sentiments of “A Man Needs a Maid” (Harvest) appeal 
to various elements of the New Left.
Although Young often turns to his rural Canadian roots to explain his 
criticism of U.S. policies, he also resembles New Left intellectuals who 
often insisted on liberal “nationalism” as an alternative to the corrupt “pa-
triotic propaganda” of the government. Young concludes Living with War 
with a brief and deliberately fractured verse of “America the Beautiful”, 
having criticized the U.S. for its reliance on religion (“After the Garden”), 
consumerism (“The Restless Consumer”), and militarism (“Shock and 
Awe”). But Young tries to work through U.S. ideology by offering alterna-
tive national values, including the pacifism in “Living with War”, which 
uses lyrics from “The Star Spangled Banner” in conjunction with the pac-
ifist values of many anti-war demonstrators: “I take a holy vow/To never 
kill again/Try to remember Peace/The rocket’s red glare/Bombs burst-
ing in air/Give proof through the night/That our flag is still there”.195
Like Bill Clinton trying to counter the “family values” rhetoric of 
George H. W. Bush’s campaign, Young tries to offer an alternative set 
of “family values” in “Families” as he tacitly calls for the troops to come 
home: “I’m goin’ back to the USA/I just got my ticket today/I can’t wait 
to see you again in the/USA”. In “Flags of Freedom”, patriotism cuts both 
ways, the American flag flying ostensibly in the parade on “the day our 
younger son/is going off to war”, but also “blowin’ in the wind” are “the 
flags of freedom flyin’” that Young identifies with “Bob Dylan singin’ in 
1963”, presumably Dylan’s composition for Peter, Paul, and Mary’s hit 
from that year, “Blowin’ in the Wind”, which celebrated not only the her-
oism of the Civil Rights Movement but also the beginnings of the anti-
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war movement. Young’s album focuses on such noble tasks as “Let’s Im-
peach the President” and “Lookin’ for a Leader”, but both are integral to 
the U.S. nationalist agenda of the album. Of course, this is not the only 
reason Living with War bombed on its release. In a hurry to release an 
album critical of the war, Young relies on melodies, especially those with 
driving downbeats, long equated with his musical style and somewhat 
clichéd as a result. We might add to such criticism, which was prevalent 
in the popular reviews of the album, that those same musical motifs have 
been associated with so many conflicting political positions in his music 
as to muddle their musical import.
Steve Earle’s efforts to transnationalize the otherwise deeply patriotic 
styles of Country music might find their political, even musical, allies in 
the long history of music by U.S. ethnic minorities intent on getting a 
“hearing” from audiences deeply resistant to their values, even identities. 
From W. E. B. Du Bois’s pioneering work on African-American “Sorrow 
Songs” in The Souls of Black Folk (1903), arguably the first scholarly treat-
ment of the cultural, social, and political significance of African-American 
spirituals to Americo Paredes’ work on Mexican-American corridos, there 
is a long tradition of popular minority music whose central purpose has 
been to challenge the geopolitical and cultural boundaries of the United 
States and citizenship. Du Bois rediscovers the international meaning 
of his “grandfather’s grandmother”’s “heathen melody”, which she sang 
“to the child between her knees” somewhere “in the valleys of the Hud-
son and Housatonic”.196 As Du Bois points out, for “two hundred years” 
the song “travelled down to us and we sing it to our children, knowing 
as little as our fathers what its words may mean, but knowing well the 
meaning of its music” (Du Bois, 207). By “music”, Du Bois clearly means 
not just the melody, even though the notes are transcribed in his text, 
but also the spirit of rebellion which the African words—“Do bana coba, 
gene me, gene me!”—express for the diasporic African American under 
slavery or racial discrimination in North America (207). The foreignness 
of the language to the African-American child’s ear is for Du Bois itself a 
sign of the transnational alliance that challenges the bondage of the U.S. 
nation and the textual literacy of the EuroAmerican tradition from which 
the slave was specifically excluded.
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“Nuestro Himno”, aired first on Hispanic radio stations on April 28, 
2006 to anticipate the May Day demonstrations against HR 4437 and the 
general anti-immigration temper in the U.S., draws on the traditions of 
the Mexican corridos to challenge U.S. imperial domination in the “bor-
derlands”, but what Ariel Dorfman terms “the Star-Spanglish Banner” 
also suggests that “la frontera” is now in the midst of the U.S. nation, not 
just at its geopolitical edges.197 As Dorfman points out, politicians as dif-
ferent as “the conservative Lamar Alexander and the liberal Edward M. 
Kennedy […] declared that ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ should be sung 
exclusively in English”, as did Charles Key, “great-great-grandson of Fran-
cis Scott Key”, who “‘finds the Spanish version unpatriotic and is ada-
mant that it should be sung only in English’” (Dorfman).
Dorfman reminds us that in the 1860s, more than 70 years before “The 
Star-Spangled Banner” was made the national anthem, there were Yid-
dish and Latin translations of the song (Dorfman). There was also a Ger-
man translation in 1861, and it has been translated into French by Ca-
juns. “The website of the U.S. State Department also has been providing 
multiple Spanish versions of the anthem”.198 Giacomo Puccini uses musi-
cal motifs from “The Star-Spangled Banner” to identify B. F. Pinkerton, 
the U.S. Navy Lieutenant who betrays Madame Butterfly in the opera 
(1904), even structuring the duet between Pinkerton and Sharpless (U.S. 
Consul at Nagasaki) in Act II in terms of the song’s music. The Ameri-
can opera historian Gustave Kobbé felt compelled to comment in 1919 
that “the use of the Star Spangled Banner motif as a personal theme for 
Pinkerton always has had a disagreeable effect upon me, and from now 
on should be objected to by all Americans”.199 The Earl of Harewood, 
who revised Kobbé’s reference text in the 1970s, notes that Puccini’s use 
of the anthem’s music never had the “disagreeable effect” on American 
audiences and “seems now to cause no comment after some seventy years 
of repeated hearings” (1181).
But Puccini’s early twentieth-century Italian libretto and the previous 
translations hardly pose the same threat to U.S. nationalism and patrio-
tism as “Nuestro Himno”, which complements the symbolic power of the 
many Mexican, Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and other Latin American na-
tional flags displayed in the May 1, 2006 and 2007 pro-immigration dem-
onstrations across the U.S. Conceived by British music executive Adam 
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Kidron, performed by Haitian-American singer Wyclef Jean, Cuban-
American rapper Pitbull, and Puerto Rican singers Carlos Once and Olga 
Tañón, “Nuestro Himno” is a genuinely transnational work that calls at-
tention to the increasingly limited horizons of the nation-state for under-
standing and governing our economic, political, cultural, and human re-
lations. “Nuestro Himno” departs strategically from the original English.
The second verse stanza claims U.S. equality for non-English singers, 
insisting “Sus estrellas, sus franjas, la libertad, somos iguales./Somos her-
manos, es nuestro himno” (“Its stars, its stripes, liberty, we are equal./
We are brothers, it is our anthem”), and casting the original anti-colonial 
struggle against Great Britain as a new revolution against U.S. economic 
imperialism: “En el fiero combate, en señal de victoria,/fulgor de lucha 
… (Mi gente sigue luchando.)/… al paso de la libertad (!Ya es tiempo 
de romper las cadenas!)” (“In the fierce combat, as a sign of victory,/The 
brilliance of battle … (My people keep fighting.)/… in step with free-
dom, (Now is the time to break the chains!)”.200
“Nuestro Himno” draws on traditions of polylingual U.S. culture, the 
challenges to assimilationship norms of the borderland corridos, and the 
more general oral traditions through which minoritized peoples have of-
ten communicated and built political and cultural solidarity. Dorfman 
claims that “Nuestro Himno” has provoked such extreme responses be-
cause it has “inadvertently announced something many Americans have 
dreaded for years: that their country is on its way to becoming a bilin-
gual nation” (Dorfman). The reality of multilingual America has, how-
ever, long been accepted, even if begrudgingly, by most Americans, and 
previous English-Only movements have failed primarily because of their 
impracticality. What threatens many Americans in “Nuestro Himno” is 
the reality that the fiction of the U.S. national border can no longer be 
maintained, in part as a consequence of our own need for economic and 
now political globalization and in part as the result of new political for-
mations, ranging from such formal organizations as the European Union 
to emerging alliances among migrant workers to the indefinite threats of 
“global terrorists”.
Adam Kidron produced “Nuestro Himno” to demonstrate internation-
al solidarity with Hispanic immigrants to the United States, and the song 
is featured on the album Somos Americanos, a part of whose proceeds were 
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donated to the National Capital Immigration Coalition in Washington, 
D. C. (Wikipedia). Kidron’s activism within the U.S. originates outside its 
geopolitical borders, as does the labor of 12 million undocumented la-
borers working inside the U.S. Under slavery, African Americans were not 
citizens; until well into the twentieth century, native Americans were not 
citizens; under the Chinese Exclusion Acts, Chinese Americans were not 
citizens. The U.S. has maintained its national identity thanks to the labor 
of countless people who have not been entitled to citizenship.
Popular music freely crosses borders in car radios, iPODs, CD play-
ers, traveling bands, and pedestrians, with or without documents, singing 
along to their favorite tunes. Lyrics signify, of course, as I have argued 
in this essay, but they also depend on their beats and melodies, so that 
a “foreign” lyric, like Du Bois’s ancestral “Do bana coba”, can still signi-
fy, even when the specific words may not be understood. People listen 
privately to music, but they also dance to it, swaying to its rhythms with 
others who know or at least know how to fake the appropriate steps. Mu-
sic can bind us to flags and wars, of course, as military personnel listen 
to their iPODs while racing into battle, but music can also take us apart, 
move us across borders, and link us with surprising communities with 
little more than the twist of a dial or that wonder of technology, a human 
voice. Mobile, inexpensive, adaptive, and politically possible, popular 
music is one means of creating the transnational coalitions that will take 
us beyond the prison-house of the nation.
Chapter 8
Visualizing Barack Obama
Prologue: 2010
I include here another “interlude”, in the manner of chapter 3 in the first 
part of this book, to suggest that cultural politics also depends on schol-
arship quickly produced in response to new circumstances and published 
in a wide range of journals now available for such rapid interpretation. 
Marquard Smith and the Editorial Group of the Journal of Visual Culture 
distributed by email a questionnaire on Barack Obama and visual culture 
to a wide variety of “scholars, educators, curators, activists and artists 
working in academia across the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, in 
cultural institutions and in the public sphere”.201 The questions from the 
questionnaire are included in their “Editorial” to the special issue, but the 
editors decided not to repeat the questions in the twenty-three different 
responses they chose to publish.202 Published ten months after Obama’s 
election, the special issue was not intended to affect the election or pub-
lic opinion, but what the editors termed the “time-sensitive nature of the 
subject-matter” was certainly related to the evanescence of visual semiot-
ics in political campaigns.
Today, two years after “The Obama Issue” of the Journal of Visual Cul-
ture was published, most of the images reproduced and analyzed in this 
issue have vanished from public view. To be sure, the Shepard Fairey 
“Hope” poster of Obama, contested over its originality, and Tina Fey’s 
comic impersonation of Sarah Palin on Saturday Night Live continue 
to shape visually the Obama Administration and its most vigorous op-
ponents, especially among the Tea Party and Tea Party Express, whose 
members have chosen Sarah Palin as a symbolic leader. Just what happens 
to the other, more fleeting images in major political events is an interest-
ing question, which would require me to analyze in greater depth the vi-
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sual narrativity that develops from both manifest and latent contents of 
the highly visual cultures that rely on electronic and digital media.
In terms of “cultural politics”, however, my purpose in including this 
already dated bit of scholarly journalism is to stress the importance of 
scholars responding with some speed to culturally and politically imme-
diate events. Careful scholarship takes time, of course, and should not be 
replaced with rapidly produced interpretations. The bathos of so much 
discussion of serious issues on personal blogs and wikis, telegraphed 
on Twitter, and personalized on Facebook reminds us that carefully re-
searched scholarship, refereed by experts, and published in reliable schol-
arly sources continues to play a crucial role in the public sphere as well as 
for its intrinsic value as knowledge. Traditional scholarship is time-con-
suming work, even if the time for its dissemination has shortened con-
siderably. Scholars should not be primarily focused on affecting public 
policies, but not because of some fantastic commitment to the “apoliti-
cal” nature of scholarship. Scholarly knowledge is always political in one 
way or another, and it is best for scholars and the public to understand 
this ineluctable fact in order to judge scholarship according to its diverse 
political interests. But the relative slowness that so much lasting scholar-
ship requires does not lend it to direct public policy recommendations, 
even if the longer history provided by substantial scholarship can and of-
ten is employed in making successful decisions affecting public policies.
The conventional wisdom is that scholars should remain focused on 
their archives, sharing their conclusions with colleagues and students in 
several pedagogical contexts (conferences, classrooms, research centers), 
venturing occasionally into the public sphere by way of opinion-editorials 
(such as I included in chapter 3), museum exhibitions and other public 
performances, and as consultants to mass media or expert-witnesses in 
legal cases. Although all of these untraditional activities might be includ-
ed in a faculty member’s annual personnel review, few have much value 
in the overall judgment of a professor’s “work”. Exhibition catalogues are 
not “books”; op-eds and responses to questionnaires are not “essays”. Be-
cause they don’t “count” significantly in the usual judgment of scholarly 
capital, professors tend not to choose them as projects, reinforcing the 
separation between the “ivory tower” and the “marketplace”. Younger, 
untenured professors are under intense pressure by their colleagues not 
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to produce work that has relatively little scholarly “value” and “impact”, 
the latter word designating the distinction of the scholarly venue and the 
number of citations within its disciplinary community. Such terms as 
capital, value, and impact are obviously drawn from a capitalist economy, 
and it is worth noting that public complaints regarding the “politicizing” 
of knowledge far outnumber those challenging the commercialization of 
scholarship.
What, then, should be the criteria for valuing “The Obama Issue” of 
the Journal of Visual Culture? The editors’ idea for this issue returns me 
to a quixotic plan I once proposed to colleagues at the University of Cali-
fornia, Irvine for a regular television program, in which scholars would 
comment on popular and mass culture, recent politics, and other news 
requiring historical, analytical, and theoretical perspectives unavailable 
on traditional news and talk-shows. To be sure, public television, alterna-
tive news, National Public Radio, and a host of other media have drawn 
increasingly on scholarly “experts” in the preparation of programs and 
documentaries that have vastly increased the public’s options for news 
and reporting with the waning of the major broadcast networks’ domi-
nance. But with the exception of brief cameo appearances, scholars re-
main “consultants” rather than interpreters and analysts in most of this 
alternative news and history.
What follows, then, is simply one small example of how the “cultural 
politics of the new American Studies” should function as ongoing com-
mentary on “current events”. In an era when both our economic and po-
litical lives are structured by highly mediated cultural productions, we 
need more than ever rapidly deployed intellectual analyses to accompany 
the more reflective, research-intensive scholarship that explains and clari-
fies the emergence of certain phenomena, narratives, formations, and 
identities that assume social reality for so many. Whereas some people 
will insist that such intellectual work should be value-neutral and thus 
apolitical, I would argue that these interpretations should be primar-
ily free from economic entanglement or interest. Whereas the evening 
news and the Internet are penetrated by advertising no longer easily dis-
tinguishable from information and knowledge, scholars should provide 
their own “freedom of information”, in which what they offer in this man-
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ner has only the most tenuous connection to their salaries, royalties, or 
other sources of remuneration.
Visualizing Barack Obama: 2009
The Obama presidential campaign certainly used the Internet, including 
its visual imaging and streaming video capabilities, to great effect in the 
recent primaries and successful presidential campaign. The “Obama Is 
Hope” image was also extremely effective in advertising Obama’s com-
mitment to cultural diversity and the effort to overcome racial and ethnic 
divisions in the United States. In his first “100 days” as President, Obama 
created a one-way “Facebook” page, retained his private Blackberry amid 
much publicity regarding possible breaches of its security, and otherwise 
announced himself as the most technologically sophisticated U.S. presi-
dent. The “visibility” of Barack Obama is not entirely a consequence of 
new digital, internet technologies; it relies on many traditional media, 
including the theatricality of political speeches, the body language (es-
pecially facial expressions) he employed in the Presidential Debates, his 
self-deprecating humor (such as he employed while giving the Com-
mencement Address at Arizona State in May 2009, in response to Ari-
zona State’s refusal to award him an honorary degree), and his fashion 
statements. As a candidate for the presidency, Obama made the news 
for not wearing the conventional American flag lapel-pin, but then ap-
peared with one that remained on his lapel for the rest of the campaign. 
Once elected, he allowed himself to be photographed in the Oval Office 
without his jacket, prompting criticism from former President George W. 
Bush regarding the “respect” Obama ought to show for the “office”. And, 
of course, Michelle Obama’s fashion statements are based on her support 
of various fashion designers from outside the usual world of haute cou-
ture, especially ethnic minority designers whose fashions she has worn to 
considerable publicity. Much of the visibility of Barack Obama has to do 
with the visualization of the Obama family, with photography and video 
of the romantic couple and of the family values exemplified by their vis-
ible attention to their two daughters, Sasha and Malia.
The visibility of Barack Obama and his family has circulated with con-
siderable speed and frequency around the world, as the two images I 
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photographed in Tanzania in August 2008 indicate. Two different carts 
selling tourist trinkets were decked out by the sellers with the famous 
Obama image.203
Like corporate logos and the “branding” businesses are encouraged to 
develop for recognition, the “Obama logo” achieved considerable trans-
national circulation in ways that caused Republicans to protest his lack of 
“patriotism” and many others to view him as a figure capable of restoring 
the waning U.S. reputation around the world. Even controversial images, 
such as the photograph of Obama in Kenya wearing a traditional African 
headdress, dubbed incorrectly by Repulicans as a “turban”, have contrib-
uted to the globalization of the Obama logo.
Yet for all the sophistication of Obama’s team in employing traditional 
and new media, it has merely built upon the innovative use of new media 
in President Clinton’s two campaigns and presidencies. The technolo-
gies available today are more sophisticated, but the basic digital media 
are similar to those available to the Clinton team and used with consider-
able sophistication and variety at the time. What differs from Clinton’s 
era to Obama’s is Barack Obama’s cultivation of his global image both 
for its own sake and for its domestic uses in the U.S. in the aftermath 
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of 9/11 and contested views of how the U.S. should represent itself in-
ternationally.
The Obama team successfully negotiated the different rhetorics of as-
similation and multiculturalism, thereby winning enormous support 
from white voters, many of whom felt particularly threatened by the mul-
ticultural and multiethnic cultural politics of the 1990s. Yet in bridging 
this divide in the U.S., Obama certainly favored a modified assimilation-
ist ideology and a return to consensus-based politics and civil rights. His 
vaunted “bipartisan” practical politics have not turned out to be very ef-
fective, despite symbolic gestures toward opponents, but the rhetoric of 
“bipartisanship” is central to his image. His presidential campaign and 
first 100 days are distinguished by his co-optation of neo-liberalism—the 
conservative strategy exemplified in the “kinder, gentler America” and 
the “100 Points of Light” slogans employed by the Bush presidents—
but that strategy has had some very negative consequences. First, it has 
produced a considerable and often angry backlash from both sides of the 
political spectrum. Reverend Wright’s radical speeches actually focused 
on what Marcuse once termed “repressive tolerance” practiced by weepy 
liberals whose tears take the place of change. Sarah Palin’s and Joe the 
Plumber’s meteoric rises to public prominence were driven by the usual 
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white rage at diminished power. Both extremes were driven by Obama’s 
ability to claim the middle ground, pushing them further out of public 
debates. In the Limbaugh-driven Republican rhetoric of the present, we 
are witnessing conservative rage consuming itself, but probably without 
some epiphenomenal problems unpredictable in their grotesque details. 
Second, Obama has reinvented “American Exceptionalism”, repeating the 
jingoistic rhetoric of conservatives—“America is the greatest country in 
the world”—and falling into the trap of this mythology in his conduct 
of foreign policies in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are still overtly building 
Western-style democracies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, so that 
their peoples can also follow “the American Dream”, Iraqi, Afghani, and 
Pakistani style. We know from the Vietnam War that this “Exception-
alism” is a fatal mythology, as is the silliness of the “American Dream”, 
which is built upon the sands of late-Capitalist entrepreneurial zeal and 
frontier (colonial) self-reliance.
Many ethnic and other minorities have been casualties of Obama’s new 
“American Exceptionalism”, especially those whose specific claims to 
rights do not fit the profile of the majority and thus have no visibility in 
consensus-based politics. Native Americans were once again invisible in 
the presidential campaign. Reverend Joseph Lowery’s benediction made 
one ambivalent appeal to “when the red man can get ahead, man”, which 
unfortunately was heard by many as “when the red man can get a head-
man”, repeating two notorious stereotypes of Native Americans. Along 
with all the candidates for the presidency, Obama avoided scrupulously 
the question of immigration reform, leaving twelve million (and more) 
undocumented workers in the U.S. to face an uncertain future. Despite 
a powerful debate across the nation regarding gay marriage during the 
presidential campaigns, Obama (and the other candidates) took melior-
ist positions or adopted politically “pedantic” views, treating the issue as 
a “state’s rights” question. Considering the fact that Proposition 108—
the Constitutional Amendment banning gay marriage—succeeded in 
California in part because of strong majorities from African-American 
and Latino/a voters, Obama should take a stand on such intersectional 
issues that affect minority rights. But his commitment to a new “Ameri-
can Exceptionalism” makes any such position extremely unlikely.
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Tina Fey’s “Sarah Palin”, together with Palin’s ill-advised decision to ap-
pear on Saturday Night Live with Tina Fey, worked brilliantly to trivial-
ize Palin and thus the McCain-Palin presidential ticket. By transforming 
the actual Sarah Palin into a “character” in someone else’s script, Satur-
day Night Live tapped into the power of what Jean Baudrillard long ago 
termed the “hyper-real”, thereby taking control of Sarah Palin’s cultural 
“narration”.204 Sarah Palin quickly became an “effect” of Tina Fey, both 
because Tina Fey did an excellent job of impersonation and because the 
political satire demanded a response that once given by Sarah Palin legiti-
mized the content of the satire. What I once termed the “spinoff rhetoric” 
of highly self-conscious television—“metavideo”—served to renarrate 
Sarah Palin and divert the McCain campaign itself.205 Republican politi-
cal strategists planning to run Sarah Palin for President in the future seem 
utterly unaware of this Baudrillardian consequence of postmodern me-
dia, despite neo-liberalism’s otherwise canny understanding of the me-
dia’s role in political campaigns. Did Tina Fey or the scriptwriters for Sat-
urday Night Live know what they were doing? No, but the semiotic logic 
of the show, dating back to the 1970s when such strategies first came to 
prominence, did that work for them. Brava.206
In his neglected and brilliant fiction, Darkwater (1920), W. E. B. Du 
Bois complained about a “beauty system” that excluded many African 
American women, designating them either “ugly” or, worse, invisible.207 
Barack and Michelle Obama have managed successfully this “beauty sys-
tem” by distinguishing themselves from “beautiful people” and celebrity 
culture. Of course, both of them are physically attractive, physically fit, 
and thin. But they have courted working-class voters by claiming their 
own humble origins and then reproducing these backgrounds in the 
rhetoric of “family values” they demonstrate with their daughters. Re-
fusing to wear a tuxedo at a recent Washington gala, removing his jacket 
in the Oval Office, the President emulates the working man. Publicizing 
the alternative, often minority designers whose fashions she chooses, 
Michelle Obama underscores the symbolic function of her public ap-
pearances while stressing her own modest roots. Their management of 
fashion semiotics is new, but the convention of presidential “humility” 
is an old, time-honored one, best exemplified by Obama’s role model, 
Abraham Lincoln.
Chapter 9
Don DeLillo and the War on Terrorism 
Literature and Cultural Politics
Oh! The only part of life that matters is contemplation. When 
everybody understands that as clearly as I do, they will all 
start writing. Life will become literature. Half of humankind 
will devote itself to reading and studying what the other half 
has written. And contemplation will be the main business of 
the day, preserving it from the wretchedness of actual living. 
And if one part of human kind rebels and refuses to read the 
other half ’s effusions, so much the better. Everyone will read 
himself instead; and people’s lives will have a chance to repeat, 
to correct, to crystallize themselves, whether or no they become 
clearer in the process […]. I mean to take up writing again.
– Italo Svevo, “An Old Man’s Confessions” (1928), 
trans. Ben Johnson and P. N. Furbank
The Messiah will come only when he is no longer necessary; 
he will come, not on the last day, but [at] the very last.
– Franz Kafka, “The Coming of the Messiah”, Parables and Paradoxes
Literature before 9/11: Mao II (1991)
Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and 
the Pentagon, and the crash of hijacked United Airlines Flight # 93 on 
September 11, 2001, I received a call from a reporter at the New York 
Times. Emily Eakin was working on a story about modern literature’s re-
sponse to earlier forms of terror, in particular the fictional representations 
of Russian revolutionaries in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Possessed (1871–
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72) and European anarchists in Henry James’s The Princess Casamassima 
(1886) and Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907).208 Eakin reasonably 
assumed that great literature offers us means of coping with crises like 
September 11 and that this specific event was not historically unique. We 
talked by phone and email about the national agendas of early modern 
revolutionary movements and the global terrorist aims of al-Qaeda, in-
cluding the aesthetic means required to represent these different political 
cultures and historical periods.
Dostoevsky, James, and Conrad were brilliant practitioners of psycho-
logical realism, which located meaning and value in the choices and ac-
tions of individuals, even when such individuals act as representatives of 
political or social groups. James’s Hyacinth Robinson “chooses” not to 
assassinate the Duke, thereby repudiating his relationship with the anar-
chists, but it is a choice that requires him to take responsibility for his 
actions by committing suicide.209 Dostoevsky’s The Possessed culminates 
in the murder of Stavrogin’s wife, Marya Timofeyevna Lebyadkin, and 
her brother by the revolutionaries, and the inevitable suicides by Stav-
rogin and his disciple Kirilov for their responsibility in this bloody con-
clusion. In Conrad’s The Secret Agent, Winnie Verloc kills her husband 
when she discovers that in using her brother, Stevie, in the anarchist plot 
to blow up the Greenwich Observatory Verloc is responsible for Stevie 
unwittingly blowing himself up. Just as Winnie judges Verloc as fully re-
sponsible for the anarchists’ crime against her brother, so Winnie com-
mits suicide both out of desperation and in apparent compensation for 
her own violent act. Repeating the newspaper story’s baffled conclusion 
about Winnie’s leap from a steamer in the middle of the English Channel, 
Conrad suggests that the “‘impenetrable mystery…destined to hang for ever 
over this act of madness or despair’” can be understood only by way of liter-
ary insight into the complex motives of the individual.210
What would these literary realists have understood in the acts of the 
al-Qaeda terrorists who lived in the U.S. suburbs, attended private flight 
schools, drank and smoked in local bars (while leaving snippets from 
the Koran for edification of the patrons), worked out at 24-Hour Fit-
ness, and just as routinely hijacked four commercial airliners and drove 
three directly into their targets and a fourth into the ground? What “real-
ist” account of such behavior is possible, except one that expresses utter 
Don DeLillo and the War on Terrorism  183
bewilderment in the face of the terrorism of al-Qaeda and other Islamic 
fundamentalist groups around the world committed to a long, even los-
ing struggle against the United States as the leading representative of 
Western capitalism and its neo-imperialist policies of “globalization”? In 
today’s Western press, “suicide bombers” remain inexplicable and deeply 
troubling, not merely because of the terrible damage they do to civil-
ians but because conventional explanations that attribute their actions to 
“madness” or to religious “fanaticism” are obviously wrong.
“The future belongs to crowds”, DeLillo writes in Mao II, and this 
prophecy echoes throughout the novel, ushering us from the opening 
section, “At Yankee Stadium”, where a mass wedding presided over by the 
Reverend Sun Myung Moon displaces the “American Pastime”, to Part 
One.211 The apocalyptic tone of “the future belongs to crowds” builds on 
DeLillo’s analysis in many previous works of how the postmodern con-
dition has destroyed traditional meanings of the humanist individual, 
philosophical subjectivity, and psychological selfhood. Although Dos-
toevsky, James, and Conrad wrote in cultures historically poised on the 
brink of this transformation, they understood it only in partial, peripheral 
ways. There is a subliminal glimpse of the vanishing modernist subject in 
these writers, but at the center of their literary attention is the problem of 
the alienated, fractured, divided self and the various ways the new urban 
“masses” have contributed to this dilemma.
For these moderns, the self is attenuated and damaged, and they use 
imaginative means to restore and cure it. Thus their literary works gener-
ally conclude with the high drama of either self-sacrifice—the “suicides” 
that betoken individual responsibility in their three novels about revo-
lution—or self-affirmation: the secular imitatio Christi in Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment, Isabel Archer’s refusal of Caspar Goodwood and 
apparent decision to return to Rome at the end of The Portrait of a Lady, 
the possibility of individual idealism and nobility represented by Jim and 
Nostromo, set off emphatically by their human failure and corruption in 
Lord Jim and Nostromo. Embattled, threatened, but finally resilient, the 
self survives in modern art and literature, often by means of the author’s 
sheer act of imaginative will to repudiate what urban, industrial societies 
were in fact doing to destroy the self by stripping it of agency and any 
power to resist complete alienation from its intrinsic power.
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DeLillo understands the postmodern condition to involve radically dif-
ferent notions of subjectivity, most of which cannot be simply opposed 
to or distinguished from mass phenomena and their representation. His 
characters are “distanced” from themselves and each other, rather than 
alienated, and this decentering of the self seems to be directly related to 
the social and cultural mediations through which experience itself is con-
stituted. In Libra, Marina Oswald experiences Lee Harvey as “someone 
you see from a distance”, even “when he was hitting her. He was never 
fully there”.212 Far from being an eccentric or a madman, DeLillo’s Lee 
Harvey Oswald is the prototype of postmodern subjectivity, albeit a dys-
topic version. In the novel, Oswald’s best expression of himself is the fa-
mous photograph, taken by Marina and posed by Oswald one day before 
his assassination attempt on General Ted Walker: “It showed Lee dressed 
in black, holding a rifle in one hand, some newspapers in the other” (L, 
290). As Oswald explains the photograph to George de Mohrenschildt: 
“‘It’s the kind of picture a person looks at and maybe he understands 
something he didn’t understand before. […]. Maybe he sees the truth 
about someone’” (L, 289). Inscribed by Lee “To my friend George from 
Lee Oswald” and by Marina in Russian, “Hunter of fascists—ha ha ha!!!”, 
the photograph is multiply textual and composes thereby the character of 
Lee Harvey Oswald, a simulation composed by George, Lee, and Marina 
among many others (L, 290).
Mao II criticizes this sort of simulated identity as symptomatic of a 
postmodern, globalized world in which no one is at home. The reclusive 
novelist Bill Gray attempts to resist this tendency and protect the more 
traditional identity celebrated in the great tradition of the novel, but in his 
rural Hudson Valley home’s vast archive of writing he is surrounded both 
by his “old handwritten manuscripts, printer’s typescripts, master galleys” 
and by “stacks of magazines and journals containing articles about Bill’s 
work and about his disappearance, his concealment, his retirement, his 
alleged change of identity, his rumored suicide, his return to work, his 
work-in-progress, his death, his rumored return” (M, 31). Like Nicholas 
Branch in Libra buried alive in the vast and conflicting documents he col-
lects to understand the truth of the Kennedy Assassination, Bill Gray is 
constituted ontologically by the archive he has built in place of a home.
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Sentimentally drawn to an older, mythic America of baseball and 
books, Gray seems unaware that both professional sports and literary 
commerce have contributed significantly to the culture of celebrity he 
has attempted to elude. Long before the Reverend Moon rents Yankee 
Stadium for his spectacular mass marriages, Gray’s childhood heroes are 
swatting home runs and rounding the bases on radio and in the press in 
ways legendized by children and novelists. In the novel, Gray recalls how 
as a child he pretended to announce baseball games, suggesting that such 
imaginary work prepared him for his career as a novelist. Well before the 
photojournalist Brita Nilsson arrives at his upstate New York home, Bill 
Gray is already both effect and cause of the postmodern conditions for 
subjectivity that give us such historical variants as J. D. Salinger, Thom-
as Pynchon, Lee Harvey Oswald and Osama bin Laden. Reluctant and 
intrigued at the same time to be photographed for Brita’s “collection” 
of writers, Bill Gray is far more prepared than he thinks to be framed 
by this world.
In the eighteenth-century European imaginary, the representative man 
organized different and conflicting experiences and data by means of his 
reason or “consciousness”. In the postmodern era, such cognitive means 
are no longer sufficient, as Paul Virilio has pointed out: “Mass phenom-
ena do indeed elude immediate apprehension and can only be perceived 
by means of the computer and interception and recording equipment 
which did not exist in earlier times.”213 The “crowd” in De Lillo’s future 
is not constituted by choices made by individuals to join a group move-
ment, as in the collective formed to bring about revolutionary change, 
but instead by the alienation of individuals from their respective agency 
and the imposition of order and “belonging” from outside or above. If, 
as a conscious, rational subject, I choose to join the revolution (or the 
nation, neighborhood, company), the larger collective is always depen-
dent on the reflective monads constituting it. In the “crowd” or “mass”, 
each subject is merely a synecdoche, which “represents” the whole, how-
ever uniquely this subject is employed. In Mao II, Bill Gray equates the 
end of modernity with the death of the novel and with the cognitive and 
communicative practices on which the novel depends: “‘Beckett is the 
last writer to shape the way we think and see. After him, the major work 
involves midair explosions and crumbled buildings. This is the new tragic 
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narrative’” (M, 157). Bill is speaking in this scene with George Haddad, 
the character who poses as the negotiator who will exchange Bill for the 
French Swiss poet, Jean-Claude Julien, the terrorists are holding hostage 
and will eventually murder.
Bill Gray understands how and why the novel ends with Beckett in late 
modernity; George Haddad understands how this sort of postmodernity 
drives us toward the need for some absolute, totalitarian principle or rul-
er, to govern what no individual can command. Trying to flatter Bill into 
meeting with the Maoist terrorists in Beirut, George tells him:
You could have been a Maoist, Bill […]. I’ve read your books 
carefully and we’ve spent many hours talking and I can easily 
see you blending into that great mass of blue-and-white cot-
ton. You would have written what the culture needed in order 
to see itself. And you would have seen the need for an abso-
lute being, a way out of weakness and confusion. This is what 
I want to see reborn in the rat warrens of Beirut. (M, 163).
Because DeLillo’s readers never actually read Bill Gray’s works, we can-
not confirm or dispute Haddad’s contention, but it is clear that DeLillo 
thinks that literary representation can and should challenge the totalitar-
ian impulses fueled by postmodern dislocation.
As we read Mao II, we learn that literature transforms us only to the 
extent that we respond to and communicate with it. The terrorist com-
modifies his hostages, who are targets and victims and symbols; the au-
thor compels his readers, those strangers, to talk back, thereby making 
themselves known, less to him than to each other (as teachers teach and 
literary critics interpret). DeLillo understands that the commercial and 
the avant-garde novel, as well as the novelist either celebrated on the talk-
show or prized for reclusiveness, are parts of the problem, rather than the 
solution. The textual situation in which senders and receivers transform 
each other and accept the historically incomplete character of all com-
munication in fact describes DeLillo’s utopian society, not the retreat of 
a few individuals into book-lined studies or their devoted fans into librar-
ies. In Libra, DeLillo indicts Americans for having virtually invented Lee 
Harvey Oswald as a consequence of their mythic construction of John F. 
Kennedy as a substitute for their own civic responsibilities. John John-
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ston has argued that Libra deconstructs “the difference between the fic-
tional and historical”, not in order to reaffirm the fictional foundations 
of historical experience, but to “open” fiction and its tidy conventions of 
coherent characters and meaningful plots “to precisely those forces out-
side prose fiction that these conventions were meant to internalize, and 
thereby to contain”.214 In a similar fashion, Ryan Simmons has argued 
that DeLillo attempts in Mao II to demonstrate that “no one has a unique 
command over language” and that “no one owns language, but everyone 
is subsumed within language in the postmodern world”.215
As critics have observed about most of his fiction, DeLillo’s internal 
critique of the novel as an aesthetic form puts him in a very difficult posi-
tion as a literary author. Simmons discusses how often scholars have con-
fused Bill Gray and DeLillo, and this tendency is undoubtedly reinforced 
by the nostalgia in contemporary culture for literary and aesthetic “value” 
(Simmons 677). Given his criticisms in many works of how postmodern 
culture fetishizes and commodifies literature, DeLillo must take a cer-
tain satisfaction from those misreadings of his works that imagine he is 
mourning the related deaths of the novel and the author, in part because 
such misreadings expose their readers’ deepest fears. Yet such misinter-
pretations also risk aligning DeLillo with a cultural conservatism he cer-
tainly abhors. Nevertheless, it is fair to judge the metafictional double-
binds and contradictions on which DeLillo’s novels typically rely to be 
very literary and perhaps too subtle and thus likely to be lost on today’s 
impatient readers.
DeLillo works hard to distinguish his aesthetic practices and values in 
Mao II from what we are told of Gray’s more traditional commitments 
to the “craft” of the novel. Each of the different sections of the novel are 
introduced by a photograph from the news that reinforces the title-page’s 
photograph of crowded Tiananmen Square in Beijing and its tacit mes-
sage: “The future belongs to crowds”. They also remind us that DeLillo’s 
narrative follows global events prominent in the news, including such sig-
nificant news stories as the 1983 terrorist attacks on the American Em-
bassy and the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Whereas Bill Gray imagines 
he can escape these media, DeLillo’s point is that television, film, photog-
raphy, music, urban noise, different languages are the ineluctable media 
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in which we live and work. These media makes us, just as they seem to 
“invade” and then organize the traditional form of the novel.
In Mao II, Bill Gray is drawn so relentlessly into the plot of the ter-
rorists that he finally “chooses” exactly what they want without being 
forced or ordered to do so. Questioning George Haddad about how to 
find Abu Rashid in Beirut during the revolt of Shiite Muslims and Druse 
in West Beirut against the Lebanese army in early 1984, Bill follows the 
directions that will lead him directly into the current site of global anar-
chy and the control of the terrorists.216 DeLillo complicates the pattern 
by making sure Bill Gray dies of “internal injuries” he suffers when a cab 
hits him in Athens and well before Gray reaches Beirut or the control of 
Abu Rashid. In a chain of miscommunications and accidents typical of 
DeLillo’s fiction, Brita Nilsson’s delivery of Charlie Everson’s message to 
Bill Gray leads Bill to London, where his public speech is postponed by 
a bomb blast, which directs Bill to Athens, where he is struck by an er-
rant cab and George Haddad talks him into traveling to Beirut by way of 
Larnaca, Cyprus. By the time Bill dies of his internal injuries on board 
the ferry he has boarded for his journey to Junieh, Lebanon, the reader 
knows that Bill Gray has been overtaken by the very contingencies of life 
he had hoped to avoid by becoming a novelist. The connections of these 
events are either radically accidental or utterly motivated and plotted, but 
in both instances they represent Bill Gray’s loss of control over his life 
and its representation.
To be sure, he rationalizes the relentless concatenation of events and 
other people leading him to Beirut, the hostage, Abu Rashid, and the 
Maoist terrorists by claiming that he wants to write about the hostage 
and that this desire is lifting the writer’s block that had prevented him 
from finishing his last novel. But when he reflects on his new interest in 
the hostage, he betrays a certain futility: “He couldn’t remember why 
he wanted to write about the hostage. He’d done some pages he half-
way liked but what was the actual point?” (M, 198). Of course, the usu-
al explanations offered by the traditional novelist are available, and Bill 
Gray imagines he
could have told George [Haddad] he was writing about the 
hostage to bring him back, to return a meaning that had been 
lost to the world when they locked him in that room. Maybe 
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that was it. When you inflict punishment on someone who 
is not guilty, when you fill rooms with innocent victims, you 
begin to empty the world of meaning and erect a separate 
mental state, the mind consuming what’s outside itself, re-
placing real things with plots and fictions. One fiction taking 
the world narrowly into itself, the other fiction pushing out 
toward the social order, trying to unfold into it. He could have 
told George a writer creates a character as a way to reveal con-
sciousness, increase the flow of meaning. This is how we re-
ply to power and beat back our fear. By extending the pitch of 
consciousness and human possibility. (M, 200).
Yet he never does say this to George Haddad, and it is just this failure 
we equate with his willingness to drift toward his own destruction as he 
wanders into the terrorists’ plot.
The terrorist plot in which Bill Gray becomes entangled differs little 
from the accidents and contingencies of an alienating world, which he 
cannot control, insofar as both Fate and Chance teach us the same les-
son: we no longer have any effective agency. The traditional novelist, no 
matter how great his craft or genius, is no longer capable of represent-
ing those forces that secretly govern ordinary experience. When an old 
man with the cleaning crew finds Bill Gray’s body “lying in the bunk” of 
the ferry, he takes only Gray’s “passport and other forms of identification, 
anything with a name and a number, which he could sell to some militia 
in Beirut” (M, 216–217).
Bill Gray never reaches Beirut, even though the anarchy of its civil war 
is for DeLillo a metaphor for postmodern conditions. In the novel, many 
scenes in New York explicitly foreshadow Beirut, especially DeLillo’s 
treatment of New York City’s homeless as equivalent to people displaced 
by civil war, terrorism, and anarchy. Thus the novel’s concluding section, 
“In Beirut”, can easily be read as a pessimistic epilogue, in which the pho-
tojournalist Brita Nilsson reappears to confirm another often repeated 
sentence in the novel: “Our only language is Beirut” (M, 239). Arriving 
one year after Bill’s death and “on assignment for a German magazine 
[…] to photograph” Abu Rashid, she has abandoned her avant-garde 
project of photographing literary authors, like Bill Gray, and returned to 
the photojournalism she had given up in the opening pages of the novel, 
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because as she puts it, “‘No matter what I shot, how much horror, real-
ity, misery, ruined bodies, bloody faces, it was all so fucking pretty in the 
end’” (M, 229, 235, 24–25).
Is there a way to overcome such aestheticism and its ideology? In the 
novel, Brita’s actions in Beirut have contrary meanings and the reader is 
left with the radical ambiguity DeLillo often employs to force us to com-
municate again and overcome our postmodern thralldom. On the one 
hand, Bill Gray’s death on the ferry to Lebanon and Brita’s reappearance 
with her cameras and assignments seem to suggest the triumph of com-
modity and celebrity culture. DeLillo’s account of why Brita decided not 
to “photograph writers anymore” and return to photojournalism seems 
characterized by her resignation to contemporary conditions: “She takes 
assignments now, does the interesting things, barely watched wars, chil-
dren running in the dust. Writers stopped one day. She doesn’t know how 
it happened but they came to a quiet end. They stopped being the proj-
ect she would follow forever” (M, 229–230). Immediately following this 
passage, Brita notices “signs for a new soft drink, Coke II,[…] slapped 
on cement-block walls” and “has the crazy idea that these advertising 
placards herald the presence of the Maoist group” (M, 230). Like Oedipa 
Maas in Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49, Brita begins to see coin-
cidences and signs everywhere, driving the characteristic paranoia of the 
postmodern subject.
Mao II and Coke II are quite rationally related, even if the corporate 
giant in Atlanta would disavow any ties to terrorist groups or militias 
in the Beirut civil war. In the ongoing “war on terrorism”, declared by 
President George W. Bush and continued by President Barack Obama, 
many critics have suggested we have not yet begun to target the transna-
tional corporations whose exploitation of third-world labor and natural 
resources, manipulation of governments for “favorable” treatment, and 
aggressive global marketing of products are perceived by many of their 
subaltern victims as terrorist acts. In DeLillo’s response to September 11, 
2001, he suggests that what “changed” on that day was the unequivocal 
identification of such corporate and technological terror with America: 
“The terrorists who attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center 
were not chanting ‘Death to Microsoft.’ It is America that drew their fury. 
It is the high gloss of our modernity. It is the thrust of our technology. It 
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is our perceived godlessness. It is the blunt force of our foreign policy. 
It is the power of American culture to penetrate every wall, home, life 
and mind”.217 Whereas “protesters in Genoa, Prague, Seattle and other 
cities want to slow down the global momentum that seemed to be driv-
ing unmindfully toward a landscape of consumer-robots and social in-
stability”, the “terrorists of S/11 want to bring back the past” by naming 
and thereby targeting transnational capitalism “America” (Ruins 35). Of 
course, insofar as the United States, with its vaunted commitments to de-
mocracy and justice for all, has failed to challenge in the name of human 
rights such globalization, then “America” may well have earned the target 
it now wears.
In another sense, Brita Nilsson repudiates the technological sublime 
today exemplified by American foreign and economic policies, albeit 
endorsed by other first-world nations. Ryan Simmons argues that the 
character of Karen Janney, the young woman who works for Bill Gray, 
offers the best alternative to Bill Gray’s outmoded aesthetic, but Sim-
mons points out in a footnote that “the photographer, Brita Nilsson, 
might also be said to fit” his characterization of Karen as better adapted 
to the postmodern world than Bill Gray: “Karen and the crowds she sees 
on the streets or on television are all part of a larger system which con-
nects them but which is also limited—which cannot provide the depth of 
connection that she or Bill or anyone else might want it to. She is not an 
‘author’ as Bill would define one because she does not try to control nar-
rative” (Simmons 694n1, 684).
Simmons does not develop this aspect of Brita Nilsson, preferring to 
stress Karen Janney as DeLillo’s alternative to Bill Gray. DeLillo works 
out technically effective parallels between Brita’s photographic session 
with Bill Gray at the beginning of the novel and her encounter with Abu 
Rashid at the end of the novel. For example, Brita communicates with 
Abu Rashid through an interpreter, even though Abu Rashid speaks 
English directly to her as the interpreter “interprets” Rashid’s meaning, 
often in bizarre ways. In her earlier photographic session with Bill Gray, 
his assistant Scott also “interprets”, often concluding sentences with the 
refrain “quoting Bill”. Gray’s assistant, Karen Janney, leaves her position 
to surrender her identity to the Moonies early in the novel. In an anal-
ogous sense, the hooded young man who guards the door during Abu 
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Rashid’s interview with Brita represents all the “children” who have dedi-
cated their lives to Abu Rashid: “‘The boys who work near Abu Rashid 
have no face or speech. Their features are identical. They are his features. 
They don’t need their own features or voices. They are surrendering these 
things to something powerful and great’” (M, 234). Abu Rashid tells Bri-
ta that the young man is “‘my son. Rashid. […]. I call myself father of 
Rashid’” (M, 234).
Abu Rashid’s conversation with Brita recalls George Haddad’s talk 
with Bill Gray in Athens as the writer prepares to seek out the terror-
ists. The difference is that Brita resists Abu Rashid’s “eloquent macho 
bullshit”, especially his adulation of Mao’s leadership (M, 236). In the 
novel, Brita “says nothing because what can she say”, but she swerves sud-
denly from her assignment to photograph Abu Rashid and “walks over to 
the boy at the door and removes his hood. Lifts it off his head and drops 
it on the floor. Doesn’t lift it very gently either. She is smiling all the time. 
And takes two steps back and snaps his picture” (M, 236). The “boy hits 
her hard in the forearm and reaches in for the camera” as “she throws 
an elbow that misses and then slaps him across the face” (M, 237). Un-
like the resigned, determined, and finally dead novelist, Bill Gray, Brita 
acts: “Feeling detached, almost out-of-body, she walks over to Rashid 
and shakes his hand, actually introduces herself, pronouncing her name 
slowly” (M, 237).
The photojournalist need not, then, merely render “pretty” by explain-
ing and ordering the ugliness of social injustice in our contemporary 
world. She can expose the identities hidden behind totalitarianisms of all 
sorts, including those that work through our own psychologies as desires 
to escape the problems of this world. Brita affirms her own identity in the 
small but significant gesture of herself looking at the faces of the terror-
ists. She looks with her camera, because DeLillo knows we cannot escape 
the media through which we understand, however corrupted they may 
be. And we look through DeLillo’s novel, which refuses to render “pretty” 
what we see: our own responsibility for “global” problems, whether we 
name them “transnational capitalism”, “American imperialism”, or “inter-
national terrorism”.
Abu Rashid several times commands Brita, “‘Don’t bring your prob-
lems to Beirut,’” but DeLillo invites us to bring all of our problems to the 
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novel. In his essay about 9/11, DeLillo notes that the terrorism that day 
ended conclusively the Cold War narrative, which “ends in the rubble and 
it is left to us to create the counter-narrative” (Ruins 35). Brita’s symbol-
ic actions at the end of the novel point toward such a counter-narrative, 
which in his essay DeLillo connects with the “hundred thousand stories 
crisscrossing New York, Washington and the world” in the aftermath of 
the terrorists’ acts. Interestingly, these stories, including the photographs 
of the missing and dead posted on buildings and in shop-windows near 
Ground Zero in New York, have entered formally into the public sphere 
through the publication of survivors’ accounts, the victims’ autobiogra-
phies, and countless documentaries and docudramas of varying kind and 
quality: “There are the doctors’ appointments that saved lives, the cell 
phones that were used to report the hijackings. Stories generating others 
and people running north out of the rumbling smoke and ash. […]. Peo-
ple running for their lives are part of the story that is left to us” (Ruins 6).
In the novel, some of this storytelling is economically represented in 
the Beirut wedding Brita witnesses from her balcony in the early morning 
following her interview with Abu Rashid. The wedding party is preceded 
by a tank and “followed by a jeep with a recoilless rifle mounted at the 
rear” (M, 240). Whether the revelers are simply caught in a military ac-
tion or being protected by some militia we never know, but what is clear 
is that we are meant to draw hope from an unquestionably ironic scene: 
“The bride and groom carry champagne glasses and some of the girls hold 
sparklers that send off showers of excited light. A guest in a pastel tuxedo 
smokes a long cigar and does a dance around a shell hole, delighting the 
kids. The bride’s gown is beautiful, with lacy appliqué at the bodice, and 
she looks surpassingly alive, they all look transcendent, free of limits and 
unsurprised to be here” (M, 240). Brita needs no interpreters to toast 
the newlyweds from her balcony in a smattering of different languages: 
“‘Bonne chance’ and ‘Bonheur’ and ‘Good luck’ and ‘Salám’ and ‘Skål,’ 
and the gun turret begins to rotate and the cannon eases slowly around 
like a smutty honeymoon joke and everyone is laughing” (M, 240).
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Literature after 9/11: Falling Man (2007)
Sixteen years after Bill Gray in Mao II wanders from his aesthetic seclu-
sion in Connecticut to New York City, London, Athens, Cyprus, and 
then dies in his bunk on the ferry to Beirut, Keith Neudecker in Falling 
Man stumbles blindly out of his collapsing office in the World Trade Cen-
ter back into his dysfunctional family life, an aimless affair with another 
9/11 survivor, and then into the bathos of international poker competi-
tions. Initially sympathetic characters, versions of a waning humanism, 
Gray and Neudecker degenerate into specters of their terrorist antago-
nists: aimless, stateless, socially determined beings following others’ or-
ders. Sixteen years later, reeling from four years of the U.S. military in-
vasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing civil and anti-colonial wars in 
both regions, and a succession of post-9/11 terrorist acts around the 
globe, U.S. readers have forgotten the cheerful irony of Brita on that bal-
cony in Beirut.
Brita challenges Abu Rashid, unmasks and photographs his face-
less “children”, introduces herself, asserts her femininity by slapping the 
“childish” guard, and reaffirms the possibility of subjectivity, even in the 
differently mediated, postmodern conditions she comprehends in Mao 
II. In 1991, DeLillo still thinks it is possible for Western liberal subjec-
tivity to “survive”. The wedding party Brita toasts must be Christian, of 
course, because they are drinking Champagne, so the Druse Christians 
DeLillo uses at the end of Mao II anticipate his more sustained reversion 
to Western concepts, including Christianity, in Falling Man. Both Gray 
and Neudecker are far more existentialist than their terrorist Doppel-
gänger; each meditates on the randomness that terrorism both exposes 
and exploits. However goal-oriented Abu Rashid and Mohamed Atta, 
the historical al-Qaeda terrorist fictionalized in Falling Man, may be in 
the cause of radical Islam, DeLillo makes clear that both serve the much 
higher purpose of metaphysical contingency. Against his best intentions, 
DeLillo ends up contributing to the cultural colonialism whereby global 
terrorism is internalized and accommodated. Falling Man is a classic in-
stance of the famous Pogo aphorism: “We have met the enemy, and he 
is us!”218 On the one hand, such a recognition offers the possibility of 
engaging the issues that global “terrorists” insist we repress unless they 
are brought violently home to us. On the other hand, DeLillo may be of-
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fering us yet another “misrecognition”, in which all we see are reflections 
of ourselves, rendering the non-Western subject as invisible. Just how we 
sort out these cultural representations of the other remains crucial work 
for the cultural critic and the primary task of cultural politics.
In Falling Man, Atta is clearly identified in the novel by DeLillo by his 
given name “Amir”—“Amir spoke in his face. His full name was Mohamed 
Mohamed el-Amir el-Sayed Atta”.219 Yet despite his effort to personalize 
the best-known of the 9/11 hijackers with this “given” name, DeLillo rep-
resents al-Qaeda primarily through the character, Hammad, not Moham-
med Atta. An Iraqi veteran of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), “a baker, 
here in Hamburg maybe ten years”, who “prayed in the same mosque” 
as Hammad, tells him his war stories, especially about the boys the Ira-
nians sent in waves of assault on the contested borderland between Iraq 
and Iran (FM, 77). The nameless baker concludes that “Most countries 
are run by madmen”, and as Hammad listens distractedly “was grateful to 
the man” (78). Hammad’s attention is not on macropolitical issues but 
women and sex—“he kept thinking that another woman would come 
by on a bike, someone to look at, hair wet, legs pumping” (78), even 
though he knows he must suppress such desires, especially for German 
women. When he does satisfy his sexual desires, he does so with a Syrian 
immigrant to Germany, but even that relationship seems foreign to him. 
Hammad’s gratitude to the baker seems less for the specific lessons to be 
learned from the futile Iran-Iraq War and more from the bare human con-
tact such conversation provides.
DeLillo’s analyses of al-Qaeda’s motives and the personal and social 
psychologies of the terrorists are brief, scattered through the novel in two 
chapters (“On Marienstrasse”, 77–83; “In Nokomis”, 171–178) and a 
portion of the concluding chapter “In the Hudson Corridor” (237–243), 
in which the actual impact of Hammad’s flight on the World Trade Center 
is represented. DeLillo is careful, however, to make sure each of the three 
parts of the novel—1. Bill Lawton, 2. Ernst Hechinger, 3. David Janiak—
includes some part of the terrorists’ story. Even so, less than twenty pages 
of a 246-page novel deal with al-Qaeda, most of them focusing on Ham-
mad’s distraction and confusion, torn between basic human desires for 
social and sexual contact and the false society of al-Qaeda. DeLillo seems 
to stress Hammad’s ordinariness, his lack of intellectual sophistication, 
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both as part of his common humanity and his willingness to be recruited. 
When Hammad asks Amir Atta about “the others, those who will die?” 
he is told: “[T]here are no others. The others exist only to the degree that 
they fill the role we have designed for them. This is their function as oth-
ers. Those who will die have no claim to their lives outside the useful fact 
of their dying”. DeLillo can only conclude: “Hammad was impressed by 
this. It sounded like philosophy.” (FM, 176)
DeLillo trivializes the terrorists by minimizing the attention he pays to 
them in the novel, reinforcing his arguments in Underworld (1997) and 
Cosmopolis (2003) that first-world, hypercapitalist nations, especially 
the U.S., have created their own antagonists in al-Qaeda and any other 
“terror” (domestic or foreign) we might experience in our postmodern 
condition. The currency trader in Cosmopolis smugly watches on televi-
sion the Seattle demonstrators opposing the global economic policies of 
the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund as they 
chant, “A specter is haunting the world…”220 For the currency speculator, 
the symbolic action of the demonstrators is pure theater, mere entertain-
ment, not a symptom of the impending collapse of global credit markets, 
admittedly historically ahead of any of these novels and yet systemically 
predictable, given the conditions of vastly growing disparities in wealth 
and poverty dividing individuals, institutions, and nations. Unintention-
ally recalling Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx (1993), DeLillo approxi-
mates its argument: we need a new intellectual-activist paradigm and a 
new international to overcome the failures of Marxism and the impend-
ing collapse of global capitalism. There is no difference between the 
home-grown American assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, and the imported 
terrorists of al-Qaeda: terror is the inevitable by-product of a system 
built upon unstable master-servant relations that inevitably prompt the 
servant’s rebellion. Keith Neudecker’s son, Justin, hearing the endlessly 
repeated news stories about Osama bin Laden begins looking for “Bill 
Lawton”, the homophonic resemblances between the Arabic and Anglo-
American name at first lost on his family.
“There is no purpose, this is the purpose” are Atta’s words, and they 
echo in Hammad’s head throughout his brief appearances in the novel, 
but they also function as a sort of horrible leitfmotif in the same way “The 
future belongs to crowds” organizes Mao II (FM, 177). Once the veneer 
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of social organization and the symbolic structures of affiliation—fam-
ily, neighborhood, religion, nation, et al..—collapse, then each of us is 
exposed to what Giorgio Agamben has termed “bare life”, a condition 
that can be simulated by totalitarian regimes but is also the fundamental 
condition to which we respond in our efforts to “be human”. Of course, 
the application of Agamben’s term “bare life” to the characters in DeL-
illo’s novel seems at first immoral, insofar as Agamben uses the phrase 
to represent how the Nazis reduced their victims to the most minimal 
existences to justify their extermination. Atta’s contention that the “oth-
ers” exist only for al-Qaeda’s purposes recalls Nazi rationalizations of 
their genocide.
Agamben develops the concept of “bare life” in part out of Hannah Ar-
endt’s notion in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) of the “naked life” 
experienced by refugees of all sorts displaced by World War II.221 Even 
before we witness Keith Neudecker escape the World Trade Center after 
the 9/11 attacks, we know him to be a “refugee”, deeply traumatized and 
displaced, incapable of dealing with his family life and work, finally driven 
relentlessly by forces he does not understand to the triviality of competi-
tive poker. Drifting from pre-9/11 poker games with friends as a mere 
social pastime to the gambling parlors of Atlantic City and Northeastern 
Indian casinos after 9/11, finally pursuing competitive poker as his vo-
cation in Las Vegas, “Neudecker” does indeed get a “new deck” or “new 
cover” that actually exposes to the reader the randomness of everyday 
life. The existentialist as fundamentally alienated can thus connect with 
other “refugees”, such as the African American woman Keith meets when 
he identifies her name inside a briefcase he has carried out of the Tower.
The brief affair between Florence Givens and Keith Neudecker is pos-
sible only because of their shared bond of post-traumatic stress:
She talked about the tower, going over it again, claustrophobi-
cally, the smoke, the fold of bodies, and he understood that 
they could talk about these things only with each other, in 
minute and dullest detail, but it would never be dull or too de-
tailed because it was inside them now and because he needed 
to hear what he’d lost in the tracings of memory. (FM, 90–91)
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Florence is described as a “light-skinned black woman”, whose “odd 
embodying of doubtful language and unwavering race” suggest a com-
munity outside Neudecker’s society, even though she lives just across 
Central Park (admittedly a proximity that also suggests class distinctions 
of the East and West sides of New York). DeLillo just barely eroticizes her 
ethnic identity, albeit strictly through Neudecker’s perspective: “[W]hen 
she laughed there was a flare in nature, an unfolding of something half 
hidden and dazzling” (92). And she is predictably in tune with the Bra-
zilian music she plays on her CD player for him, “clapping her hands to 
the music” and finally dancing “arms up and away from her body, nearly 
trancelike, […] facing him now, mouth open, eyes coming open” until 
Neudecker “began to crawl out of his clothes” (92–93).
“‘I’ve never been to Brazil,’” Florence admits, but it is her racial identity 
in the novel that permits her to respond, however awkwardly, to music 
that finally moves Neudecker out of his middle-class propriety. The mu-
sic (and thus this possible contact between the two characters) was what 
was inside the briefcase Neudecker returns to Florence: “’This is the disc 
that was in the player that you carried out of there,’” she tells him (93). 
Three pages from the end of the novel, as Neudecker makes his way down 
the stairways of the Tower, an “old man, smallish, sitting, […] resting”, 
hands him the briefcase, explaining, “‘I don’t know what I’m supposed to 
do with this. She fell and left it’” (244). Parodying some classic detective 
plot, DeLillo gives us the “treasure” inside that briefcase as the Brazilian 
rhythms of Samba or some hybrid musical form, intended to liberate us 
from the confines of capitalism, print-knowledge, Western Civilization: 
“He heard the music change to something that had a buzz and drive, 
voices in Portuguese rapping, singing, whistling, with guitars and drums 
behind them, manic saxophones” (92). Neudecker, the real estate invest-
ment banker—“‘[s]mall outfit called Royer Properties […]. We were 
Royer and Stans. Then Stans got indicted’” (53)—can only respond pro-
fessionally: “‘I’m talking to somebody. Very early in the talks. About a job 
involving Brazilian investors. I may need some Portuguese’” (93).
Like the white man drumming his fingers methodically on the juke 
joint’s table in Zora Neale Hurston’s “How It Feels to Be Colored Me” 
(1928), Neudecker never really makes contact with Florence, even if they 
do have a brief sexual relationship. “Music. The great blobs of purple and 
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red emotion have not touched him”, Hurston writes, “He has only heard 
what I felt […]. He is so pale with his whiteness then and I am so col-
ored”.222 But DeLillo does not draw this conclusion, even if he gestures in 
the direction of Keith’s and Florence’s cultural, ethnic, and class differenc-
es, overlooked briefly as a consequence of a shared, but passing post-trau-
matic stress. Their undeveloped interlude is strange indeed in the novel, 
because it is one of the very few times characters in the novel actually 
cross the boundaries of their small worlds, apart from the framing act of 
al-Qaeda’s attack, in itself a fundamental transgression of realms. At some 
level, DeLillo suggests that these personal failures—Keith’s inability to 
hear the Brazilian rhythms Florence so clearly feels—are symptomatic of 
our national problem and explain in part our susceptibility to terror.
The other instances of transgression in the novel are either fantastic, 
trivial, or merely reinstate the boundaries they threaten. Hammad longs 
for the German women cycling in the street, but then sleeps with a Syrian 
woman. Lianne angrily tells her neighbor, Elena, to turn down the Ara-
bic sounding music—“women in soft chorus, singing in Arabic” (119)—
shortly after 9/11, complaining, “‘The whole city is ultrasensitive right 
now. Where have you been hiding?’” (FM, 120). Lianne’s mother, Nina, 
has a twenty-year long relationship with a mysterious German art-dealer, 
Martin Ridnour, aka Ernst Hechinger, who is rumored to have been as-
sociated with Kommune 1 in Berlin and the Red Brigades in Italy (146). 
Linda Kauffman has argued convincingly that Falling Man draws on De-
Lillo’s nonfictional prose, both before and after 9/11, to comment on 
the relationship between 1960s radical protest movements in Europe 
and the U.S. to contemporary global terrorist movements.223 Like Anto-
nio Negri, convicted in absentia for his role in the Italian Red Brigades’ 
kidnapping and murder of Christian Democratic Prime Minister Aldo 
Moro, Ridnour/Hechinger represents the intersection of radical politics 
and culture.
DeLillo explicitly identifies Ridnour/Hechinger with “Kommune 1”, 
not Baader-Meinhof, although Nina also suggests “he was in Italy for 
a while, in the turmoil, when the Red Brigades were active. But I don’t 
know” (146). Kommune 1, or “K 1”, was a short-lived political commune 
founded in Berlin in 1967 by a group of radicals led by Dieter Kunzel-
mann, Rudi Dutschke, Bernd Rabehl, and including Hans Magnus En-
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zensberger’s ex-wife, Dagrun, and his brother, Ulrich. By 1969, this 
anti-government student activist group had fallen apart, but in its hey-
day was known for planning and occasionally carrying out Dadaist style 
“performance” acts of social satire. Such acts included the planned “Pud-
ding Assassination” of Vice President Hubert Humphrey during his visit 
to Berlin in April 1967—so-called because one plan called for attacking 
him with pudding, yogurt, and flour—and the famous K 1 photograph 
of communards’ buttocks posed against a wall with the headline: “Das 
Private ist politisch!” (“The personal is political!”). The symbolic actions 
of Kommune 1 were usually linked to specific political acts, such as their 
demonstration against the Shah of Iran’s visit to Berlin on June 2, 1967, 
but they were often criticized by German left-activists as more interested 
in publicity than in political change.
Kommune 1 nevertheless comes close to DeLillo’s earlier versions of 
the radical artist, and their leaders were headlined as “Eleven Little Os-
walds” in Die Zeit’s coverage of the abortive “Pudding Assassination” 
plot. Thanks to their members’ connections with well-known German 
writers, Kommune 1 members lived for a time in Hans Magnus Enzens-
berger’s Berlin apartment and later in Uwe Johnson’s studio apartment 
until Johnson, abroad in the U.S., grew alarmed at the negative public-
ity Kommune 1 had attracted and asked his neighbor, Günter Grass, to 
have them evicted. Whereas the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader-
Meinhof in Germany really did commit urban terrorist acts with lasting 
consequences, Kommune 1 worked primarily through symbolic actions. 
However different these political activist groups are, they still have in 
common their origins in 1960s European left politics and their associa-
tions with the 1960s Left in the U.S.
DeLillo includes very few political debates in the novel and all of them 
take place among the scholars and artists surrounding Lianne’s mother, 
Nina, the distinguished Professor of Art History, and her lover, Martin/
Ernst, the cosmopolitan art-dealer and former radical. At the lunch fol-
lowing the memorial service for Nina, Martin announces “the thought 
[…] of American irrelevance”, of “the day [that] is coming when nobody 
has to think about America except for the danger it brings”, that “Amer-
ica is losing the center” (191). Martin’s different thoughts are in fact the 
same for DeLillo: irrelevance equals marginal; marginal equals danger-
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ous. These equivalences suggest the ultimate one: America = terrorism. 
This conclusion, of course, comes predictably from the suspected 1960s’ 
radical, Ernst Hechinger (aka Martin Ridnour), pontificating on a sub-
ject we are led to believe he knows too well.
But what, then, should we conclude about the brief, undeveloped re-
lationship between Florence Givens and Keith Neudecker, whose Ger-
man surname adds to his vague family relationship to Ernst Hechinger 
through Keith’s mother-in-law, Nina? Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
conclude Empire (2000) with a final section, “The Multitude against Em-
pire”, in which they predict an emerging coalition of oppressed peoples 
rising against the EuroAmerican Empire that has caused so much human 
misery in the names of modernization, progress, freedom, and selfhood 
in the previous 500 years.224 If it does arrive, Hardt and Negri argue, it 
will not come from within the system of EuroAmerican hegemony and 
privilege. “What comes after America?” Martin asks Nina’s mourning 
friends and her daughter, but he has no more idea what to do with this 
knowledge than did the historical members of Kommune 1 (192). Li-
anne understands the problem: “Maybe he was a terrorist but he was one 
of ours, she thought, and the thought chilled her, shamed her—one of 
ours, which meant godless, Western, white” (195).
Why, then, does DeLillo so marginalize his other characters, his char-
acters of otherness, ranging from the ordinary but nonetheless ethnically 
specific Florence to Hammad and Amir Atta, the terrorists? Florence Giv-
ens’ surname suggests the various gifts with which she is associated, rang-
ing from the suitcase (with its CD player and its Brazilian music) to the 
human contact she gives Keith, perhaps hinting at a new “gift economy” 
of human relations, rather than social relations based on property and 
commodities. Yet DeLillo, like Keith, seems merely to entertain her as an 
impossible alternative, a means to non-Western knowledge she implies 
in her yearning, albeit clumsy, dance to those Brazilian rhythms. Keith 
Neudecker’s response is finally trivial, personal: he will confess his affair 
to his estranged wife, Lianne, and she will “get a kitchen knife and kill 
me”. Trivializing any revolution from within the first-world system, De-
Lillo refuses to explore the possibility of any transvaluation from outside, 
apart from the dogmatism of the terrorists, represented as the nearly per-
fect opposite, the inevitable product, of Western ambiguity and doubt.
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In his representation of a specific terrorist, DeLillo gives some human 
definition to Hammad only to westernize him, a strategy reinforced by 
the fact that Hammad is fictional, whereas the historical Amir Moham-
med Atta is dogmatic and totalitarian. Hammad stumbles along in Ham-
burg, Afghanistan, Nokomis (Florida), even on board the jetliner hur-
tling down the Hudson Corridor toward the North Tower of the World 
Trade Center. He has his doubts about the use of children in the Iran-
Iraq War, the promise of salvation to all martyrs in the jihad against the 
West, the prohibition against sex for the terrorists, even the demand that 
Muslim men grow beards. Critical of most of these lessons, he nonethe-
less accepts the basic premises: that the West is making war on Islam and 
that a blow against Western dominance shows “how a great power can be 
vulnerable. A power that interferes, that occupies” (46). And yet those 
final words are spoken by Martin/Ernst, the descendant of the 1960s Eu-
roAmerican left, not by Islamic fundamentalists or such groups as Hez-
bollah and Hamas, who repeatedly condemn EuroAmerican support of 
what they consider Israeli imperialism in the Middle East.
DeLillo understands fully how the existentialist aura of modernity, in 
which he and I were both educated, does not adequately motivate the 
social bond. To argue as philosophical existentialism did that the funda-
mental absurdity of our existence as humans, our insurmountable alien-
ation from the external world, is what calls us together and thus should 
motivate us passionately to create human habitation and social institu-
tions, is too abstract and paradoxical to motivate the ordinary person. 
DeLillo cannot transcend his earlier education, and he still believes in 
the fundamental abyss, the randomness of existence that the mind trans-
forms into patterns, plots, characters, destinies, and empires. Behind the 
dogma of Amir Atta lies the skepticism of Hammad, so that even the ji-
hadists will be tricked into nothingness in the end. But DeLillo no lon-
ger believes that this universal truth of human contingency can motivate 
anything beyond the ceaseless history of a will-to-power that thrives on 
warfare and the production of subalterns who deserve our domination 
(whoever “we” may be in the particular historical moment).
Lianne “loved Kierkegaard in his antiqueness, in the glaring drama of 
the translation she owned, an old anthology of brittle pages with ruled 
underlinings in red ink […].He made her feel that her thrust into the 
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world was not the slender melodrama she sometimes thought it was” 
(118). But Lianne’s life is “a slender melodrama”, only expanded into 
significance by the suffering of untold others, victims of foreign poli-
cies, wars, economic cheats, whereby Lianne lives in relative comfort and 
Hammad remembers nothing but crowding, narrow rooms filled with 
other lodgers, and ceaseless displacement. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghani-
stan, Hamburg, Florida, New York, the Hudson Corridor—Hammad 
is always in some foreign place, experiencing to be sure the fundamen-
tal estrangement of DeLillo’s and modernity’s existentialist thesis. Are 
we all strangers? Yes and no; Hammad more than Lianne. Does Lianne 
recognize this impasse when she turns oddly, unpredictably, casually to 
religion in chapter 14, just a few pages before Hammad and Atta begin 
their fateful flight toward the North Tower? “She wanted to disbelieve”, 
perhaps because her father, Jack, a suicide, believed so passionately and 
contradictorily “that God infused time and space with pure being, made 
stars give light”, as if this gave purpose to his own career as “an architect, 
an artist”, someone in the business of producing order (232).
But it is not the “will to disbelieve” that motivates her; instead, Lianne 
turns to Catholicism, as if in direct reply to the passionate will to believe 
DeLillo attributes to Atta: “Others were reading the Koran, she was going 
to church. […]. She followed others when they stood and knelt and she 
watched the priest celebrate the mass, bread and wine, body and blood. 
She didn’t believe this, the transubstantiation, but believed something, 
half fearing it would take her over” (233). Lianne’s religious conversion is 
still some version of Christian existentialism, a lingering trace of the an-
tiquated Kierkegaard she loved in college and before 9/11, but it is none-
theless Catholicism, especially when it says: “God is the voice that says, ‘I 
am not here’” (236). Although Lianne waffles between several versions of 
Christianity in a few pages, her conversion does enable her “to be alone, 
in reliable calm, she and the kid”, apart from Keith, who has chosen the 
radical contingency of hyper-capitalism (236).
Displaced from the North Tower to Florence’s apartment “across the 
Park” to the Sport and Gambling clubs of Atlantic City, then finally to 
Las Vegas, where he “works” fitfully as a competitive, compulsive poker 
player, Keith Neudecker acts out hyper-capitalism’s response to the ex-
istentialist predicament. If it is all a lie, merely a passing game, then we 
204
can only expose the fiction by ceaselessly demonstrating it, always living 
on the edge, facing every day the sheer contingency thinly veiled in the 
“risks” of the stock, credit, and currency markets of the Wall Street world 
where Keith once felt secure. Almost forty years ago, Robert Venturi, De-
nise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour’s Learning from Las Vegas (1972) 
appeared as a postmodern manifesto, even if its title underscores the iro-
ny that serious architecture and urban planning should follow the lead of 
Las Vegas’ kitsch.225 DeLillo’s conclusion in Falling Man is that Las Vegas 
has only led us to the bathos of capitalism, the absolute point of contra-
diction when the system can no longer hold, and he turns Las Vegas into 
the capital of America’s “own shit” (191), recalling the main argument of 
Underworld (1997).226
The dilemma staged in DeLillo’s Falling Man is exemplified in the 
eponymous act of David Janiak, whose repeated enactment of “falling” 
reminds New Yorkers of the pathos of the American “fall”. Of course, 
what he stages is literally a “memento mori”, that old poetic trope, of the 
several victims of 9/11 who chose to throw themselves from the top of 
the towers, rather than be incinerated or asphyxiated within. Much has 
been written about these “falling” people, whose peculiar positions were 
primarily the consequence of the basic physics involved, rather than any 
final gesture in response to the horrifying events of 9/11. Lianne witness-
es one of Janiak’s performances when she picks up Justin at school and 
chances on Janiak “falling” from an elevated subway platform visible from 
the schoolyard. Years later, she comes across his obituary, then searches 
his history on the web. A trained actor with “a heart ailment and high 
blood pressure” (230), he is found dead at 39 years old in Saginaw Coun-
ty, Michigan, “more than five hundred miles from the site of the World 
Trade Center” (223), perhaps preparing to perform his “last jump” with-
out a harness.
The performance art DeLillo stages in the novel invokes the rich his-
tory of street performance in New York City and recalls the specific act 
of the French aerialist, Philippe Petit, who on August 7, 1974 defied se-
curity at the World Trade Center, still under construction, to stretch a 
cable between the towers and tight-rope walk between them. Celebrat-
ed and criticized in James Marsh’s recent documentary, Man on Wire 
(2008), in which no reference to 9/11 is made, Petit anticipates DeLillo’s 
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Janiak, just as Marsh’s documentary offers an unwitting commentary on 
DeLillo’s mysterious figure. Both call attention to the human being in 
the overwhelming scale of late-modern urban space; both depend upon 
the World Trade Center as a symbol of modernist dehumanization, pit-
ting either Petit’s daring or Janiak’s victimized human form against such 
a cityscape.
Yet even as news photographs of Petit’s daring act circled the globe and 
Janiak leaves New York City, presumably to spread his own news to the 
Midwest and across America, both figures occlude the events of 9/11. 
Americans did not attack themselves on September 11, even if DeLillo 
argues convincingly that Americans contributed to the global conditions 
that have prompted the rise of numerous anti-imperialist, non-state affili-
ated, politically radical groups at war with first-world nations and global 
financial powers since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Understand-
ing “our fall” as a powerful nation, which has abused its moral and po-
litical authority in that same historical period, is certainly an important 
task. Falling Man contributes to this ongoing analysis by left intellectu-
als around the globe by detailing the instability of the values on which 
the U.S. has based that moral authority: religious tolerance, the nuclear 
family, intellectual and cultural criticism of the state, equal opportunity, 
anti-imperialism, and universal human rights. Janiak “falls” in the novel 
to demonstrate our failings in each of these areas. Islamic terrorism drives 
Lianne to Catholicism. Lianne and Keith’s shaky marriage only briefly re-
covers after his escape from the North Tower; as he struggles with post-
traumatic stress, the marriage totters and falls again. Nina and Martin/
Ernst’s artistic circle typifies the “radical chic” that no longer has any trac-
tion in global politics. Neither Kommune 1’s pranks nor serious art can 
change the system from within. The white walls of the art-dealer Mar-
tin Ridnour’s apartment suggest not only his impermanence but also the 
erasure of aesthetic and intellectual critique. Postmodern intellectuals 
and artists have been contained by a pervasive U.S. anti-intellectualism, 
as well as by their own complicity in the global class/caste system. Like 
those elegant Giorgio Morandi paintings that hang in Nina’s apartment in 
which slender bottles and spare boxes barely appear against white back-
grounds, contemporary art criticizes late capitalism merely by stressing 
our impoverishment and commodification. In Morandi’s paintings, we 
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are those bottles and boxes, still-lives without natural referents, distilled 
into useless, expensive objects in a shop window.
But none of this explains Atta and al-Qaeda. Hammad’s westernized 
desires and confused soul do not adequately represent the rage or the 
violence directed against the U.S. by groups and individuals who are will-
ing to die for the barest chance to “speak out” against first-world arro-
gance. The ten rural peasant youth who carried out the attack on Mumbai 
between November 26 and 29, 2008, paused in the lobby of Taj Mahal 
Hotel and Tower to wonder at the television screens, personal comput-
ers, and vast array of technological devices available to the hotel guests. 
Those young revolutionaries were witnessing a disparity of global wealth 
also evident in the social and economic inequities of rapidly modern-
izing Mumbai. Of course, the motives of their Pakistani-based militant 
organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba, are in part driven by religious differences 
between Muslims and Hindus in South Asia, but the attack also indicat-
ed how these local religious politics are now inflected with a deep anti-
Semitism that seems to bind together globally Islamic terrorist groups. 
The religious, political, economic, social, and personal cathexes of global 
terrorism cannot be represented adequately, much less successfully ana-
lyzed and criticized, entirely within the framework of EuroAmerican ide-
ologies. British imperialism in the Subcontinent, U.S. neo-imperialism 
around the world, and global capitalism of the first-world nations are all 
to blame for the production of terrorism, but terrorism is neither a uni-
fied global movement nor entirely the effect of these causes.
Written before 9/11 and published in the same year, Salman Rush-
die’s Fury (2001) does attempt to understand the psychology of the mi-
noritized non-European faced with first-world economic, political, and 
personal hegemony. Rushdie’s protagonist, Malik Solanka, is not a poor 
peasant from an undeveloped country but a Cambridge-educated Bom-
bay millionaire, whose invention of the doll, “Little Brain”, has brought 
him fortune and fame. Perhaps for all of these reasons, Solanka feels an 
overpowering “fury”, which he fears he will wreak violently on his own 
family, so he exiles himself from London to New York. Yet in New York 
City, he reads compulsively newspaper stories about a serial killer Solan-
ka fears may be himself, acting out his uncontrollable rage in some re-
pressed or somatic state.227
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Malik Solanka turns out not to be that psychopathic killer, but Rushdie 
makes clear that his character’s anger against the West is so real, so pal-
pable even to him, that it may erupt at any moment. When on November 
5, 2009, Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major serving as a psychiatrist 
at Fort Hood, Texas entered the Soldier Readiness Center, shouted “Al-
lahu Akbar!” and opened fire, wounding forty-three and killing thirteen 
people, his fury adds to that of the 9/11 terrorists and others, whether 
al-Qaeda inspired or not, bombing trains in Madrid and London, night-
clubs in Bali, foreign naval ships in Yemen, resorts in Egypt and Israel, as 
well as the countless foiled attempts to bomb public transport and spaces 
throughout the imperialist first-world. Was Major Hasan a “terrorist”? 
Did his cell-phone and email contacts with Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen 
prove that Hasan was part of this “global war”, or was he just another psy-
chopath, a “madman” ironically trained to treat others’ post-traumatic 
stress disorder?
Rushdie’s pre-9/11 attempt at a literary interpretation of the “con-
sciousness” of third-world fury by no means “covers” the issue, which to-
day is at the center of our global anarchy. John Updike’s Terrorist (2006) 
brilliantly captures the inner fury of Ahmad Ashmawy Mulloy, the eigh-
teen-year-old Northern New Jersey convert to Islam who was raised by 
an Irish-American mother abandoned by her Egyptian husband when 
Ahmad was three. Sentimental in its conclusion when Ahmad changes 
his mind while driving a truckload of explosives into the Lincoln Tunnel, 
Terrorist nevertheless is a valiant effort by a thoroughly bourgeois writer 
to employ the techniques of the novel to help American readers compre-
hend this otherworldly fury. It is not, then, the “failure” of the novel as a 
genre that makes it so difficult for us to “represent” terrorism and terror-
ists. Whatever its limitations, the novel can still help us think through an 
“other”, however fraught with problems of language, style, cultural and 
religious differences, and reader competency this process may be.
The fatal impasse in DeLillo’s Falling Man is not the fault of the liter-
ary genre, but DeLillo’s excessive reliance on the U.S. national form. 
Throughout his career, DeLillo has been one of our greatest critics of 
the limitations of thinking only from inside the U.S. I began this essay 
by arguing that DeLillo’s Lee Harvey Oswald cannot be understood in 
exclusively national terms. America “changed” the day Oswald assassi-
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nated John F. Kennedy, because from that moment on we could never 
again understand “America” apart from Mexico, Cuba, Japan, the Soviet 
Union. Should we ever have thought of “America” in a culturally isolation-
ist way? In recent years, American Studies has turned significantly to-
ward transnational and international work to demonstrate that “national” 
knowledge—the old “American Exceptionalism”—has blinded us to the 
historical and geopolitical scope of U.S. imperialism, its global deploy-
ment of domestic racial and ethnic and sexual stereotypes, class and re-
lated economic inequities, and its extension of slavery “by other means”.
Rushdie’s Malik Solanka in Fury is never tricked into believing that 
New York City is some cosmopolitan or multicultural utopia. Worse 
even than that old imperial metropole, London, New York City poses as 
egalitarian, inclusive, diverse, and functional, when in fact Solanka clearly 
sees it as a microcosm of the inequities, political barriers, and occupied 
territories that continue to enrage so many outside the “first world”. In 
“Edward Said and American Studies”, I argued that even Said, one of our 
most important postcolonial theorists, was himself lured by the cosmo-
politan promise of New York City. But Rushdie understands New York 
to be a thoroughly American metropolis, well before it was targeted as 
such by al-Qaeda. DeLillo’s Harper’s essay, “In the Ruins of the Future”, 
published in December 2001, only three months after 9/11, predicts ac-
curately what he would write in Falling Man: a searching criticism of our 
national failings without a complementary understanding of the global 
forces we have helped to produce and yet have exceeded our cultural, po-
litical, and military control. In this respect, both his nonfictional and fic-
tional responses to 9/11 contribute to, rather than challenge, what I have 
termed the “hypernationalism” whereby the U.S. state has attempted to 
incorporate and thereby domesticate global problems. That one of our 
most powerful social critics and insightful writers could be so captivated 
by the national form is another reason why we so desperately need ways 
of thinking beyond the nation to theorize anew the political, economic, 
and human relations of a genuinely global order of things.
The agenda for a progressive cultural politics, whether in the estab-
lished discipline of American Studies or such related fields as Ethnic, 
Postcolonial, Indigenous, and Cultural Studies, must be post-nationalist 
and offer models of social, political, and economic affiliation that exceed 
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the national form. The contact zones with other, non-U.S. communities 
need to be determined by scholars working together in a variety of fields, 
but for a cultural politics conceived in post-national terms we need a new 
comparatism that will go far beyond an older, Eurocentric “world litera-
ture” and consider the relations between exilic, dissident, and marginal-
ized writers and intellectuals within the U.S. and beyond its borders. By 
the same token, we cannot ignore the importance of studying the U.S. 
as a global power, especially as it exercises such power through cultural 
practices. It is no longer sufficient to criticize “American Exceptional-
ism” at home, but today we must also reveal how such Exceptionalism 
is exported and thereby works its way through many different local net-
works beyond our borders. How are U.S. films and literature received in 
Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Jerusalem, and Nicaragua? Which consumer goods, 
computer software, Internet content, and related “cultural work” are 
available in those nations with large U.S. military bases and balance-of-
trade imbalances? Demystification of U.S. power, especially in the guise 
of “freedom and opportunity”, remains a central task, even as we must 
learn more about those communities, states, and peoples most threat-
ened by U.S. global hegemony. As we have learned from the enormous 
immigrant populations displaced by the Vietnam War, our military, po-
litical, and economic powers of globalization often bring significant new 
populations to our nation, so that immigration and its cultural conse-
quences must be studied in conjunction with the cultural foreign policy 
I have proposed. The “American novel” can no longer be read in isolation 
or in terms solely of its representations of a national symbology that is 
impossible to think apart from its transnational, postnationalist circuits.
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